XHE INXIMAXE PAPERS O] COLONEL HOUSE VOLUME I COLONEL HOUSE ARRANGED AS A NARRATIVE BY CHARLES SEYMOUR PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT YALE UNIVERSITY VOLUME I BEHIND THE POLITICAL CURTAIN 1912-1915 House longed to get good accomplished and was content that others should have the credit/^ VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON ERNEST BENN LIMITED 8 BOUFERIE STREET LONDON E.C. First p^tblished McircH 5 ^^, Reprinted , « March, I*rtrt4ted 4snS Bdmd& in. Grea-t Mr%ia,in hy 'Wa.tson ^ Winey, Z^ndiyn atnd. A,y%&shM.Ty» xo SIDNEY EDWARD MEZES PREFATORY NOTE By Colonel House T his book written around my papers is in no sense a conventional apologia such as, despite my best intentions, I should probably have written had I attempted to describe the stirring and controversial events in which it was my fortime to play a part. The reader must bear in mind that it treats only of such matters as came within the orbit of my own activities. The President and his Cabinet dealt with many questions which could not enter into this narrative. My chief desire has been to let the papers tell their own story, and for this reason I have preferred to leave their arrangement in the hands of an historian. Dr. Seymour in arranging these papers has felt it his duty to assume a highly critical attitude towards some of the chief actors. Especially he has attempted to present the great central figure of the period, Woodrow Wilson, in a purely objective light. As for myself, I frankly admit that I was and am a partisan of Woodrow Wilson, and of the measures he so ably and eloquently advocated. That we differed now and then as to the methods by which these measures might be realized, this book reveals as one follows the thread of the story, and never more sharply than in the question of military and naval preparedness. The President, I believed, represented the opinion prevailing in the coimtry at large, apart from the Atlantic seaboard; and I was not certain, had he vil v/x CL idig^c diiiiy'^ i^on^rcss would have sustained him. But I was sure, given a large and efficient army and navy, the United States would have become the arbiter of peace and probably without the loss of a single life. When the President became convinced that it was necessary to have a large navy, Congress readily yielded to his wishes. But, even so, it is not certain that had he asked for such an army as I advocated he would have been successful. The two arms do not hang together on even terms, fon , the building of a great army touches every nerve centre of the nation, social and economic, and raises questions and antagonisms which could never come to the fore over a large navy programme. In my opinion, it iU serves so great a man as Woodrow Wilson for his friends, in mistaken zeal, to claim for him impeccability. He had his shortcomings, even as other men, and having them but gives him the more character and virility. As I saw him at the time and as I see him in retrospect, his chief defect was temperamental. His prejudices were strong and oftentimes clouded his judgments. But, by and large, he was what the head of a state should be — intelligent, honest, and courageous. Happy the nation fortunate enough to have a Woodrow Wilson to lead it through dark and tempestuous days ! Much as he accomplished, much as he commended himself to the gratitude and admiration of mankind, by some strange turn of fate his bitterest enemies have done more than his best friends to assure his imdying fame. Had the Versailles Treaty gone through the United States Senate as written and without question, Woodrow Wilson would have been but one of many to share in the imperishable glory of the League of Nations. But the fight which he was forced to make for it, and the world-wide proportions which this warfare assumed, gradually forced Woodrow Wilson to the forefront of the battle, and it was around his heroic figure that it raged. While he went down in defeat in his own country, an unprejudiced world begins to see and appreciate the magnitude of the conception and its service to man- kind. The League of Nations and the name of Woodrow Wilson have become inseparable, and his enemies have helped to build to his memory the noblest monument ever erected to a son of man. NOTE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT Some three and a half years ago Colonel House gave to Yale University, for deposit in the University Library, his entire collection of political papers. For permission to select and pubhsh the most significant of these, I my- self and all students of recent history are deeply in his debt. The responsibility for the choice and arrange- ment of these papers, as well as their interpretation, must rest upon me. Colonel House, whose sense of the scientific historical spirit is very lively, agreed that no essential document which might affect the historicity of the narrative should be omitted. Whatever deletions appear in the published papers have been dictated by the exigencies of space or by a regard for the feelings of persons still alive, and in no case do they alter the his- torical meaning of the papers. The comment and advice of Colonel House have been invaluable. He has carefully avoided, however, any insistence upon his personal point of view, at the same time that he has offered priceless aid in throwing light upon innumerable aspects of the political story which would otherwise have remained obscure. For the time and interest and freedom which he has given me I am profoundly grateful. It is a rare privilege for the his- torian that his documentary material should be explained by the chief actor in the drama. I am indebted also, and beyond measure, to Colonel House’s brother-in-law. President Sidney E. Mezes, and to his secretary, Miss Frances B. Denton, for constant assistance and criticism. xi ^ ***w.*A c ctxlUL piuuij, a.iiCL oy rcs-Son of their intimate first-hand knowledge of the events concerned, they have corrected many misinterpretations. My gratitude must also be expressed for the help given by many of those who themselves played an im- portant political role during the past thirteen years ; they have been willing to discuss freely the history of that period and to permit me to publish their letters. I would mention Ambassador James W. Gerard, Ambas- sador Brand Whitlock, Ambassador H. C. Wallace, Attorney-General T. W. Gregory, Postmaster-General A. S. Burleson, Mr. Frank L. Polk, Mr. Vance McCormick, Mr. John Hays Hammond, Mr. Gordon Auchincloss, Viscount Grey of Fallodon, the Earl of Balfour, Mr. Lloyd George, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Sir Horace Plunkett, Sir William T5nTell, Mr. H. Wickham Steed, Mr. J. A. Spender, Sir WiUiam Wiseman, M. Georges Clemenceau, M. Ignace Paderewski. All of these came into close touch with Colonel House, and the personal and political sidelights which they have thrown upon him have been of inestimable value. The volumes owe much to those who have cordially permitted the publication of letters now in the House Collection of the Yale University Library. I take pleasure in thanking Mrs. Walter Hines Page, Mrs. Thomas Lindsay, Mrs. Franklin K. Lane, Lady Spring- Rice, Mrs. WiUiam Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo, Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston, Justice James C. McReynolds, President Charles W. Eliot, Mr. J. St. Loe Strachey, Mr. A. H. Frazier, Mr. E. S. Martin, Mr. George Foster Peabody, Mr. James Speyer. In the arrangement of the papers and their interpreta- tion I have made constant use of the numerous letters k from President Wilson to Colonel House now deposited in the House Collection. It seemed wise to the hterary legatee of the President not to grant permission to publish these letters textually ; something of the personal attractiveness of Mr. Wilson has thus been lost. But the sense of the letters, setting forth his intimate feelings and policies, has been freely translated into the pages which follow. A hst of the letters which I have thus utihzed is appended.^ None of them have been pub- lished ; many of them were typed by the President himself without a copy being made, often in the private code used only by Colonel House and himself. To the authorities of Yale University who have pro- vided facilities for the care of the House Collection and to the staff of the University Library, especially the Librarian, Mr. Andrew Keogh, I would express warmest gratitude, as well as to those alumni of Yale who by financial assistance have made possible the fifing and organization of documents; given by Colonel House and others. I am indebted in particular to my assistant in the curatorship of the House Collection, Miss Helen M. Reynolds ; every page of these volumes bears witness to the devoted effort she has expended upon the construc- tion of the manuscript, the verification of references, and the correction of proof. Finally I must acknowledge the constant encouragement and practical assistance of my wife in the large task of selecting the most significant documents and arranging them so as to make a coherent narrative. C. S. Yale University Janmry i, 1926 ^ See page xv. LETTERS FROM WILSON TO HOUSE Utilized for the period^ October 1911 — March 1917 BATE SUBJECT 1911 October 18 Wilson’s party regularity. 24 Desirability of abolishing two-thirds rule in National Democratic Convention. * December 4 Engagement to dine with House and Dr. Houston. 22 Pre-Convention campaign organization. 26 Pre-Convention campaign organization. 1912 January 4 Personal. Bryan’s attitude. 27 Personal. February 6 Personal. 14 Personal. March 15 Pre-Convention outlook. Political strength of Champ Clark, Underwood, Harmon. May 6 House’s political organization in Texas. 29 Personal. [Telegfam.] June 9 Plans for Baltimore Convention. 24 Convention organization. July 17 Plan of electoral campaign. August 22 Plan of electoral campaign. 31 Plan of electoral campaign. September ii McCombs’s possible resignation as National Demo- cratic Chairman. November 7 Comment on result of election. Gratitude for House’s services. 30 Personal. House’s Washington visit for study of Cabinet material. December 3 Personal. House’s Washington visit. 1913 January 6 Discussion of Cabinet materiaL 23 Discussion of Cabinet materiaL February 5 Cabinet appointments. 7 Cabinet appointments. May 9 New York appointments. XV 1913 May 17 Federal Reserve Bill, 20 Personal. [Telegram.] July 17 Personal. [Telegram.] September 4 Personal. 18 Massachusetts appointments. 26 Request for House’s help in personal matter. 29 Personal. October 17 One Hundredth Anniversary of peace among English™ speaking peoples. November 5 Mexico. December 9 Message to Congress. 27 Personal, 1914 January 3 Trusts. 6 Trust Message. [Telegram.] 9 Federal Reserve Board appointments. 28 Panama Canal Zone. 30 Personal. [Telegram.] February 16 Federal Reserve Board appointments. 18 Federal Reserve Board appointments. 25 Federal Reserve Board appointments. Mexican situa™ tion. March 7 Federal Reserve Board appointments. 30 Federal Reserve Board appointments. April 2 Federal Reserve Board appointments. May 2 Federal Reserve Board appointments. 15 Departure of House for Europe. June 16 House’s mission in Europe. 22 French proposal for revision of commercial treaty be tween France and the United States. Mediation between the United States and Mexico. 26 House’s mission in Europe. July 9 Endorsement of House’s mission August 3 Situation m Europe. 4 Mediation in European War. [Telegram.] 5 Mediation in European War. 6 Mediation in European War. Shipping Bil* 6 Mrs. Wilson’s death. [Telegram.] 17 Personal. 18 Personal. 25 Attitude towards European War. 27 Personal. [Telegram.] September 8 Approval of House’s letters to Zimmermann and Am- bassador W. H. Page. A. VIJ. S SUBJECT ciber i6 Approval of House's suggestion on taxes. 17 Appointments. 19 Approval of House's negotiations with Bernstorff. [Telegram.] 3r 10 Negotiations for purchase of cotton. 16 Negotiations for purchase of cotton. 19 Appointments. 22 Personal. 23 Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page, 29 Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page. aber 2 Personal [Telegram.] iber I Presidential Message. Belgian relief. 2 Foreign relations. 9 Presidential Message. 14 Personal. 16 Personal. [Telegram.] 22 Personal. [Telegram.] 25 Personal. 26 Industrial relations, [Telegram.] 26 Trade Commission. 28 Personal. 28 Personal. [Telegram.] 31 Personal. [Telegram.] iry 5 Approval of House's letter to Zimmermann. 6 Appointments. 7 Federal employment bureau. II Personal. 16 Mediation in European War. 17 Personal. [Telegram.] 28 Situation in Germany. 29 Personal. [Telegram.] 29 Purpose of House's European mission, lary 13 House's negotiations in England. Note to the Allies. [Cablegram.] 15 Gerard's information on situation in Germany, [Cablegram.] 20 Relations with Great Britain. [Cablegram.] 25 House's negotiations. [Cablegram.] li I Conditions in Germany. [Cablegram.] 8 House's negotiations. [Cablegram.] 23 British Order in Council. [Cablegram.] 2 Approval of House's negotiations. [Cablegram.] DATE SUBJECT 1915 AprE 15 Messages to President and Foreign Minister of France, [Cablegram.] 22 Pan-American Pact. [Cablegram.] Ma]/ — British blockade. [Cablegram.] 4 Sinking of GulfligU. [Cablegram.] 5 British blockade. [Cablegram.] 16 Possible compromise between British blockade and German submarine warfare. [Cablegram.] 18 British blockade. [Cablegram.] 20 Possible compromise between British blockade and German submarine warfare. [Cablegram.] 23 British blockade. [Cablegram.] 26 British blockade. [Cablegram.] June I House’s return. [Cablegram.] 20 Personal, Wilson planning visit to House. [Tele- gram.] 22 WEson’s visit to House. [Telegram.] July 3 Mexico. [Telegram.] 3 Mexico. 7 Mexico. 12 Counsellorship of State Department. Note to Ger- many. 14 Strained relations with Germany. 19 Contraband and cotton. 20 British blockade. 22 Contraband and cotton. 27 Counsellorship of State Department. British blockade, 29 British blockade. Bernstorff. August 4 Appointments. 4 Mexico. 4 German plots, 5 Contraband and cotton. 7 Contraband and cotton. 21 Asking for advice on Arabic case. Attitude of Am- bassador W. H. Page. 25 Bernstorff. German plots. 31 Personal. 31 Arabic crisis. Federal Reserve Board, September 7 Austrian plots. Sinking of Hesperian. 20 Bernstorff, Arabic crisis. 27 Bernstorff. Arabic crisis. 29 Personal. October 4 Personal. 4 Armed merchantmen controversy. 18 Possible offer of help to Allies. DATE SUBJECT 1915 October 18 Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page. 29 Personal. November 10 Possibilities of peace. Domestic politics. 11 House's messages to Grey. [Telegram.] 12 Conditions in Germany. Sinking of Ancona. 17 House's mission to Europe. 24 British and German Ambassadors in Washington. House's mission to Europe. 1916 ^January February March April May June July 9 Assurance of American co-operation in policy seeking to bring about and maintain permanent peace. [Cablegram.] 12 The Senate and British blockade, [Cablegram.] 13 Approval of House's negotiations. [Cablegram.] 16 Armed merchantmen. [Cablegram.] 3 Personal. [Telegram.] 20 Gerard's report from Germany. 15 Appointments. [Telegram.] 21 Sussex crisis. 22 Sussex crisis. Domestic politics. 29 Sussex crisis. [Telegram.] 5 Sussex crisis. [Telegram.] 8 Relations with GrSat Britain. 9 Possibility of peace. 16 Offer of help to Allies. British blockade. 17 Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page. 17 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee. 18 Offer of help to Allies. Relations with Great Britain. 18 Request for advice on speech before League to Enforce Peace. 22 Relations with Allies. Request for material for speech. Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee. 29 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee. 6 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee. 10 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee. 11 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee. [Telegram.] 22 European situation. Mexico. Plan for electoral campaign. 2 Relations with England. Appointments. Electoral campaign. 23 British Black-list. 27 Relations with Great Britain. I— & DATE SUBJECT 1916 September 20 Personal 29 Electoral campaign. October 10 Relations with Great Britain. 24 Electoral campaign. 30 Madison Square rally. November 6 Personal. 21 Drafting of note calling on belligerents to state terms of peace. 24 Relations with Germany. Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page. 25 Peace note. December 3 Peace note. 4 Personal. 8 House’s information from England. 19 Peace note. 27 Attempt to secure confidential peace terms from Germany. 1917 January 16 Drafting of speech on peace terms before the Senate. 17 House’s negotiations with Bernstorff. 19 House’s negotiations with Bernstorff. Speech before the Senate. 24 House’s negotiations with Bernstorff. February 12 Refusal to consider coalition government. CONTENTS VOLUME I CHAPTER I. Introduction II. Backgrounds (1858-1911) War and Reconstruction in the South — House in School and College — Frontier Life and Friends in Texas — Political Beginnings — State Electoral Campaigns — The Governors' Adviser — ^National Campaigns — Enter Wilson. III. Beginnings of a Friendship . First Impressions of Woodrow Wilson — ^The Pre- Nomination Campaign-»-Persuading Mr. Bryan — Organizing Texas — ^The Threat of Champ Clark — The Baltimore Convention — Wilson N omin- ated — Discords among the Democrats — ^McCombs and McAdoo — Soothing the Tammany Tiger — Captain Bill McDonald — Democratic Victory. IV. Building a Cabinet . . . . Everyone wants something " — Sifting the Possi- bilities — House Refuses a Cabinet Post — ^The Aloofness of Wilson — ^A Visit with Mr. Bryan — Offers and Refusals — ^The Final State. V. The Silent Partner . . . . Relations of House and Wilson — Mr. House is my second self" — ^Wilsonian Table-talk — ^The Visits of a President — Defects of Wilson as seen by House — The Colonel as a Political Buffer — A Recipient of Criticism — Relations with the Cabinet — Problems of Appointments and Local Politics, PAGE I 9 46 86 118 PAGE CHAPTER VI. The Administration Starts Work . 155 The Radicalism of Colonel House — Philip Dra : its Composition and Significance — Legislative Prob- lems of the Wilson Administration — Colonel House and Currency Reform — ^Drafting the Federal Reserve Act — Making up the Federal Reserve Board — Results af the First Legislative Session : '' A great exhibition of leadership/' VIL Aspects of Foreign Policy . . « i8i Problems of Diplomatic Appointments — ^The Am- bassadorship to St. James's — Colonel House as Confidant of Ambassadors — His Conception of a Positive Foreign Policy — Relations with Great Britain — Panama Tolls Exemption — Mexico — Clearing the Ground with Sir Edward Grey — ^The Visit of Sir William Tyrrell — ^An Informal Under- standing — Repeal of the Tolls Exemption. VIII. A Pan-American Pact .... 213 House Urges Need of Close Understanding with South American States — ^First Draft of Proposed Pact — Conversations with Naon, da Gama, Suarez — ^Approval, in Principle, of A.B.C. Powers — Joint Action Regarding Mexico — ^Development of the Pact — ^Dfficulties and Delays — ^Lapse of Negotia- tions — Historical Significance of the Attempt. IX. The Great Adventure . . . 241 Heavy Clouds in Europe — House's Sense of American Interest and Responsibility — A Scheme to Meet the Danger — ^An Extraordinary Mission — Atmosphere in Germany — ^The Talk with the Kaiser — Planning Peace with the British — The Murder of the Archduke — Colonel House's Letter to the Kaiser — Failure. X. Wilson and the War .... 282 Outbreak of the Conflagration — ^The Question of American Mediation — ^President Eliot’s Suggestion of Intervention — ^The Sympathies of Wilson — House Urges Military Preparation — ^Allied Interference with American Trade — ^Difficulties with the British — ^Page and Spring-Rice. PAGE chapter XL Plans of Mediation . « » « 324 The Military Situation in Europe — German Defeat on the Marne — Overtures of Bernstorff — Discussions with Spring-Rice — Letters from Page and Gerard — Growth of Feeling against United States in Belli- gerent Countries — Sir Edward Grey on the Attitude of American Government — ^Wilson Decides to Send House to Europe. XII* A Quest for Peace * . . * 365 House Sails on the Lusitania — First Conferences with Grey and Asquith — ^The German Submarine Threat — Suggestion of ** The Freedom of the Seas — Discouraging News from Germany — K Talk with the King — ^The Personal Contracts of House — ^War- time London — Decision to go on to Germany. XIII. The Freedom of the Seas , . . 399 Paris — Interview with Delcass6 — ^Aspirations of France — Berlin — '' Everybody seems to want peace, but nobody is willing to concede enough to get it — Feeling against America — tiouse Suggests Freedom of the Seas — Its Significance — ^Bethmann and Zimmermann — Return to Paris — Poincare — London again — Conferences with Grey — Sinking of the Lusitania. XIV. Submarine versus Blockade . . 436 House’s Advice to Wilson — Lord Kitchener on American Participation — ^Wilson’s Note to Germany — A Suggestion of Compromise between German Submarine and Allied Blockade — Grey Approves Compromise — Germany Refuses — ^Effect of Allied Restrictions on American Commerce — House Explains the Danger — Conferences with Lloyd George, Bryce, Balfour, Crewe — House Returns to America — Results of Mission. Index . At end of Volume II CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION I look forward now to your book. It is, I hope, books like yours and mine that will bring people to reflect soberly upon the war. If so, we shall be helping to form a public opinion that will make for peace. Viscount Grey of Fallodon to House, October id, 19^5 T he practice of interring historical documents in securely locked archives, where they may lie forgotten until popular interest in the period evaporates, has much to be said for it. It prevents their use for partisan political purposes ; it protects the sensibilities of those political leaders whose role, viewed at close range, may have been less heroic than the public imagined; it guarantees, through the lapse of time, the growth of that ma’gical touchstone, “ historical perspective,” which supposedly eliminates bias and ensures the truth. Unfortunately, if the materials of real history are absent, those of legend replace them. ” History,” said Voltaire, “is a fable which men have agreed upon.” And one may ask whether it is not the duty of the historian to estabhsh the facts before the fable has crystallized, and the duty of whoever possesses the documents to make them available to the historian at the earliest possible moment. The argument is the stronger if we accept the view that mankind learns from its past. Granting that a lesson of value is to be secured from history, surely our own generation has a right to insist that its benefits ought not to be reserved for the unborn of the future. If the inner history of the decade I— I wmcn saw JC/Uiope uaugm ui uic iiunui ui wai aiiu ixs aftermath can help us to avoid another such disaster, the disadvantages of keeping that history in cold storage until the twenty-first century are apparent. Such thoughts may have crossed the mind of Colonel House when he determined to have published sufficient of his papers to elucidate what he regarded as the true story of the decisive years in which he played a role of major political importance. A newspaper cartoon of 1916 represents the Muse of History (rather a frowzy Clio, to be sure, bespectacled and distraught) presenting a tightly corked bottle labelled Foreign Policy to a silent and impassive Colonel House, and in desperation de- manding the opener. After the lapse of a decade, the Colonel has produced it. The anxiety of the Historical Muse is comprehensible as the student pores over the pile of papers which indicate the extent and variety of the personal and political contacts that House establislied. Here are great sheaves of letters from the European statesmen of the war period —Grey, Balfour, Bryce, Lloyd George, Plunkett, Reading, Briand, Clemenceau, Zimmermann, Bemstorff, Spring- Rice— with the Colonel's replies; yet more extensive files of his correspondence with the American Ambas- sadors in the capitals of Europe — the Pages, Gerard, Sharp, Penfield, Whitlock, Willard ; letters to and from the members of Mr. Wilson’s Cabinet, covering the details of appointments and departmental policy ; and finally the eight years’ series of correspondence with the President himself, intimate and afiectionate, which explains the origin and development of Wilsonian policies, domestic and foreign, from the beginning of Wilson’s race for the Presidency in 1911 until the Peace Conference of Paris in 1919. As he sorts the dusty files, the curious investigator finds himself introduced into the very penetralia of politics — the making of a Cabinet, the origins of currency reform, the American attempt to prevent the World War, American offers to help the Allies made and refused, the intimate details of American co-operation in the war, in the Armistice, and in the Peace Conference ; he sees at close range, the President himself, Bemstorff and the Kaiser, the European Premiers and Foreign Ministers, American Ambassadors and Cabinet members. If it had not been for an aid of exceptional character, the preservation of these papers would have been dif&cult or impossible. Fortunately House possessed in Miss Frances B. Denton, the daughter of an old friend, an assistant who was more collaborator than confidential secretary, and one whose r 61 e proved to be of increasing importance. In the midst of the negotiations which Colonel House carried on with Cabinets and potentates, she found time to gather and file the material without which the story could never have been told. She com- bined the discretion and tact demanded by House's diplomatic activities with an instinct for the preservation of documents that will always endear her to historians. “ She has not only kept the record,” wrote House m 1916, “but has kept the faith and with an enduring loyalty and self-abnegation.” Through Miss Denton was made possible the diary which forms the heart of the entire collection of papers. Every evening, with rare exceptions and during eight years, Colonel House dictated to her his resume of the events of the day. Definitely and objectively he related his conversations with, often the very words of, his political associates, and he was associated with the men who made the history of the decade. The result is a V* AAAwxv Lvvu LiiuuDciiiu. pdgtjbi E record drafted at the moment and with a frankness which suggests that it was not designed for publication. It has the Colonel’s comments on men and events, opinions which he sometimes changed, prophecies which upon occasion were fulfilled and again remained unfulfilled, a personal document such as the biographer dreams of and seldom discovers. Upon the basis of such papers and his recollections. Colonel House might have written the conventional “ Memoirs,” which too often confuse the after-impression with the event itself, but which, through the possession of hindsight, preserve the author from ever having committed an error. Instead, he chose to let the papers tell their own story and permit the reader to decide whether or not the Colonel was right in this incident and in that. If there is prejudice in the pages that follow— -and what historical narrative is innocent of prejudice ? — it is that of the man who, after many months of arranging the papers so as to let them make a story, came to see events through the eyes of Colonel House himself. But at no time was a chapter begun under the influence of a preconceived thesis, and nothing could have been more exciting than to watch the behaviour of the chief figures as each chapter took form ; in this they did well, m that they were disappointing. An objective narrative, such as the documents themselves recount, was the more necessary in view of the paucity of published information touching the career and accomplishments of Colonel House. There are few, if any, instances of men exercising so much political influence about whom so little was known. The personal story of a man holding public of&ce must needs become public property. A searchlight is immediately turned upon his past career. The press will have it so and, if skilfully utilized, political propaganda of value may conceivably be developed from it. Since we demand of our public personages a certain blameless rectitude of conduct, without which one is ill-advised to seek of&ce, the subject of inquiry, even though he may never have accomplished anything of note, is generally well pleased with the conventions of political advertising designed to engage the interest of the voters. With Colonel House it was bound to be otherwise. He sought no office for himself — in itself a peculiarity and one that would naturally puzzle opinion— nor did he seek office for his friends. His methods and purposes were quite different from those of the party boss, for he never worked through a “ machine ” ; he disliked the details of party politics, and in later years he generally managed to evade them. He aimed certainly at influenc- ing political events, as the sequel will show, but he accomplished his aim thro'ugh personal influence very different from that of the orthodox politician. The story of how he acquired such influence is the explanation of his success, and to understand it we must read his political papers. But it is easy to comprehend at first glance that to him conventional political advertisement could bring no profit and might bring much harm. He strove constantly to stifle the public adulation that zealous press agents sought to inspire, and he was careful to bring it about that credit for this or that measure in which he was interested should go to the political office- holders. House's papers are Med with references to the efforts he made to obliterate the intimate personal sketch, so familiar in American politics ; and when finally a brief biography appeared which gave him full credit for his influence in the Wilson administration, at 6 IJNlKUUUtXiUJN his special request the edition was withdrawn by the publisher. The desire to escape publicity was largely a matter of common sense, for in this way only could he hope to avoid political enmities and jealousies ; President, Cabinet members. Ambassadors, all knew that he stood ready to help them and yet would seek no public recogni- tion. It was also instinctive, springing not from undue modesty, for Colonel House was as coldly objective in judging himself as another, but rather from a philosophic pleasure in accomplishment rather than reward, and perhaps in part from a sardonic sense of humour which was tickled by the thought that he, unseen and often unsuspected, without great wealth or office, merely through the power of personality and good sense, was actually deflecting the currents of history. Whether this supposition is borne out by the intimate papers of the Colonel, the reader must judge. The path which House' laid out for himself was entirely untrodden, and it is fruitless to seek an historical parallel. Monarchs had shared their secrets with father- confessors and extracted wisdom from their advice; Presidents had created their kitchen-cabinets. But neither the one nor the other suggests the unofficial functions which House exercised. He was a combina- tion of Richelieu’s Father Joseph and Thurlow Weed, but he was very much more. At the same time that he played the part of adviser to the President, of buffer between office-seekers and Cabinet, of emissary to foreign courts, he indulged in a complex of activities which kept him in close touch with business men, local politicians, artists, and journalists, lawyers and college professors. His intimacy with European statesmen was as close and his friendship as warm as the personal associations he created at home. Long after the war, when their political relations had become ancient history, he visited Grey and Plunkett, Clemenceau and Paderew- ski. Long after the Democrats lost power in the United States, the officials of Great Britain, France, and Ger- many sought his advice. His range of contacts was so great that he became a sort of clearing-house for all who desired to accomplish something. He avoided high office, which comes to many men, but he reserved for himself a niche which is unique in history. Inevitably, the public was mystified, especially during the early years of the Wilson administration. The circle widened that recognized in him a powerful factor in national and international politics, and yet few could answer the simplest questions about him. Who and what was he ? Many replies were given, but, as Colonel House refused to say which were true and which false, no one was the wiser. He became the Man of Mystery and, since facts were lacking, fiction supplied their place. Myths of the most varied sort developed about this " Texas Talleyrand,” this “ backwoods politician.” He was represented as a lover of devious methods, reticent as the Sphinx, emotionless as a Redskin. Such tales must be strung with the other mock-pearls of history. And the interesting point to note is that the public, deprived of facts, none the less refused to accept the legends fed to them which, had they been true, would have disqualified House utterly for the work that he undertooL Puzzled but untroubled, they accepted him finally as "the President's adviser.” Here and there were to be heard grumbles at this strange departure in American politics ; but in general, knowing little of his activities and nothing of his advice, the people came to look upon him as a wise institution. 0 Xi'« iiV\/JL/ WV^XiV/X'l Thus Colonel House disdained fame and achieved it. His fame, however, rested primarily upon the fact of his relations with Wilson and not upon what he was or what he did. Of that the Colonel and those close to him alone could tell, and they told nothing. It is, therefore, with the greater interest that the historian turns over the mass of papers from which the story of his dramatic career may be disengaged. CHAPTER II BACKGROUNDS Your success has been without a parallel in Texas politics. Governor-elect Sayers to House, May ij, I “ "T T TE originally came from Holland and the name \/\/ was Huis, which finally feE into House. Father V V ran away from home and went to sea when a child, and did not return to his home until he had become a man of property and distinction. He came to Texas when it belonged to Mexico. He joined the revolution, fought under General Burleson, and helped make Texas a republic. For his services in this war he received a grant of land in Coryell County. He lived to see Texas come into the Union, secedfe, and return to the Union. He lived in Texas under four flags.” Thus wrote Colonel House in the summer of 1916, when a brief luU in his political activities gave oppor- tunity for him to reconstruct on paper something of the background that lay behind his rapid rise to national and international eminence. Although the family was in its origin Dutch, his forbears were for some three hundred years English, and it was from England that his father ran away. House himself, a seventh son, was bom in 1858, at Houston, Texas, and this State he has always regarded as his home. Even more than those of Wilson or Walter Page, with whom he later was so closely associated, his first years were touched by the excitement and turmoil of the events of the time. 9 10 i5 U IN J^O " Some of my earliest recollections are of the Civil War. I began to remember, I think, in ’62 and ’63, when our soldiers were coming and going to and from the front. I remember quite distinctly when Lincoln was assassinated. Father came home to luncheon, and I recall where Mother was standing when he told her that the President had been shot, I remember, too, that he said that it was the worst thing that had so far happened to the South. He saw farther than most men, and he knew from the beginning of the war that it must end disastrously for the South. He knew the Northern States possessed the resources which are potential in war, and that the Southern States, lacking them, would lose. The blockade which the Federal Government was able to throw around the Southern coast, while not absolute, was rigid enough to make it difficult to break through and obtain from the outside what was needed within. “During the war he sent many ships out from Galveston with cotton, to run the blockade to the near- by ports, such as Havana and Belize, Honduras. At that time we had a house in Galveston as well as in Houston. The Galveston home covered an entire block. The house was a large red-brick Colonial one, with white pillars, and an orange grove took up most of the grounds, and oleanders encircled them. “ In determining when to send his ships out. Father was governed largely by the weather. Dark, stormy nights were the ones chosen. In the afternoon he would go up to the cupola of our house, and with his glasses he would scan the horizon to see how many Federal gun- boats were patrolling the coast. Then his ship would go out in the early part of the night. In the morning, at daylight, he would be again on the look-out to count the Federal gunboats, to see if any were missing. If they were aU there, he felt reasonably sure his ship with her cargo had gotten through the blockade. “ It would be months before he knew definitely whether his ships had come safely to port or whether they had been captured. When he lost one, the loss was complete ; but when one got through, the gaii ^a^ large. He had a working arrangement with the Com federate Government by which the return voyage brought them clothing, arms, and munitions of war of all kinds. “ The terrible days between Lee’s surrender and the bringing of some sort of order out of the chaos in the South made a lasting impression on my mind. I cannot recall just now how long the interim was, but it must have been a fuU year or more. " There was one regiment of Texas soldiers that came to Houston and disbanded there. They looted the town. They attempted to break into Father’s store- house, but he stood at the doors with a shotgun. . . . Murder was rife everywhere ; there was no law, there was no order. It was unsafe to go at night to your next-door neighbour’s. When Father had this to do, he always reached for his shotgun or six-shooter and held it ready to shoot while both going and coming.” Those who later were to accuse Colonel House of ill- considered pacifism, would doubtless have been surprised to learn of the atmosphere in which he was reared. In later life he was often asked whether he considered him- self a pacifist. ” Yes,” he replied, ” so far as inter- national affairs are concerned. War is too costly and ineffective a method of settling disputes between nations. But as an individual I have not been able to escape the conviction that there are occasions in hfe when a man must be prepared to fight.” As a boy and later in early manhood, he learned from personal experience the meaning of lawlessness and bloodshed. Because of this, perhaps, he was brought to perceive not merely the horror but the stupidity of war ; and it was easier for him, when he attained an influential position, to utilize it to bring peace, in that his personal courage was beyond question. It may have JL^ 15ALK.GR0UNDS been from these early experiences also that he learned the value of audacity. In the days of his great political influence, Colonel House was frequently pictured as a man dominated by the spirit of caution. Nothing could be further from the truth. He believed always in careful preparation and foresight whenever possible ; as an English statesman once said, " House always sees three months ahead.” But he believed more fervently yet that nothing worth while could be accomplished without a daring that might wisely be allowed to approach reck- lessness. Like Cavour, whom he admired, he knew how to wait for the supreme moment and then risk everything. “ Even the children of the town [he wrote] caught the spirit of recklessness and disorder, and there were constant feuds and broils amongst us. My brother James, six years older than I, was the leader of our ‘ gang.' We all had guns and pistols. We had ' nigger shooters ’ (small catapults), and there were no childish games excepting those connected with war. We lived and breathed in the atmosphere of strife and destruc- tion. “ In the evening, around the fireside, there were told tales of daring deeds, and it was the leader of such deeds that we strove to emulate. Often the firebeUs would ring as a signal that a riot was imminent, and the citizens would flock together at some given point, all armed to the teeth. These disturbances were, as a rule, between the old-time citizens and the negroes and carpet-baggers. ” I cannot remember the time when I began to ride and to shoot. Why I did not kill myself, one can never know, for accidents were common. My eldest brother had the side of his face shot off and has been disfigured by it all his life. He hung between life and death for weeks, but finally came through with one side of his face gone. ” I had many narrow escapes. Twice I came near killing one of my playmates in the reckless use of fire- BACKGROUNDS 13 arms. They were our toys and, as a matter of fact, death was our pla5miate.” The young House was taken to England as a boy and went to school at Bath. His experiences with his schoolmates by no means presaged the cordial relations which he was later to establish with British diplomats : “ James attempted the same sort of rough play we had been accustomed to in Texas, and we were constantly in broils with the young English lads, who were not familiar with such lawlessness. My old darkey nurse used to tell me that if I had not been the seventh son of a seventh son, I would never have survived.” At the age of fourteen, after the death of his mother, he was sent to school first in Virginia and then in Connecticut. House’s recollections of the former are not pleasant : “ I shall never forget my depression when we arrived. . . . The nearest town to us was thirty miles away, and a more desolate, lonely spot no homesick boy ever saw.” Scholastic pursuits evidently made less impression on his mind than the cruelty of the older boys, which soon furnished an opportunity for House to display his mettle. He says little of the particular incident which evidently gave him a preferred place among the boys, but that little indicates something of the determined temper which was to appear on various occasions during his political career. " I made up my mind at the second attempt to haze me that I would not permit it. I not only had a pistol but a large knife, and with these I held the larger, rougher boys at bay. There was no limit to the lengths they would go in hazing those who would allow it. One form I recall was that of going through the pretence 14 BACKGROUNDS of hanging. They would tie a boy's hands behind him and string him up by the neck over a limb until he grew purple in the face. . . . None of it, however, feU to me. What was done to those who permitted it, is almost beyond belief. . . . The only thing that recon- ciled me to my lot was the near-by mountains, where I could shoot and enjoy out-of-door life.” Clearly a change, even to a Yankee atmosphere, was an improvement ; and House hailed with relief, if not enthusiasm, the plan which at the age of seventeen sent him to New Haven, Connecticut. " I had expected to be able to enter Yale, but I found myself wholly unprepared and reluctantly entered the Hopkins Grammar School of the Class of '77. . . . What I had been taught was of but little use, and I would have been better off as far as Latin and Greek were concerned if I had known nothing and had started from the beginning. I studied but little, and I soon found I would have difficulty in joining the Class of ’81 in Yale. Meanwhile, Oliver T. Morton, a son of Senator Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, and I had become fast friends and we agreed to tutor together and go to Cornell instead of Yale. Both Morton and I were more bent on mischief than upon books, and, while the mischief was innocent, it made us poor students.” It was less mischief, however, than budding enthu- siasm for his lifelong interest that kept House and Morton from their books. Already the young Southerner was intoxicated by a passion for politics and public afiairs ; he read politics, talked politics, and in his first year at the Grammar School, a boy of seventeen, he brought himself into close contact with the mechanism of politics. It was the year of the famous Hayes-Tilden campaign. BACKGROUNDS 15 " Every near-by political meeting I attended, and there was no one more interested in the nomination and election of the presidential candidates of 1876 than 1. At every opportunity I would go to New York and hang about Democratic Headquarters, which, I remember, were at the Everett House in Union Square. I used to see Mr, Tilden go in and out, and wondered then how so frail a looking man could make a campaign for President. “ Bayard, Blaine, and others I heard speak whenever the opportunity occurred, and I believe that I was as nearly engrossed in politics as I have ever been since. “ Before the nominations were made, I was, of course, hoping to see young Morton’s father nominated for President, and it was a bitter disappointment to us both when the telegraph operator handed us out the first slip giving news that the Republicans had compromised upon Rutherford B, Hayes. The operator knew us, for we were continually hanging about the ofiice instead of attending to our studies. Morton’s father was such a power at that time that there was no difficulty in his having access to any information that was to be had. “ Ardent Democrat that Lwas, and ardent Republican that he was, young Morton and I had no unpleasant discussions. After the election and during the contest that followed, it was utterly impossible for me to bring myself to think of desk or books. I was constantly going to Washington with Morton, in order to be near the centre of things, I was usually the guest of the Mortons, who lived at that time at the Ebbitt House. I knew much of everything that was going on. Re- publican leaders would come in day and night to consult the distinguished invalid who was directing the fight for Hayes. In this way, directly and indirectly, I saw and met many well-known Republicans in public life at that time.” No clearer proof is necessary that the child is father to the man, for, as his papers will show, the mature Colonel House displayed an invincible obstinacy in BACKGROUNDS i6 making personal friends of his political opponents. The characteristic proceeded, perhaps, from a natural inability to remain on anything but good terms with those whom he met, whether in conflict or co-operation ; it resulted in giving him an insight into the motives that actuated his opponents which was of no small political value. The election of 1876, we may remind ourselves, was disputed and was ultimately settled by an Electoral Commission which, despite the protests of Democrats at the moment and heedless of the criticism of later his- torians, awarded the Presidency to Hayes. Such a conflict formed an incomparable opportunity for the young House to study political operations, and one which he did not fail to utilize, regardless of the fact that school was in session. “ When the Electoral Commission was organized and began to hold its sittings in the Supreme Court Room at the Capitol, young Morton and I were permitted to slip in and out at will, although the demand for admission could only be met in a very small way. I heard Evarts speak, but the speech that impressed me most was that of Senator Carpenter, who, although a Republican, pleaded for Tilden. “ In those days, too, I had the entree to the White House. I remember General Grant and Mrs. Grant and several members of his Cabinet. All this was educational in its way, but not the education I was placed in the Hopkins Grammar School to get, and it is no wonder that I lagged at the end of my class. I had no interest in my desk tasks, but I read much and was learning in a larger and more interesting school. “ When I entered Cornell, it was the same story. . . . I was constantly reading, constantly absorbing, constantly in touch with, public affairs. I knew the name of every United States Senator, of practically every Repre- sentative, the Governors of all the important States, and BACKGROUNDS 17 had some knowledge of the chief measures before the people. " I had found that I could neglect my studies up to the last minute and then, by a few days of vigorous effort, pass my examinations by a scratch, nothing more. I cannot remember getting a condition, nor can I re- member getting much more than a passing mark. “ My Washington experience perhaps changed my entire career. Fortunately or unfortunately for me, I saw that two or three men in the Senate and two or three in the House and the President himself, ran the Government. The others were merely figureheads. I saw Senators and Representatives speak to empty benches and for the purpose of getting their remarks in the Congressional Record sent to their admiring con- stituents. I saw, too, how few public men could really speak well. I can count on the fingers of one hand all the speakers that I thought worth while. In some the manner was good, in others the substance was good, but in nearly all there was lacking one or the other. Therefore I had no ambition to hold office, nor had I any ambition to speak, because I felt in both instances that I would fall short of the first place, and nothing less than that would satisfy me. " Yet I have been thought without ambition. That, I think, is not quite true. My ambition has been so great that it has never seemed to me worth while to strive to satisfy it.” Matters might have been different had it not been for the delicacy of House’s health. " Up to the time I was eleven or twelve years old,” he wrote, ” I was a robust youngster. One day while I was swinging high, a rope broke and I was thrown on my head. Brain fever ensued, and for a long time I hovered between life and death. Upon my recovery, malaria fastened upon me, and I have never been strong since.” The confining routine of office was impossible for him. Especially did 1—2 i8 BACKGROUNDS he suffer from the heat, which put residence in Washing- ton during the summer months out of the question. Thus early and for various reasons he set aside the thought of a conventional political career ; but his ambition, although unorthodox, was, as he admits, very real, and, even though he does not admit it, we shall see that he did much to satisfy it. He longed to play an influential if not a decisive role in politics, and from the beginning seems to have been inspired by the desire to improve political conditions. Through all his corre- spondence and papers runs this idealistic strain : to make of government a more efficient instrument for effecting the desires of the people ; to inspire in the people a more sensible view of their welfare ; to take a few feathers out of the wings of enthusiasm and insert them in the tail of judgment ; above all, to hasten the advent of a system which would protect the weak, whether in the political or economic sphere, from ex- ploitation by the strong. -Even as a boy there was in him something of Louis Blanc and Mazzini, strictly controlled, however, by an acute sense of the practical that recalls Benjamin Franklin. His ambition, furthermore, was determined by an ever-lively sense of proportion, which means sense of humour, that continually manifests itself in his papers. It led him to seek accomplishment rather than notoriety. Careless of title or office, even had his health per- mitted him to seek them, yet determined to make of politics his real career. House faced the problem that confronts so many young idealists leaving college and anxious to serve their country and mankind. How to begin ? BACKGROUNDS 19 II Mischance cut short the college career of House, for after two years at Cornell he was called back to Texas by the illness of his father, who died in 1880. The two had been close companions, and the younger man’s sense of loss was acute and the deprivation of his father’s aid and experienced counsel was a serious blow. “ My affection may blind me,” he wrote, “ and my judgment may have been immature, but he seemed to me then, as he seems to me now, among the ablest men I have ever known. ... I owe more to my father than to any person, living or dead. He not only made it possible for me to pursue the bent of my inclinations by leaving me a fortune suf&cient for all moderate wants, but he gave me an insight into the philosophy of life that has been of incalculable value. . . . While he devoted his life largely to commerce in various forms and while he acquired what* seemed to Texas a large fortune, he taught me not to place a fictitious value on wealth. It was with him merely a means to an end.” The year after leaving college, House married Miss Loulie Hunter, of Hunter, Texas, and after travelling in Europe for a twelvemonth, returned to make his home first in Houston and then in Austin, Texas. Cotton- farming and commercial enterprises kept him busy, but more and more he began to steal time from business to indulge his vital interest in public affairs. During what he calls " the twilight years,” after he had achieved political success in Texas and before the opportunity for national service had opened, he indulged his taste for adventure by embarking upon various industrial schemes, some of which were obviously calculated to produce pleasure rather than profit for himself. 20 BACKGROUNDS “ In this connexion I undertook the building of the Trinity and Brazos Valley Railway. The capital was raised by my friend Thomas Jefferson Coolidge, jun., of the Old Colony Trust Company of Boston, who occa- sionally visited me in Texas. I outlined the route and he accepted my judgment as to its feasibility. For two or three years this gave me much pleasure and absorbed my entire interest. There was not a man connected with the building of this road, except the engineer, that had ever had the slightest experience with railroad building. I wonder now at the temerity of those Boston capitalists. My one thought was to have around me men capable and honest, and to this I attribute our success. My secretary, Edward Sammons, than whom there is no better accountant, looked after the accounts ; and William Malone, the manager of my farms, saw to it that we got such material as was paid for. I put but little money in the project, for I had but little ; therefore I made but a small sum from it, success- ful as it was — some thirty thousand dollars. A larger share of the profits had been allotted me by the syndicate managers who had put up'the money necessary to build the road, but I divided it with those friends in Texas, poorer than I, who aided in the actual work of building the road. “ It was a pleasure, though, to undertake to build a railroad honestly, without a dollar’s profit to anyone excepting to those who placed their money in the venture. The money was raised in advance and everything was paid for in cash, and no bonds were sold until after the road was a going concern and sold to another system. “ We undertook to lay down one cardinal principle which no road in Texas, up to that time, had deigned to do ; and that was, to treat the public in such a way that they became friends of the road instead of enemies. If a farmer or any citizen along the route had a claim against the company, it was promptly and fairly adjusted. Notices were put up and circulars sent out that there would be no need to hire damage-claim lawyers when BACKGROUNDS 21 there was a claim against the T. and B.V. Railroad ; that all honest claims would be adjusted immediately. “ The result was magical, and it was not long before the patrons of the road understood that we were acting in their interest as well as our own, and any attempt — and there were many — to blackmail us in the usual way that railroad corporations have been blackmailed, found no S3mipathy with any jury along the line of the road.” During the eighties Texas was just passing from the condition of a frontier where law was frequently enforced by the individual, according as his hand was quick and his eye true, and where order was a variable quantity. House speaks admiringly of “ those citizens of Texas who died with their boots on — a death which every citizen of Texas of those days coveted.” We must picture him, accordingly, as a man who spent his early years not merely in Eastern colleges and schools, in cotton-farming and politics, but as the com- panion and friend of the older generation — " that intrepid band,” he calls them, “ that made Texas what she is to-day. I make obeisance to them ! Nothing daunted them. They tore a principality from a sovereign state and moulded a trackless wilderness into a great common- wealth. These men were the heroes of my childhood ; and now when I am growing old and have seen many men and many lands, I go back to them and salute them, for I find they are my heroes still.” With the younger generation of frontiersmen House was on close personal terms, and for a while, after returning from college and beginning his business as planter, he lived their life. One of the oldest and perhaps the best of these friends was the noted and picturesque Ranger, Captain Bill McDonald, whose career House felt to be so 22 BACKGROUNDS typical of the Texas of those days that he could not rest until it was put into a book. “ I wanted to have Sidney Porter ( 0 . Henry) do it. I had it in mind that he should write twelve stories, each representing some incident in Bill’s life. I wrote to Porter, whom I had known while he lived in Texas ; but the letter was held back by his mother-in-law until a few weeks afterwards, when she visited him at his summer home at New Ground, Long Island. In the meantime, not having heard from Porter, I got in touch with Albert Bigelow Paine through James Creelman, whom I knew, and he undertook the work. . . .• I received a letter from Porter after Paine had undertaken the task, in which he said he would have liked to have done it, for it would have been a ' labour of love.’ “ I was amused at Paine when Captain Bill arrived in New York. Paine and I were waiting for him at the New Amsterdam Hotel, at Fourth Avenue and Twenty-First Street, which was convenient to the Players’ Club, where Paine intended to stay while writing the memoirs. It was a cold, wet night, and Bill came in with his ‘ slicker ’ and big Stetson hat. We went upstairs with him. He took off his coat, pulled from one side his *45 and from the other his automatic. He did this just as an ordinary man takes out his keys and knife. I explained to Paine that Bill had to carry his artillery in tMs way in order to be thoroughly ballasted — that he would have difficulty in walking without it. “ At this time Paine was writing the life of Mark Twain and was living most of the time at Mark Twain’s home, which was then in lower Fifth Avenue. Mr. Clemens invited us to dinner one evening. I could not go because of a previous engagement, but dropped in later. When I arrived, Mark and Bill were playing billiards and it was amusing to see Bill sight his cue just as if it were a rifle and, three times out of four, send his ball ofl the table. It entertained Mr. Clemens immensely. When we went upstairs, Clemens ran and Bill ran after, BACKGROUNDS 23 as if to catcli him, but did not do so. Bill winked at me and said, ‘ I believe the old man really thinks I could not catch him.’ BUI is as lean and as agile as a panther. “ Another time Paine invited Bill and me to take dinner with him at the Players’. I found Bill in the lobby of the hotel without a collar. I said, ‘ Bill, you have no collar on.’ He reached up his hand and replied, ‘ That’s so ; I forgot it.’ However, he made no move to get one. Paine came in a few minutes later and asked if he were ready to go to dinner. BUI replied that he was. Paine then said, ‘ Captain, you have no collar on.’ Bill remarked, ‘ My God Almighty, can’t a man go to dinner in New York without a collar ? ’ Paine did not press the matter further and Captain Bill went to the Club just as he was, much to the amusement of everybody there. " In my early boyhood I knew many of the BUI McDonald type, dthough he was perhaps the flower of them all. I knew personally many of the famous desperadoes, men who had kiUed so many that they had almost ceased to count their victims. . . . “ There were two types, of so-called ‘ killers ’ — one that murdered simply for the pure love of it, and others that killed because it was in their way of duty. Bill McDonald belonged to this latter class. So also did Blue-eyed Captain McKinney of the Rangers, whom I knew in my ranching days in south-west Texas. " McKinney was finally ambushed and killed, as almost every sheriff of La Salle County was killed during that particular period. Whenever I went to our ranch, I was never certain that I would return home alive. Feuds were always going on, and in some of these our ranch was more or less involved.” Fort Bend and Brazoria Counties, where the elder House’s plantation lay, seemed to be the breeding- place for bad men. “ They were different from the ordinary desperado, and only killed upon insult or fancied insult. Duels 24 BACKGROUNDS were frequently fought on the plantation and were always deadly. I recall two in particular. George Tarver's brother and his room-mate had some slight quarrel concerning the bed they occupied in common. I think the room-mate put his muddy boots on the bedspread. ‘ Here, you can’t put those boots on the bed,’ said George’s brother. ‘ I can if I choose,’ was the reply. There was only one possible outcome to the debate. They went out, stood back to back, counted aloud, walking ten paces, wheeled, fired, and advanced upon one another. They fell dead almost in each other’s arms, both having several mortal wounds. They were good friends a quarter of an hour before the duel. "Another incident I remember. Jim Thompson fancied that some man, whose name I have forgotten, was making fun of him. He demanded that the man get his shotgun. The man hesitated and made a faint apology, which Thompson would not accept. The man then got his shotgun, stepped out of the house, both fired, and Thompson killed him instantly. Thompson was missed by a few inches. They were so close together when they fired that the buckshot went almost like a rifle ball, having no time to scatter. " I asked Thompson why he was so insistent upon fighting. He said he knew that if he had not called the man to account, he would not have been able to live at Areola and would have been branded as a coward. It was necessary, he thought, either to kill or be killed, and without further argument. . . . " I can hardly realize that so short a while ago we lived in an atmosphere where such things seemed proper and even a matter of course. I was often with men whom I knew would surely be killed soon, and perhaps at a time I was with them. " Governor Hogg^ did more than any executive in Texas to break up this habit of public killing. ... He also broke up strikes during his administration. Cap- tain Bill McDonald, of the Ranger Service, was the ' Governor of Texas frota 1890 to 1894. BACKGROUNDS 25 instrument he used. Hogg sent word to the leaders that if they continued to uncouple cars, or to do any- thing that might interfere with the movement of trains, he would shoot holes through them big enough to see through. When Bill conveyed this to the ringleaders and presented himself as the instrument through which it was to be done, lawlessness ceased. “ The nearest I ever came to killing a man was in Breckenridge, Colorado. It was in 1879, when the town was merely a mining camp. I had gone to Colorado at the request of Whitney Newton, a college friend who was in Breckenridge at that time buying gold dust and sending it to the Denver Mint by special messengers, the express companies refusing to carry it because of the danger of robbery. “ In going to Breckenridge in those days, one left the main line of the railway at the little station of Como, which at that time had but one house. A so-called stage carried one from there to the mining camp. There is no need to describe it, for it was like all other camps of that sort-rough men, and rougher women, gambling, drinking, and kiUing. I was in a saloon, talking to a man whom I had known in Texas, when the incident I speak of occurred. A big, brawny individual came into the room and began to abuse me in violent terms. I had never seen the man before and could not imagine why he was doing this. I retreated, and he followed. I had my overcoat on at the time and had my hand on my six-shooter in my pocket and cocked it. The owner of the saloon jumped over the bar between us. In five seconds more I would have killed him. An explana- tion followed which cleared up the mystery. He had taken me for someone else against whom he had a grudge, and whom he had seen but once. I learned later that he was a popular ex-sheriff of Summit County and that if I had killed him I should have been lynched within the hour. " It always amuses me when I see the bad men in plays depicted as big, rough fellows with their trousers BACKGROUNDS 26 in their boots and six-shooters buckled around their waists. As a matter of fact, the bad men I have been used to in southern Texas were as unlike this as day- light from dark. They were usually gentle, mild- mannered, mild-spoken, and often delicate-looking men. They were invariably polite, and one not knowing the species would be apt to misjudge them to such an extent that a rough word or an insult would sometimes be offered. This mistake of judgment was one that could never be remedied, for a second opportunity was never given." In later years House expressed intense amusement at the oaths and objurgations of Parisian taxi-drivers, which, however violent, never seemed to result in physical encounter. “ In Texas,” he said, “ it was the reverse. No words were wasted. Frequently the first symptom of mild disapproval would be a blow or revolver-shot. People praise us Southerners for our courteous de- meanour ; we learned it in a school of necessity." Ill It would be a mistake to picture House’s early life as merely that of the frontiersman. Quiet and unobtru- sive as one of the mild-mannered desperadoes he describes, and as courageous, he loved to meet every variety of individual and he had a gift for bringing him- self into touch with the Rangers and men of the back districts.^ He loved the open country, the smeU of the camp-fire, and the meal cooked over its embers. But his time was spent mostly in the towns and especially in the capital. He knew the business men of Texas, the > S. V. Edwaxds, Captain of Rangers, wrote House, May 24, 1902 : " If you want anything in this new district all you have to do is indicate it. . . . I am with you to a finish in any old thing.” BACKGROUNDS 27 editors, lawyers, and educators ; later they tried to make him a trustee of the University of Texas. The Mayor of Houston writes to him as “ My dear Ed.” and the Governor signs himself “ Your friend.” His father had bequeathed to him a social position in the State which he enjoyed maintaining and develop- ing, so that, apart from the frequent journeys that he made to Europe, he came constantly into contact with persons of interest. The home in Houston was the place where nearly every distinguished visitor that came to Texas was entertained, Jefferson Davis among the rest. “ Father counted among his friends,” wrote House, ” the rich and the poor, the humble and the great.” The younger House followed in his footsteps. After moving to Austin, he built a large house which became the focus of the social and political life of the region. ” The large veranda to the south [wrote House] was the scene, perhaps, of more political conferences than any similar place in Texas. It was there that the clans congregated. I had long made it a rule not to visit, and it was understood that if anyone desired to see me, it must be at my home. I did this not only to conserve my strength, but because it enabled me to work under more favourable conditions. I had an office which I was seldom in, and latterly I refused to make any appointments there whatsoever. This necessarily led to much entertaining, and our house was constantly filled with guests. Those days and guests are among the pleasantest recollections of my life. “ Many distinguished people, passing through Austin, from time to time were our guests. Among those that I admired most was Dr. Charles W. Eliot of Harvard. His life and devotion to public service were a revelation to me. He seemed to regulate his life in a way to get the maximum of service for the public good. 28 BACKGROUNDS "Baron d’Estoumelles de Constant of France was another guest whose society I enjoyed while he was in Texas. I remember when leaving me at the station he remarked : ‘ My friends in Paris would be amazed if they could hear me say I was leaving Austin, Texas, with keen regret.’ ’’ Apart from the interest which he took in men and in their activities, a further characteristic should be noted: constant and omnivorous reading. This fact is to be deduced less from his correspondence and papers than from the existence of a private library which he developed and enlarged without cessation. It is an illuminating instance of the man’s real tastes that when, after the Paris Peace Conference, he had made a book- plate, he omitted in its composition all references to his diplomatic or political career; he chose as salient features ^bove the horse, dog, and camp-fire, the gun and powder-flask, reminders of his early life — an open hearth and books. The books which he read were of all sorts, poetry and essays, but chiefly biography, history, and political science. The main strength of Colonel House in his later political career was, of course, his understanding of human nature, his ability to enter into friendly relations with all t3^es ; but it would be a mistake to overlook the strength he derived from books. In such an atmosphere House began the career in politics which soon became his real vocation, and it was during those years that he underwent the political schooling that prepared him to assume a guiding rfile in national and international affairs. With aU the cosmopolitan tastes which he developed by constant travel, and with every intention of entering the arena of national poHtics, he regarded his life in Texas as a necessary and delightful prologue. Before he could BACKGROUNDS 29 acquire national influence, he must win prestige in his own State. An ardent Democrat, he saw in Texas, with its tremendous influence in the party, an ideal spring-board. A liberal and progressive, he could throw himself into the fight for liberal and progressive legislation which Governor Hogg — “ the inimitable Hogg,” House calls him— was directing. He was ready for the opportunity, which was not slow to knock upon the door. IV The year 1892 was one of politico-social ferment in Europe and the United States ; the forces of liberal progressivism were everywhere arrayed against reaction. In Texas the struggle was sharp. Governor Hogg, whose courage and force had made him a dominating influence in the State, was the centre of the storm ; and because of his advanced ideas, many of which found incorporation in sweeping legislative reforms, he had aroused against himself a powerful group which protested against his nomination for a second term. The fight offered to the young House the opportunity for which he had been waiting. " House was not nominally manager of the Hogg campaign,” writes T. W. Gregory, later Attorney-General, who was then active in Texas politics, “ but was chiefly responsible for the organization, and to him Hogg owed a large share of his victory.” ^ For ten years House had watched the mechanics of State politics, pondered the mistakes of politicians, developed personal contacts. Already he possessed the technique necessary for the conduct 1 Manuscript memorandum communicated to the author, August 1924. 30 BACKGROUNDS of a campaign, and it was infused with an enthusiasm for reform. “ When I found that the railroads and the entire corporate interests of Texas were combining to defeat Hogg [wrote House], I enlisted actively in his behalf. Although he had known me but a short time, we had many times discussed political ways and means, and he asked me and the then State Health Of&cer to take charge of his campaign. Later the burden of it fell on me. We selected a committee and got my good friend General W. R. Hamby to act as chairman. That campaign was a battle royal. We had no money, and every daily paper in Texas was against us. Hogg’s opponent was Judge George Clark, of Waco. When the Clarkites found we had sufficient votes to nominate Hogg, they bolted the convention and nominated Clark. The Republicans endorsed him and we had another hard fight at the election, but Hogg won by a decisive majority. It was a bitter fight and the wounds lasted many years. It was the first firm stand the people of any American State had taken against the privileged classes, and it attracted attention throughout the Union. “ I felt that Governor Hogg’s confidence in me was a great compliment, because of my youth and, as far as anyone knew, because of my lack of political experience. " So in politics I began at the top rather than at the bottom, and I have been doing since that day pretty much what I am doing now— that is, advising and helping wherever I might.” With the success of the Hogg campaign, the political position of House in Texas evidently became assured. “ From 1892 to 1902 [Mr. Gregory writes] House took continual interest in the elections and the admin- ' istration of Texas. . . . From the first he displayed that quality which made him of such value to the successive BACKGROUNDS 31 Governors and to President Wilson, an almost uncanny ability to foretell the effects which any measure would have upon public opinion. He was offered by them and dechned many positions of honour and power, and he might have been Governor himself. . . , “ In 1894 he managed Culberson’s successful cam- paign. He was again in charge when Culberson was re-elected in 1896. In 1898 and 1900 he directed the successful campaigns of Major Joseph D. Sayers. He was active in the Lanham campaigns of 1902 and 1904.” Apart from the fact that House himself consistently refused office, one notes especially, in the first place, that he was invariably successful in his political ventures, and in the second place, that he did not rely upon a “ machine,” for House's candidate for Governor was almost invariably opposed by his predecessor. It was a curious manifestation of electoral skill, political judg- ment, or good luck, according as the reader may choose. Thus in 1894 Governor Hogg and House disagreed upon his successor. The Governor supported the veteran Senator Reagan, who had served in Jefferson Davis’s Cabinet ; House was behind the State’s Attorney-General, Charles A. Culberson. Both were liberals. As always in Texas, the real struggle was at the Democratic Con- vention, where in addition to Reagan and Culberson two other candidates appeared — one of them as leader of the reactionary forces in the party which had been suppressed by Hogg. House pointed out the danger of division in the liberal camp. AU the reform legisla- tion of the past four years was threatened, and it could be saved only if one of the two liberals withdrew. The final interview between the Governor and his recalcitrant adviser must have been picturesque. Hogg was immense, loud, commandmg, with his “ Young man, you’U do as I teU you, if you know what’s good 32 BACKGROUNDS for you.” House, of slight build and quiet manner, speaking almost in a monotone, was inflexible in his argument that liberalism in Texas depended upon the union of the progressive forces und that to secure it Reagan must withdraw. It ended with Hogg going to Reagan, who magnanimously agreed to retire in order to avoid the split in the liberal group. ” Texas never produced a nobler citizen than Judge John H. Reagan,” wrote House. ” He was honest, he was able, and he was fearless.” Doubtless it was easier for House to pass this high estimate upon his erstwhile opponent, in that his retire- ment paved the way for the nomination of Culberson. Great was the astonishment of the convention when the man chosen to nominate Reagan, after beginning with the conventional eulogy of his subject, proceeded in the peroration to announce his withdrawal and to second Culberson himself. House stayed in the convention until his man had received a majority, then walked over to the club to congratulate him. It was characteristic of his foresight that he had by him the expert accountant Major Edward Sammons, who could add fractions in his head, so that in the convention (where fractional votes of delegations are common) he loiew the result some minutes before the clerks themselves. “ The truth is, as I told you,” wrote Culberson to House, August 17, 1894, " I could not have won except through your splendid management.” ” This is the only time in my political career [wrote House] that I openly assumed the chairmanship of a campaign. It has been my habit to put someone else nominally at the head, so that I could do the real work undisturbed by the demands which are made upon a chairman. BACKGROUNDS “ The public is almost childish in its acceptance of the shadow for the substance. Each chairman of the campaigns which I directed received the publicity and the applause of both the press and the people during and after the campaign had been brought to a successful conclusion. They passed out of public notice within a few months, or at most within a year ; and yet when the next campaign came around, the public and the press as eagerly accepted another figure-head. . , . “ In every campaign I have insisted that the candi- date whose fortunes I directed should in no instance make any pre-election promises, either directly, indirectly, or otherwise. I pointed out that it was bad morals and worse politics. The opposition usually promised everything, and it was not infrequent that two men would meet that had been promised the same office.” Four years later a similar situation developed when Governor Culberson, after a second term, supported his Attorney-General, M. M. Crane, while House opposed him — largely on the ground that the Attorney-General- ship was becoming a stepping-stone to the Governorship. ” I did not believe it was a good precedent to follow,” he wrote, ” because it would cause an Attorney-General to become something of a demagogue, perhaps uncon- sciously but nevertheless surely.” He agreed, therefore, to direct the political fortunes of a Texas Congressman who during the entire campaign remained in Washington, Major Joseph Sayers. ” Culberson urged me not to do this [wrote House], declaring that defeat was certain. ... I did not heed his advice. It looked as if it would be necessary to do what was done in the Culberson-Reagan fight four years before, and that was, to break down the organization which had been built up during the previous administra- tion. This was not disagreeable to me, for I was never a believer in political machines. 1—3 34 BACKGROUNDS “ In the Culberson race I had to overcome the Hogg organization which I had helped to build up. In the Sayers-Crane campaign it was necessary to defeat the Culberson organization. ... In justice to that organiza- tion, it pleases me to say that most of them came to offer their services in behalf of Sayers if I demanded it. This I did in no instance, advising them to go where their sympathies and interests lay. “ The two other candidates in this campaign were Lieutenant-Governor Jester and Colonel Wynne of Fort Worth. At the start I assumed that Crane had eighty per cent, of the chances for success. However, there were no single counties in Texas he could call clearly his own, while there were many counties that could not be taken from Sayers. “ We had our friends in these Sayers counties caU their primaries early. The Crane forces saw what we were doing, but were unable to respond in kind because they had no counties which they were absolutely certain of carrying. The result was that when county after county declared for Sayers and we had practically reached the end of our strength. Crane in a fit of depression withdrew from the race. “ The Dallas News called me over the telephone at twelve o’clock at night and said that Crane had sent in his written withdrawal. They asked me if I had any statement to make. I replied I would make one in the morning. I lay awake for nearly an hour, enjoying the victory, and then went back to sleep. In the morning before I arose I reached for one of my pockets, secured an old envelope, and wrote in pencil our opinion of Crane’s withdrawal. I took occasion to comphment Crane upon his great patriotism in bowing to the will of the people, and I declared that it was certain that Mr. Jester and Colonel Wynne would not be lacking in as high patriotic motives and that the electorate of Texas could look forward with certainty to their early with- drawal. The result was that both Jester and Wynne began to deny they had any intention of withdrawing. BACKGROUNDS 35 But the deed was done, and Jester actually withdrew within a few weeks and Wynne did not stand the pres- sure much longer.” Major Sayers displayed at the moment a gratitude and modesty which the elect of the people are not always prone to manifest. “ Your success in the management of my canvass [he wrote House, May 17, 1898] has been unprecedented in the history of political campaigns. You have taken a disorganized and probably a minority force at the outset and driven from the field the candidate of an organized majority. You have not only done this, but you have also held in line the lukewarm and trivial of our own party and have made them brave, vigorous, confident, and aggressive. Your generalship has indeed been superb, and considering that your own candidate was absent from the State and has not made a political speech outside of his own district in more than twenty years . . . your success has been without a parallel in Texas politics. ... I have felt that it would be wise in me to leave the entire matter to yourself.” The situation was not less piquant in that Culberson, who opposed House’s candidate for Governor, was him- self running for the United States Senate and asked House to direct his campaign. The latter acceded, and the election of Culberson proved to be the beginning of a senatorial career that lasted a quarter of a century. V House’s political activities in Texas were by no means confined to elections. Under both Hogg and Culberson he took a constant interest in legislation and gradually came to occupy the same position in the State 36 BACKGROUNDS as he was later to assume in national affairs. He believed first in the necessity of reform, and next in an intelligent and reasoned foundation for reform measures, and he spared no study or effort in the preparation of bills. His pride in the accomplishment of the Texas Governors was great, and perhaps not unjustified. " House was always a progressive [writes Gregory], and in many respects a pronounced radical, almost invariably being more advanced in his ideas than the persons he was working with. This genuine interest in progressive legislation accounts to a large degree for his interest in politics. He wanted to see advanced ideas placed upon the statute books. It is interesting to note that, although rated as one of the wealthy men of Texas, he was invariably aligned politically on the side of the plain people and*^ against most of those with whom he was socially intimate.” ” In Texas I worked, I think [wrote House], not only for Texas itself, but also in the hope that the things we worked for there would be faken up by the country at large ; and in this I was gratified. The great measures which Governor Hogg advocated, like the Railroad Commission, the Stock and Bond law, were largely written into national law later. Texas was the pioneer of suc- cessful progressive legislation, and it was all started during Hogg’s administrations. ... I see it stated from time to time that California, Wisconsin, and other States were the first to impress the progressive movement upon the nation. This is not true ; Texas was the first in the field, and the others followed. “ Even in municipal reform, Texas led the way. Galveston initiated the commission form of government, and nearly all the other Texas cities of importance fol- lowed. It was then taken up in Iowa and I often hear of the ‘ Dubuque idea.’ As a matter of fact, they took over the idea from Texas. " Governor Hogg, I think, we wiU have to place as BACKGROUNDS 37 the foremost Texan, giving Sam Houston the second place. He did not have the fine, analytical mind that Culberson has, but he possessed a force, vision, and courage to carr)^ out, that few men I have known possess. With Hogg it was always a pleasure to enter a fight, for it was certain that there would be no compromise until victory crowned the effort. He was afraid of nothing and gloried in a conflict. “It is a great pity that he did not go into national life when he left the gubernatorial chair. His proper place would have been in the House of Representatives, although he might have gone to the Senate had he so desired.” House’s relations with Governor Culberson w^ere even closer than with Hogg. Many people have wondered how it was possible for the Colonel later to find a way to make himself indispensable to President Wilson and by what magic he maintained himself as the Presiden:’? unofficial adviser. There was less of magic than of experience, for during his fexas days he had been doing exactly the same sort of thing for the Governors. “ During Culberson’s terms as Governor [he recorded] I devoted myself as constantly to his administration of public affairs as I have since to Woodrow Wilson’s as President. I went to his office at the Capitol nearly every day, and sometimes continued my work there until nightfall.” House’s files are fiUed with letters like the following : " Knowing that you have a great deal more influence with the Governor-elect than anyone else, and as I ask nothing for myself, I venture to write you in behalf of a friend of mine,” etc. And from the holder of an appointive office : “ I presume the crisis will approach 38 BACKGROUNDS very soon in matters political. When it comes, please remember me in your prayers." The Governor evidently relied upon House both as political confidant and personal friend. So much is made clear by the numerous letters that passed between them. “ You must take charge of things here [wrote Culber- son] and organize the work. My room will be open to you at all hours.” And at the opening of a legislative session : “ It is impossible for me to be in Austin prior to the organization of the legislature, and in fact I do not know when I can get there. This busy time I wish you would seek the Speaker, whoever he may be, and talk with him about the committees on taxation and revenue, finance and contingent expenses.” "In my day [ran a letter from Culberson, dated February i, 1895] I have had many friends, but you have been more than any to me. . . . There is nothing in the way of happiness and prosperity and honour good enough for you in my view, yet I hope for you all that is attainable.” After Culberson entered the Senate, the friendship evidently persisted, for he writes to House : “I wish I could see you to-day and have a long talk. I feel that way often these days. . . . Take a pencil and write me confidentially how I stand with the Democrats in the State now. Give me the thing straight, no matter how the chips may fall.” And when a certain bill came up in the Senate : " What do you think of it ? Write me fully and at your earliest convenience, because I want to study it.” BACKGROUNDS 39 It was Governor Hogg who provided House with the title of " Colonel/’ by appointing him, entirely without the recipient’s suspicion, to his staff. The staff officer’s uniform could be, and was, bestowed upon an ancient and grateful darkey, but the title proved to be adhesive. There is a certain poetic justice, almost classical in character, to be seen in the punishment thus laid upon House, who spent his Hfe in avoiding office and titles, and during the World War exercised as much ingenuity in escaping European Orders as in his diplomatic negotia- tions : henceforth, despite his protests, he became and remained " Colonel House,” or even “ The Colonel.” With the succeeding Governors, House’s relations were not so close, but it is obvious that in 1902 his influence in Texas affairs still dominated. He was the directing spirit in the election of Lanham in that year, who wrote to him in gratitude for " your discreet advice and promptness to suggest to me. Always say just what you think, for it will be received in the spirit tendered.” And again : " The fact that your influence was for me has been of incalculable benefit to me. . . . The knowledge of your friendship for me will also deter other entries into the field. ... I need and appreciate your counsel.” At the same period a letter from Con- gressman, later Postmaster-General, Burleson indicates that it had become a state tradition for House to draw up the party platform. “ I tender my congratulations upon the sldll you have displayed in drafting the platform. ... It is such a great improvement, from the standpoint of brevity, over those you have given us in the past, that I think the State is to be felicitated upon the prospects of its adoption.” 40 BACKGROUNDS But the end of this phase of House’s career was approaching. “ When another election drew near,” he wrote, “ I refused to interest myself in any way.” We find him asked by both candidates for his advice, which " I gave to each of them— advice which in no way con- flicted.” Apparently the one heeded the advice, while the other " was so certain of success that he left his campaign to be run in the old slipshod way, to find himself defeated.” VI " I had grown thoroughly tired of the position I occupied in Texas,” wrote House. He had, it is true, the satisfaction of participating in the administration of a great commonwealth ; ten years of Texas success had been admirable preparation. They gave him the political experience and prestige he needed. But now he felt equipped for a broader field. “Go to the front where you belong,” wrote Governor Hogg in 1900. “ During all these years [recorded House] I had never for a moment overlooked the national situation, and it was there that my real interest lay. In 1896 I was ready to take part in national affairs. My power in Texas was sufficient to have given me the place I desired in the national councils of the party. “ The nomination of Bryan in 1896 and the free silver issue made me feel the unwisdom of entering national party politics under such conditions. I therefore bided my time.” He proved that he knew how to wait. Three national campaigns followed in which the Democratic Party was dominated by Mr. Bryan or by Eastern conservatives, and House stood aloof. In each campaign overtures were made with the purpose of giving him a responsible BACKGROUNDS 41 share in its management, but on each occasion he evaded them. The Democrats must embrace the liberal creed, he insisted, but it must be cleansed of the Bryan financial heresies. None the less. House came more and more into touch with the national Democratic leaders and with Bryan himself, and established a close personal friendship. “ Mr. Bryan’s daughter, Grace, had not been well and he wished to spend a winter south. Governor Hogg and I undertook to arrange a home for the Bryans practically within the same grounds as ours. ... So he, Mrs. Bryan, and the children lived there next to us during the winter, and I had many opportunities to discuss with him national affairs and the coming campaign. It was the winter, I think, of 1898 and 1899. “ I found Mrs. Bryan very amenable to ad\ice and suggestion, but Mr. Bryan was as wildly impracticable as ever. I do not believe that anyone ever succeeded in changing his mind upon any subject that he had determined upon. ... I believe he feels that his ideas are God-given and are not susceptible to the mutability of those of the ordinary human being. ‘‘ He often told me that a man that did not believe in ' the free and unlimited coinage of silver at 16-1 was either a fool or a knave.’ He was so convinced of this that he was not susceptible to argument.” In 1900 Bryan went down to defeat for the second time. In 1904 the quarrels of the Eastern and Western Democrats would have ensured disaster even in the face of a weaker candidate than Roosevelt. “ I returned to Texas,” wrote House, " discouraged over the prospects of the Democratic Party ever being able to rehabilitate itself.” In 1908 came the third Bryan candidacy and defeat. But already the Democratic sun was about to rise. 42 BACKGROUNDS The difficulties in the Republican Party, which threatened under Roosevelt, became more obvious in the succeeding administration. They were intensified after Roosevelt’s return from travel abroad by his own outburst of dis- content at the policies adopted by Mr. Taft, whose selection as President he had himself demanded. The apparent control of the Republican Party by the Old Guard, alleged to be tied up to the “ interests,” the unsatisfied demand for measures of social reform, the threat of the new Progressive movement in the heart of the party itself, pointing to a possible split— all gave hope to the Democrats. That this hope was not entirely illusory seemed indicated by the state and congressional elections of 1910, when the political pendulum swung far in their direction. Colonel House was watching the opportunity. The great problem was to find a leader. In 1910 he came East from Texas and, like Diogenes, sought a man. “ I began now to look dbout [he wrote] for a proper candidate for the Democratic nomination for President. In talking with Mr. Bryan, he had mentioned Mayor Gaynor of New York as the only man in the East whom he thought measured up to the requirements. ” I felt sure the nomination should go to the East, and I also felt it was practically impossiWe to nominate or elect a man that Mr. Bryan opposed. I therefore determined to look Mr. Gaynor over with the thought of him as a possibility. “ I used my good friend James Creelman to bring us together. Creelman was nearer to Gaynor than any other man. He arranged a dinner at the Lotus Club, at which only the three of us were present, and it was a delightful affair. The food and the wine were of the best, for Creelman was a connoisseur in this line. The dinner lasted until after twelve o’clock. I bad been told that Gaynor was brusque even to rudeness, but I BACKGROUNDS 43 did not find him so in the slightest. He knew perfectly well what the dinner was for, and he seemed to try to put his best side to the front He showed a knowledge of public affairs altogether beyond my expectations and greater, indeed, than that of any public man that I at that time knew personally who was a possibility.” “ I proceeded to follow up this dinner by bringing such friends as I thought advisable in touch with him. “ One day Creelman and I went to the Mayor’s office by appointment, to introduce Senator Culberson and Senator R. M. Johnson, editor of the Houston Post and Democratic National Committeeman from Texas I got Culberson and Johnson to second my invitation to Gaynor to go to Texas during the winter and address the Texas legislature. Gaynor consented. When I went to Texas I asked some members of the legislature to introduce a resolution inviting him to address them. This was done and the invitation telegraphed to him. A newspaper reporter of one of the small Texas dailies sent Gaynor a telegram asking him about it, Gaynor telegraphed back something to the effect that he had no notion of coming to Texas to address the legislature and had never heard of any such proposal.” Reasonable explanation of this surprising volte-face on the part of Mayor Ga3mor has never been advanced. It may have been that he failed to appreciate the value of the support of Texas ~a vital misjudgment, as the Baltimore Convention of 1912 proved. Or it may have been merely another example of the erratic and whimsical nature of the Mayor which did so much to vitiate his undeniably statesmanlike qualities. Colonel House felt certain, in any case, that Gaynor’ s blindness to the opportunity he had created, indicated a lack of political sagacity. “ I wiped Gaynor from my political slate [he wrote], for I saw he was impossible. I was confirmed in this 44 BACKGROUNDS resolution when Dix was nominated for Governor of New York, which I wanted Gaynor to accept. Some of the Mayor’s other friends thought that it would be a mistake to accept the nomination, that to be Mayor of New York meant greater honour and more power than to be Governor of the State. I contended that the people would hesitate to nominate or elect a mayor of a city to the Presidency, but if he were elected Governor he would become the logical candidate.” House continued his search. He had carefully con- sidered Senator Culberson, and frequently discussed with him the possibility of the presidential nomination. But Culberson’s health was poor. Furthermore, House believed that he was too purely a Southerner to make a successful race. The candidate must come, if possible, from the East ; he must attract the West by his liberalism. “ I now turned to Woodrow Wilson [House wrote], then Governor of New Jersey, as being the only man in the East who in every wiy measured up to the office for which he was a candidate.” House had never met Wilson, but his attention had been called to him by Wilson’s ambitious reform pro- gramme in New Jersey and the success with which he was driving it through the legislature. He studied his background, which was admirable in that he had no political record and thus started with no political enemies, while his troubled career at Princeton seemed to label him as an opponent of aristocratic privilege. He studied his speeches, which he believed should be classed with the finest political rhetoric extant. There was obviously in him the capacity for moral leadership. Late in the year House returned to Texas convinced that he had found his man, although as yet he had never BACKGROUNDS 45 met him. “ I decided to do what I could,” he writes, “ to further Governor Wilson’s fortunes. I spoke to all my political friends and following, and lined them up one after another. This was in the winter of 1910-1911.” Thereafter we find House making arrangements to bring the Governor to Texas, in clearing up doubts of his party regularity, in securing the aid of Culberson and striving for that of Bryan. A letter to E. S. Martin, editor of Life, makes it plain that House’s support of Wilson as yet rested less upon his personal admiration for him than upon the conviction of Wilson’s availability. “ The trouble with getting a candidate for President [he wrote, August 30, 1911] is that the man that is best fitted for the place cannot be nominated and, if nominated, could probably not be elected. The people seldom take the man best fitted for the job ; therefore it is necessary to work for the best man who can be nominated and elected, and just now Wilson seems to be that man.” Thus in his work for Wilson, House was serving the Democratic cause rather than the man, whom he had never seen. One afternoon late in November, Governor Wilson called alone on Colonel House at the Hotel Gotham, where the latter was staying. From that moment began the personal friendship which was so powerfully to affect the events of the following years. CHAPTER III BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP It looks to me as if they depended too much upon speech-making and noisy demonstrations, and not enough upon organization. House to Wtlson, August 28, 1912 I W oodrow WILSON and Colonel House first met on November 24, 1911, a year before the presidential election. Already House had decided definitely that circumstances made of Wilson the most available candidate, one who could arouse the enthusiasm of the voters in the electoral campaign, and one who, if elected, possessed the courage and the imagination to lead a vigorous reform administration. For these were the two qualities which the Colonel believed essential to a successful President. Governor Wilson, in his turn, must have found his curiosity piqued by the friendly efforts of the unseen House, word of which had been brought to him during the summer. Without experience in national politics, he knew little or nothing of the career of House in Texas, nor of his relations there with the successive Governors and with Bryan. But he appreciated the skill with which House, working through Senator Culberson, had disposed of the attacks on Wilson’s party regularity that threatened to destroy his candidacy even while in the em- bryonic stage ; and he was impressed by the success of his address in Texas which House and Gregory had arranged. 46 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 47 This beginning of what Sir Horace Plunkett later called “ the strangest and most fruitful personal alliance in human history,” should properly have taken place under more dramatic auspices. The small hotel room where they met did not add glamour to the occasion and neither could guess what the political future held in store for them. But each evidently experienced an instinctive personal liking for the other which ripened immediately into genuine friendship. The first impres- sions of Wilson can only be deduced from the almost affectionate tone of the letters that he wrote to House after the interview. Those of the Colonel have been preserved in more definite form. “ He came alone to the Gotham quite promptly at four [recorded House], and we talked for an hour. He had an engagement to meet Phelan, afterwards Senator from California, at five o’clock, and expressed much regret that he could not continue our conversation. We arranged, however, to meet again within a few days, when at my invitation he came to dine with me. ” Each time after that we met at the Gotham, as long as I remained in New York that autumn and winter and whenever he came to the city. “ From that first meeting and up to to-day [1916], I have been in as close touch with Woodrow Wilson as with any man I have ever known. The first hour we spent together proved to each of us that there was a sound basis for a fast friendship. We found ourselves in such complete sympathy, in so many ways, that we soon learned to know what each was thinking without either having expressed himself. “ A few weeks after we met and after we had ex- changed confidences which men usually do not exchange except after years of friendship, I asked him if he realized that we had only known one another for so short a time. He replied, ‘ My dear friend, we have known one another always.’ And I think this is true.” 48 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP It is curious to note that it was the personal amiability of Mr. Wilson, rather than his intellectual qualities or political ideas, which impressed House at the outset. He thus reported this first interview to his brother-in- law : Colonel House io Dr. S. E. Mezes'^ New York, November 2$, 1911 Dear Sidney ; I had a delightful visit from Woodrow Wilson yester- day afternoon, and he is to dine with me alone next Wednesday. ... I am glad that he has arrived, and we had a perfectly bully time. He came alone, so that we had an oppor- tunity to try one another out. He is not the biggest man I have ever met, but he is one of the pleasantest and I would rather play with him than any prospective candidate I have seen. From what I had heard, I was afraid that he had to have his hats made to order ; but I saw not the slightest evidence of it. . . . Never before have I found both the man and the opportunity. Fraternally yours E. M. H. Writing in November to Senator Culberson, House expressed his thorough satisfaction with Wilson as a candidate and solidified the support which the influential Texan Senator was already prepared to offer. The more I see of Governor Wilson the better I like him,” said House, “ and I think he is going to be a man one can advise with some degree of satisfaction. This, you know, you could never do with Mr. Bryan.” Wilson’s amenability to advice at this period per- ^ Then President of the University of Texas, later President of the College of the City of New York^ BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 49 mitted an important development which House suggested and carried through. The Governor had taken as his chief text for campaign speeches the political control of privileged interests under Republican Administrations. He had not, however, emphasized the importance of the real stronghold of privilege and the means by which it might be attacked. If Wilson were to pose as the champion of the “ common man,” he must not overlook the tariff. “ In reading the speeches he was making in 1911 [recorded Colonel House], I noticed he was not stressing the tariff. I called his attention to this and thought it was a mistake. Underwood and Champ Clark were making this a feature. I was sure Wilson could do it better than they, and, since it was becoming a prominent issue of the campaign, I advised striking a strong note on the subject in order at once to call attention to him- self as a fit champion of the Democratic cause. I sug- gested that he let me invite D. F. Houston,^ who had made a lifelong study of the question, to come to New York for consultation. “The Governor agreed to the advisability of this move, and Houston came. I gave a dinner at the Gotham [December 7]. The others present besides Governor Wilson were Houston, Walter Page, McCombs, and Edward S. Martin. I seated Houston by Wilson and arranged it so they could talk afterwards. Before dinner I went over the data which Houston had prepared, and added to it and eliminated from it whatever seemed necessary. This data was afterwards given to Governor Wilson, who based his tariff speeches largely on it.” The effect of Wilson’s tariff speeches was destined to put him in the popular mind as the chief antagonist of 1 Formerly President of tlie University of Texas ; at this time Chan- cellor of Washington University, and later a member of Wilson's Cabinet- 50 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP Republican policies and therefore the natural repre- sentative of the Democratic point of view. The dinner at the Gotham also assured the enthusiastic support of Mr. Houston. Dr. D. F. Houston to Dr. S. E. Mezes Washington University, St. Louis December ii, 1911 My dear Mezes : ... I have just returned from New York, where I saw a great deal of Mr. House and something of some other people. I will tell you all about it, including the Wilson part of it. Wilson is the straightest-thinking man in public life, and can say what he thinks better than any other man. He may not be a great executive officer, but neither was Lincoln, and I am for him. Wilson is clean, courageous, and disinterested. It will be a liberal education to the community to have Wilson do the talking, such of it as he ought to do and will have to do. I can’t tell you how mfuch I enjoyed my visit with Mr. House, especially on the train. He has a vision. I should like to make him Dictator for a while. . . . Cordially yours D. F. Houston II The various booms for candidates were now beginning to assume definite form. The Wilson movement was regarded more seriously by the practical machine poli- ticians than hitherto, but wiseacres believed that the final struggle would be between Underwood of Alabama and Harmon of Ohio. Both were regarded as repre- senting conservative interests. Champ Clark of Missouri, esteemed a radical, ‘was mentioned by those who realized the difficulty of success with a conservative standard- BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 51 bearer and who feared that Wilson, after his fight with the New Jersey bosses, would not be inclined to accept the orders of any machine. Both House and Governor Wilson understood that the approval of Bryan would be a factor essential to the success of Wilson’s candidacy, and from the autumn until the time of the nominating convention, House worked ceaselessly to secure it. The intimacy with Mr. Bryan which he had developed in Texas now proved of inestimable value, for he knew exactly which of Wilson’s qualities would attract Bryan and therefore deserved emphasis ; he laid especial weight upon the fact that the reactionary forces in the Democratic Party were fighting both Bryan and Wilson. " Before I left for Texas, in December 1911 [wrote House], it was understood that I should nurse Bryan and bring him around to our way of thinking, if possible. Before Mr. Bryan left New York for Jamaica, he asked me to keep him informed concerning political conditions and to send him such clippings as I thought would be of interest. He said he was taking but few papers : the World, the Washington Post, I think he mentioned, because I wondered why he took either of them, since they were both so antagonistic to him. “ However, his request gave me an opportunity to send him such clippings as I thought would influence him most in our direction.” As early as November, we find House writing to Senator Ciflberson : “ I saw Mr. Bryan just before he sailed for Jamaica and I think I removed several ob- stacles that were in his mind, and I got him in almost as good an attitude as one could desire.” Thereafter House called Bryan’s attention to all the Wilson char- acteristics likely to attract his approval. 52 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP Colonel House to Mr. W. J. Bryan New York, November 2 ^, 1911 Dear Mr. Bryan : . . . Governor Wilson called yesterday afternoon and was with me for an hour and a half. I am pleased to tell you that when I asked him what he thought of the Supreme Court ruling about which we talked when you were here, he replied in almost the exact terms you used to me. As far as I can see, your positions are identical. He is also opposed to the Aldrich plan,^ but I think you are both wrong there. You will have to convert me the next time I see you. I am inclined to think that Aldrich is trying to give the country a more reasonable and stable system. It seems to me a long way in advance of the money trust which now dominates the credit of the nation. There is some evidence that Mr. Underwood and his friends intend to make a direct issue with you for control of the next convention, and it looks a little as if they were receiving some aid from Champ Clark and his friends. My feeling is that we can lay them low, but we must not lag in the doing of it. . . . Faithfully yours E. M. House New York, December 6, 1911 Dear Mr. Bryan : ... I was called over the telephone last week by a friend of Mr. Hearst, who made an appointment to see me. He said that Mr. Hearst had been out to his country place on Sunday and they had talked about enlisting me in his behalf for the presidential nomination. ' For a central bank. WUson ultimately accepted House’s arguments for centralized control of banking which materialized in the Federal Reserve Act. See Chapter VI. BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 53 I told him that I was thoroughly committed to Governor Wilson and that, even if I were not, I would advise Mr. Hearst to submerge himself for a while and work within the party for a season. After further conversation it developed that he was grooming himself for a dark horse. I do not know what effect my talk had, but as yet he has made no formal announcement. I learned, too, that he was favourable to Underwood or Champ Clark and was against Governor Wilson. I took lunch with Colonel Harvey yesterday. It is the first time I have met him. I wanted to determine what his real attitude was towards Governor Wilson, but I think I left as much in the dark as ever. He told me that everybody south of Canal Street was in a frenzy against Governor Wilson and said they were bringing all sorts of pressure upon him to oppose him. He said he told them he had an open mind, and that if they could convince him he was a dangerous man he would do so. He said that Morgan was particularly virulent in his opposition to Governor Wilson. I asked him what this was based upon, and he said upon some remark Governor Wilson had made in Morgan’s presence con- cerning the methods of bankers and which Morgan took as a personal reference. He told me that he believed that any amount of money that was needed to defeat Governor Wilson could be readily obtained. He said he would be surprised if they did not put $250,000 in New Jersey alone in order to defeat delegates favourable to his nomination. We are going to try to devise some plan by which we can use this Wall Street opposition to Governor Wilson to his advantage. If the country knows of their determination to defeat him by the free use of money, I am sure it will do the rest. . . . If you can make any suggestions regarding the best way to meet the Wall Street attack, I would greatly appreciate it. 54 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP From now, letters wiU reach me at Austin, Texas. With kind regards and best wishes for aU of you, I am Faithfully yours E. M. House There was in the foregoing letter a cleverness which might escape the too casual reader. In the form of simple narrative Colonel House underlined the activities of Hearst, who was anathema to Bryan, and emphasized Hearst’s preference for Clark over Wilson; he then indicated the interest Wall Street exhibited in the defeat of Wilson ; and he concluded by an assumption that Bryan would ftaturally align himself with the forces that stimulated the enmity of Hearst and Wall Street. Mr. Bryan evidently wavered. He had opposed Harmon from the first, as a rank reactionary, and he refused to consider Underwood. If Clark were to have the support of the New York group, Bryan might be drawn to Wilson. Mr. W. J. Bryan to Colonel Home Kingston, Jamaica, December 2Z, 1911 My DEAR Mr. House : , . . Am anxious to get back and find out more of the political situation. I shah attend the Washington banquet on the 8th of January and will have a chance to learn how things are shaping up. I am glad Governor Whson recognizes that he has the opposition of Morgan and the rest of WaU Street. If he is nominated it must be by the Progressive Demo- crats, and the more progressive he is the better. The Washington banquet will give him a good chance to speak out against the trusts and the Aldrich currency scheme. Yours very truly W. J. Bryan BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 55 The Washington banquet, to which he referred, gave a good chance to Bryan himself to exhibit his personal generosity, for just before it Wilson’s opponents published a letter which, while President of Princeton, he had written to Mr. Adrian Joline, some five years previous. In the letter appeared this unfortunate sentence : “ Would that we could do something at once dignified and effective to knock Mr. Bryan once for ail into a cocked hat.” It would have been only human nature if the Commoner had then and there forsworn Mr. Wilson and all his works. Instead, he did not permit himself to show any pique and at the dinner manifested the ut- most cordiality to the Governor, who himself in a speech of rare discretion emphasized the admiration that all good Democrats felt towards Mr. Bryan. It is possible that his friendliness towards Wilson was enhanced by the controversy between the Governor and Colonel George Harvey, which received much publicity as the result of % spirited exchange of letters between Mr. McCombs and Colonel Watterson. For Bryan distrusted Harvey as a representative of New York interests. House appreciated keenly the part which Colonel Harvey had played in setting Governor Wilson on the road to political fortune. Harvey had encouraged him to give up his academic career and try the luck of politics; he had influenced the New Jersey machine to give him the nomination for Governor. From the first he had worked with the possibility of the presidential nomination in mind. But the fervour with which he supported Wilson in Harper’s Weekly raised suspicions in the Middle West that the Governor, through Harvey, was putting himself under obligations to New York financial interests. This was so obvious that House 56 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP had discussed with his friend E. S. Martin, editor of Life and also an associate editor of Harper’s Weekly, the desirability of a less enthusiastic support of Wilson by the Weekly. After House left New York, Colonel Harvey put the question direct to Wilson, as to whether the Governor felt this support to be injurious; the reply of the latter was perhaps too brusque an affirma- tive. The affair might have passed as a minor incident, had it not been for the emotion displayed in the press by McCombs on the one side and Watterson on the other. It was a moment when the conciliatory influence of House, then absent in Texas, would have proved valuable. Colonel House to Mr. E. S. Martin Austin, Texas, January i8, 1912 Dear Martin : What a mess we have made with the Harper’s Weekly- Harvey-Wilson matter. I feel it is largely my fault, and yet I had no thought of it taking any such direction. I would rather be defeated for the Presidency than even be under the suspicion of ingratitude, and, according to Colonel Watterson, Governor Wilson was almost brutal. I hope this is exaggerated. All I had in mind was for Harper’s not to be so strenuous, but I never remotely considered wounding Colonel Harvey’s feelings nor the breaking of the friend- ship between Governor Wilson and himself. , . . Faithfully yours E. M. House Both the Harvey episode and the publication of the Joline letter ultimately worked in favour of Mr. Wilson. In the Middle West and the South the impression became current that the Governor had braved the New York interests in refusing Harvey’s support and had dis- played honesty in telling Harvey that he did not want BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 57 it. In Texas Mr. Gregory skilfully utilized a remark of Colonel Watterson, who had taken up the cudgels in favour of Harvey. Watterson spoke rather sneeringly of the “ austere truthfulness of the schoolmaster.” There was in Texas, a rural community, a great free school system and some forty thousand school teachers. Mr. Gregory at once gave full publicity to the phrase, asking whether Wilson should have lied in answer to Harvey’s question and whether this was not a time when austere truthfulness was desirable even from a schoolmaster. The next day forty thousand Texan school teachers were behind Wilson. Bryan, reassured by Wilson’s quarrel with Harvey, obviously felt kindly towards him after his own magnani- mous treatment of the “ cocked hat” incident. While still warm with the sense of having acted in a rather large way, he continued to receive the commendatory letters of Colonel House that always emphasized, directly or indirectly, the progressiveness of Wilson and the opposition of Wall Street to him. Colonel House to Mr. W. J. Bryan Austin, Texas, January zt, 1912 Dear Mr. Bryan ; . . . Another thing that has pleased me beyond measure is your treatment of the Joline-Wilson incident. Your friends all knew your bigness of mind and heart, but it was an object-lesson to those who thought of you differently. I am glad that you have taken the position that you have regarding the Wilson-Harvey controversy. I know a great deal about it, perhaps as much as anyone, and I hope that I may have the pleasure of discussing it with you when you come to Texas. . . . Faithfully yours E. M. House 58 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP Colonel House to Governor Wilson Austin, Texas, February 2, 1912 My dear Governor Wilson : Mr. Bryan is now on his Rio Grande farm, and I have asked him here before he leaves. In the meantime I will continue to keep in touch with him by correspond- ence. Please let me know if there is anything you would like to have suggested to him, for there can be no better place to do this than by the quiet fireside, I am, my dear Governor, Your very sincere E. M. House Colonel House to Mr. W. F. McCombs Austin, Texas, February 10, 1912 Dear Mr. McCombs : . . . Mr. Bryan has gone to Tucson to see his son, but he promises to stop over and see me at the first opportunity. He says he did not stopTn going through, on account of reaching Austin at four o’clock in the morning, which he thought a little early for me. I sent him some clippings favourable to Governor Wilson, which he promises to use and asks for more. If you could think to have sent me things that you would like to have used in the Commoner, I am sure that I could arrange it. I agree with you that Mr. Bryan’s support is abso- lutely essential, not only for nomination but for election afterwards ; and I shall make it my particular province to keep in touch with him and endeavour to influence him along the lines desired. He has evolved considerably in our direction, for when I first talked to him in October he did not have Governor Wilson much in mind. Faithfully yours E. M. House BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 59 Apart from his interest in winning Bryan to the Wilson cause, House directed his energies to the organiza- tion of Texas, the forty votes of which were bound to exercise a powerful influence at the Democratic Nominat- ing Convention. As one looks back, it is easy to see that without Bryan and without the steadfast loyalty and enthusiasm of the Texas delegates, Wilson could not have been nominated. That Colonel House realized this so long before the convention is an indication of the degree to which foresight afiected his plans. When he arrived in Texas, in December 1911, he found that, despite the success of Wilson's Dallas speech, sentiment had not crystallized in his favour. An energetic campaign would have to be developed if Wilson delegates were to be chosen. “ That campaign,” writes Mr. Gregory, who played an important role in it, " was the greatest work of organization that I remem- ber. Colonel House had various pieces of his old poli- tical machinery i5nng around, which he soon brought together ; but we had against us the political forces of the state. The Chairman and thirty of the thirty-one members of the State Executive Committee were opposed to Wilson, the Governor did not favour him, and Senator Joseph W. Bailey stumped the State against him. Only four of the Texas Congressmen favoured him.” ^ House mobilized his friends, who for three months stimulated Wilson sentiment in critical districts, without a blare of trumpets but none the less effectively, it would appear, for by the beginning of March the Colonel was willing to express the expectation of a solid Wilson delegation from Texas. He was the more optimistic 1 Memorandum of T. W. Gregory. Subsequently Governor Campbell a friend of Colonel House and later a member of the Texas delegation a Baltimore, supported Wilson vigorously in the National Convention. 6o BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP in that the Harmon supporters devoted themselves to speeches rather than personal canvassing, a sure method, according to House, of making a noise and losing the fight. Colonel House to Mr. W. F. McCombs Austin, Texas, March 4, 1912 Dear Mr. McCombs : . . . Confidentially, I have not been at all satisfied with our organization in this State ; but I am glad to tell you that it is now getting in such shape that I feel I can say that you need have no further concern about Texas. I will not go into details now, further than to let you know that it is in process of complete organization and that we find the sentiment largely for Governor Wilson. Strangely enough, the opposition are doing practi- cally nothing in an effective way, except to blow in the newspapers. , . . Faithfully yours E. M. House Colonel Rouse to Governor Wilson Austin, Texas, March 6, 1912 My dear Governor Wilson : _ I am pleased to tell you that we now have every- thing in good shape in Texas and that you may con- fidently rely upon the delegates from this State. We may or may not have a presidential primary, but the result will not be changed. In two or three weeks our organization will be per- fected, and then I shall leave for the East where I shall have the pleasure of seeing you. Faithfully yours E. M. House Mr. Wilson replied that House’s news brought great cheer when he most needed it. The Governor had been BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 6i discouraged by the news from Kansas and Michigan, where he felt the Wilsonian forces ought to have won, and he declared that the Colonel’s success in Texas and the knowledge that he would soon be East to offer his counsel put him in heart again. Wilson was troubled by the suspicion of a combination against himself of Clark, Underwood, and Harmon, with a division of territory, and by what he regarded as evidence of its being financed from Wall Street. And he expressed the fear that the " dear old party ” might become the tool of reactionaries. Ill In April Colonel House returned to New York, satisfied that Texas was safe for Wilson, but disturbed by the failure of the Wilson forces to make the progress elsewhere that had been expected. For the political situation had changed since«autumn. The conservative leaders, who favoured Harmon or Underwood, appreci- ated the strength of liberal feeling in the party and realized that Wilson by assuming the leadership of the liberals might run away with the nomination. To defeat him the Harmon, Underwood, and Clark sup- porters combined to concentrate in each State upon the strongest candidate opposed to Wilson. The result was that the threat of Champ Clark, in particular, began to appear dangerous. Bryan had endorsed him as a liberal and the conservatives preferred him to Wilson, for he was a “ practical politician ” with whom they could negotiate. At least he would serve to deadlock the convention against Wilson. “ Nobody regards Clark seriously,” wrote House to Gregory, “ except as a means to defeat Wilson.” 62 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP After a few days in the East, House recognized the strength of the combination that was putting Clark forward. Pennsylvania went for Wilson, but the South and the Middle West were cold. “ Illinois hit us a pretty bad jolt,” wrote House to Burleson on April ii, “It was not that we expected to carry it, but we did not expect to lose by so heavy a vote. A few days later Nebraska declared for Champ Clark. The Colonel recorded that at the end of May it looked as if the anti- Wilson forces would triumph. Bryan remained neutral as between Clark and Wilson. “ I had seen Mr. Bryan in New York [wrote Colonel House] almost immediately upon arrival in April, and had persuaded him to declare his belief that either Clark or Wilson would be an acceptable candidate. I could not get him to go further than this, although I pointed out that all his enemies were in the combination to defeat Wilson. “ Mrs. Bryan helped me in getting a favourable decision for Woodrow Wilson. I remember I break- fasted with the Bryans at the Holland House, and every argument I made in behalf of Wilson was supple- mented by Mrs. Bryan.” The Commoner refused as yet, however, definitely to commit himself, and Colonel House could not avoid the suspicion that Mr. Bryan regarded it as a good Demo- cratic year and would not scorn the nomination. Colonel House to Senator C. A. Culberson New York, May i, 1912 Dear Senator ; ... It looks to me as if the opposing candidates might again be Bryan and Roosevelt. In that event, I think Roosevelt would beat him. He would get his share of the progressive vote and most of the conserva- BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 63 live vote. _ Bryan thinks he could beat Roosevelt, but, in my opinion, he could beat Taft more easily. Wilson’s best chance now, I think, is the fear of many people that Bryan will be nominated and the further fear that Hearst may succeed in landing Champ Clark and then dominate the Administration. Faithfully yours E. M. House As May passed, prospects appeared brighter ; and the result of the Texas convention, which, as House had predicted, was wholly in Wilson’s favour, gave impetus to the cause. The Colonel relied upon the forty dele- gates from Texas to stand firm, and his confidence was justified. He told them to consider no second choice. Mr. Gregory records that shortly before the convention, “ Tammany made an offer to the Texas delegation that, if they would drop Wilson, Tammany would support Culberson ; but the delegation, which included Culberson himself, simply laughed at them.” House also relied upon the fact that many delegates instructed for Clark or Underwood approved Wilson in their hearts and would vote for him as soon as it became obvious that their candidates could not be chosen and they were released from their pledges. He now advised Wilson to proceed carefully, for he felt that Bryan, influenced by his wife, was more favourable, and he feared the tactical mistake which at the last moment so frequently spoils a candidate’s chances. Colonel House to Governor Wilson Beverly, Massachusetts Jum 7, 1912 Dear Governor Wilson : I have a letter from Mr. this morning, telling me that he has suggested some things to you, which I hope you will not consider. . . . 64 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP In my opinion, everything is being done that should be towards influencing the delegates in your behalf. Plans for organizing them into an efficient and effective force at Baltimore are already under way, and will be much more potent than anything Mr. has suggested. If I see the situation rightly, there has never been a time when your nomination seemed so probable as now, and if I were you I would move cautiously and do no- thing further for the present. I do not doubt but that a large part of your time has been taken up, as indeed has Mr. McCombs’s and mine, by people giving advice which, if acted upon, would defeat our ends. Do you recall what I told you concerning the con- versation I had with Mrs. B. ? I have a letter this morning from her containing this most significant sen- tence ; “I found Mr. B. well and quite in accord with the talk we had.” ^ It encourages me to believe that Mr. Clark will never receive that influence and that you will. It also means that he [Bryan] will not want the nomination unless two Republican tickets are in the field. If your engagements will permit, I hope that we may have the pleasure of seeing you here before the 25th. Faithfully yours E. M. House Governor Wilson replied in a manner that would have surprised some of his later critics. He not merely thanked House for his advice, but confessed that he stood in need of it, for at first he had been inclined to follow Mr. ’s suggestion. Not only did he admit he was wrong, but he promised not to act independently in the future. ‘ Evidently suggesting that Bryan was veering away from Clark. BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 65 IV Colonel House was not at the Baltimore Convention which nominated Wilson, Because of his health he was accustomed to flee American summer heat, and even the importance of this particular crisis did not prevent him from following his regular habit, which was to spend the summer in Europe. When the convention met, he was on the ocean. ft This absence did not eliminate his influence. In Texas he had been present at only three of the nominat- ing conventions that chose the candidates he had sup- ported ; he was accustomed to lay his plans so carefully that they could be clearly understood and definitely executed by his lieutenants. Thus we find him, during the weeks that immediately preceded the convention, in close consultation with Mr. McCombs and spending long hours v/ith the leaders of the Texas delegation, which was promised the rolb of Old Guard in the ap- proaching battle. “ On June i [the Colonel recorded] McCombs and I went to Beverly, Massachusetts, where we had taken a house for the summer. McCombs was so run down in health that I did not think he would be able to go to the Baltimore Convention on June 25. Governor Wilson thought I was mistaken about this and that he was tougher than his appearance indicated. I was sure, however, he needed the rest ; and I was also sure he needed what suggestions and coaching I might be able to give him in regard to handling conventions, because he had never had any experience in such matters.” In these consultations Mr. T. W. Gregory and Mr. T. A. Thomson of the Texas delegation played a pro- minent part. They were to hold the fort against Clark, I C 66 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP who had already secured a majority of the delegates and who, if his strength did not weaken on the early ballots, threatened to gather enough more to obtain the neces- sary two-thirds. Underwood was strong in the South, but among the Southern delegations there was bitter opposition to Clark which the Texans were able to capitalize. “ It looked to me [recorded House] as if Wilson had a good chance, but nothing more. I urged both Gregory and Thomson to use their influence with the Texas delegation to hold it as a unit and to stay in the fight in the same way we had been accustomed to do in Texas. The history of the convention records the work of those forty delegates from Texas, without whose loyalty and intelligent support the President could never have been nominated.” \^Tiat House advised was to assign to each influential member of the Texas delegation the task of working upon some other delegation with whom he had personal relations, and to secure mutual understanding that in no contingency would either yield to pressure from the Clark forces. This plan had evidently long been in Colonel House’s mind, for as far back as December 1911 he had written to a Southern friend, William Garrott Brown : “It goes without saying that we will make no move adverse to Mr. Underwood in his own State, but we will expect our friends to see that delegates are selected there not unfriendly to Governor Wilson for second choice.” Mr. Gregory thus describes his own activities ; “ Champ Clark had by far the largest convention vote of any of the candidates, and it was evident that he must first be disposed of before any of the other BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 67 candidates would have a chance. In these circumstances the Wilson people made airtight agreements with a sufficient number of delegates instructed for candidates other than Clark, to the effect that under no conditions would any parties to the agreement vote for Clark ; there was no agreement as to what would be done after Clark had been eliminated. The delegates involved in this agreement constituted more than one-third of the convention vote, and against this stone wall the forces of Champ Clark battered in vain.” Colonel House to Governor Wilson Beverly, Massachusetts Jtme 20, 1912 Dear Governor Wilson : I am sorry beyond measure that it is my fate not to be able to be at the Baltimore Convention. Both my inclination and my deep interest in your success call me there, but I am physically unequal to the effort. However, I have done everything that I could do up to now to advise and to anticipate every contingency. I have had interviews with many delegates, and some of my warm personal friends on the Texas delegation will be here to-morrow in order to have a final word. Colonel Ball, who is perhaps the most forceful man on the Texas delegation and the one best equipped for floor tactics, has wired me that he will be in Baltimore to-day. I have told Mr. McCombs of those upon whose ad\'ice and loyalty he can lean most heavily, and now I feel that I can do nothing further excepting to send my good wishes. If Mr. Clark’s strength crumbles on the second and third ballot— which I hope may be the case— then I believe that you will be nominated forthwith ; but if, on the other hand, his vote clings to him and he begins to get the uninstructed vote, he may be nominated. We are sailing for England on the Cunard s.s. Laconia on the 25th at six o’clock, but Mr. McCombs has promised 68 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP to tell me of the result by wireless ; and if you are nominated I shall return almost immediately. I shall at least have the benefit of the trip over and back, and that is one of the reasons I am going on the 25th rather than waiting until after I know the result If you will permit me to act as your friend in an advisory capacity, it will give me pleasure to use my every effort in your behalf. With kind regards and best wishes, I am Faithfully yours E. M. House Beverly, Massachusetts June 23, 1912 Dear Governor Wilson : T. W. Gregory and T. A. Thomson, two of the delegates from Texas, have just left me. I have never known two better organizers than they are, and I have outlined to them in detail what to do at Baltimore with Mr. McCombs’s approval. I am afraid that if thorough organization is not had, we will find fifty of our friends working upon one dele- gation and perhaps no one attending to another dele- gation of equal importance. I have suggested that the forty men from Texas be divided into four units of ten, and each given one of the doubtful Southern States. The same methods should be pursued with New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and other loyal delegations. In this way the work becomes effective and good results foUow. I have urged them to make friends with the delega- tions to which they are assigned, to influence and enter- tain them in one way and another until the convention is ended. . . . Faithfully yours E. M. House On June 25 Colonel House sailed, and on the same day the Democratic Convention met at Baltimore. Its history has been told many times and we may merely BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 69 remind ourselves of the bitter struggle between the liberal and conservative forces, and of how Clark, originally put forward to break the Wilson movement, soon threatened to run away with the convention. His strength did not crumble, as House had hoped, after the first few ballots and, if we may believe Wilson’s secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, even McCombs despaired. At this juncture appeared the value of the plans made by House during the winter and spring. The Wilson delegates, at first in a small minority, stood firm, led by the band of forty from Texas. Gradually, as the cause of Underwood appeared hopeless, Wilson began to pick up votes from the delegations of which he was second choice ; the Clark forces weakened. And at the critical moment the arguments that House had so constantly pressed upon Bryan, during the winter and spring, bore fruit. The New York delegation, dominated by Tammany, attacked Wilson and supported Clark with such vigour that Bryan -was finally convinced that Wilson must be the right man. His intervention proved decisive, and on the forty-sixth baUot Wilson received the nomination. Colonel House had not yet reached England when the issue was determined. “ I received the notification of the nomination of Wilson by wireless, one day out from Liverpool. It was from H. H. Childers and read, ‘ Wilson wins.’ It came at ten o’clock at night. Dr. Arthur Hadley of Yale and some others were pla5dng cards at the time. I told Hadley that perhaps he would be glad to know that Woodrow Wilson had been nominated at Baltimore. I was sadly mistaken in my supposition that the know- ledge of this would give him pleasure, for I never saw a man who evinced less enthusiasm.” 70 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP V The real struggle of 1912 was for the nomination. It would have been far otherwise had the Republican Party remained united and presented its normal strength at the polls ; in such a case the election of Wilson would have been difficult, if not impossible. But the dissen- sions which during the spring had already threatened Republican solidarity culminated in Republican disaster at the Chicago Convention, where Taft was nominated ; for the adherents of Roosevelt bolted, organized the Progressive Party, and in August nominated their hero. Most well-informed observers, while they conceded the personal popularity of Roosevelt, believed that the lack of an established organization would certainly prevent his election ; nor did they believe that Taft, now deprived of the support of the most vigorous elements in the party, would prove a dangerous candidate. Wilson might count upon the approval of many regular Republicans who detested Roosevelt and who realized that the surest means of defeating him would be to elect Wilson, The issue proved the accuracy of such prog- nostications. Generalizations are usually misleading, but in this case the historian may venture the assertion that in 1912 Roosevelt put Wilson in the White House. Colonel House was among those who believed that the result of the split in the Republican Party would be certain Democratic victory. Hence he did not cut short the travels that he had planned for the summer of 1912, which included Sweden, Finland, Russia as far east as Moscow, Germany, France, and England. In August, however, he returned ready to throw himself into the campaign, which soon captured all his time and energy. He was delighted with the liberalism and BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 71 eloquence displayed in Wilson’s speeches, which gained in effectiveness as the campaign progressed ; and he found a double assurance of success in the vehemence with which Roosevelt emphasized the differences between Republicans and Progressives, in his virulent attacks upon Taft. “ In my opinion [he wrote Wilson, soon after his return] the greatest asset that we have is the scare that Roosevelt is giving the conservative Republicans, and I have found that my efforts in proselytizing prominent Taft adherents have been successful whenever I have been able to show that a vote for Taft is a half- vote for Roosevelt.” Colonel Rouse to Governor Wilson Beverly, Massachusetts August 28, 1912 Dear Governor Wilson : ... I am trying to get our friends to organize properly in Vermont and Maine. It looks to me as if they depended too much upon speech-making and noisy demonstrations, and not enough upon organizations. I have suggested that they get a committee in every precinct, whose business it shall be to get out the Demo- cratic vote and influence as many of the Republican votes as possible. Upon these committees I have suggested placing a Taft Republican, who is supporting you for one reason or another, a progressive Republican who does not want to vote for Roosevelt and cannot vote for Taft, and the best Democratic organizer that can be obtained. If this method is followed, not only in Vermont and Maine, but in every State in the Union, there will be nothing left of your opponents that wiU be worth while. Your very sincere E. M. House 72 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP What interested House chiefly was not so much the election of Wilson, which he regarded as certain, as the question of harmony between the Democratic leaders. Fortunately, the influence of Mr. Bryan was not among the disturbing elements. He was naturally satisfied with the part he played at Baltimore, where he had abdicated his own pretensions, and his attitude towards the candidate whose success he had done so much to assure was one of benevolence. Obviously he was not inclined to interfere with the management of the cam- paign. Mrs. W. J. Bryan to Colonel House Fairview, Jtily 27, 1912 My dear Mr. House : Have been in a mad struggle with mail lately— my desk is cleared and I celebrate by writing a line to you. Your letter was faithfully delivered by Mr. Thomson, and the correctness of your diagnosis was even then proven. I thought of you aaid Mrs. House several times while the fight was on. I knew how anxiously you were awaiting bulletins on shipboard. Just between us three, it was a remarkable fight. I was never so proud of Mr. Bryan — ^he managed so well. He threw the opponents into confusion ; they could not keep from blundering and he outgeneralled them at every point. After all their careful planning, he wrested the power from their hands. Under the circumstances I am sure the nomination went to the best place and am entirely satisfied with the result. Will said all the time he did not think it was his time, and when we found the way things were set up we were sure of it. The people through the country regard him as a hero —he is filling Chautauqua dates in larger crowds than he has ever had, and is perfectly well. The mail i The secretary told me yesterday there are several thousand Baltimore letters still unopened, and it is almost impos- BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 73 sible to handle the daily increase. I am not telling you these things to boast, but because I know you are interested to know how he is getting on since he has been “ buried ” again. As to the possibilities in case of Democratic success : I am not sure what he would do. I know he dislikes routine work exceedingly, but believe he would do anything to help the cause. . . . Did you read the platform ? Will got in a provision on national committeemen that will eliminate the whole ring four years from now. — This letter seems full of politics, but we are all interested. My best wishes for a safe return and kindest regards to Janet, Mrs. H. and yourself. Sincerely yours Mary B. Bryan Reassured by the friendly attitude of Mr. Bryan, Colonel House was none the less disturbed by the lack of organization in the Democratic campaign and the contentions that had arisen among the campaign leaders. “ They are making the usual campaign of speeches, publicity, and noisy demonstrations,” he wrote Mr. Houston, " and if it were not for the split in the Repub- lican Party the result would be fatal.” It was true that the Republicans and Progressives firmly refused to permit the Democrats to defeat themselves. But if the latter were so torn by discord at the moment of victory as to find it impossible to organize an harmonious adminis- tration, there would be small profit in victory. Much of the dif&culty resulted from the illness of Mr. McCombs, who had been chosen Chairman of the National Committee and who during the summer found himself unable to stay at Headquarters. Mr. McAdoo, Vice- Chairman, took active control of affairs. Feeling between the two men and their adherents became scarcely short 74 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP of envenomed. It was the first news that reached House upon his arrival from Europe. " We landed at Boston [he recorded] and motored to Beverly, where messengers began to^ come telling of discord and demoralization at Democratic Headquarters. Those that brought their tales first were adherents of McCombs, and my sympathy was largely with him. "McCombs himself came from the Adirondacks to Boston for a conference with me. He told a story of perfidy that was hardly believable. McAdoo was the ringleader and he, McCombs, was the victim.” For Colonel House the important matter was party harmony. Unable to decide exactly where the trouble lay, although to begin with he sympathized with McCombs, he was determined that the first Democratic Administration in twenty years should not be ruined at the outset by the scandal of a public quarrel. The initial step was to prevent the resignation of McCombs, which he threatened at regular intervals. The next was to come into touch with McAdoo. Colonel House to Governor Wilson Beverly, Massachusetts September 2 , 1912 Dear Governor : McCombs is seriously thinking of resigning, and may do so to-morrow. There are reasons why his resignation at this time would be a serious blow to the cause. I cannot go into an explanation here, but you would readily under- stand the reason if all the facts were before you. . . . Mr. McAdoo has asked me to go to Maine, which I shall do to-morrow night or Wednesday morning ; and when I return I should be glad to come to New York if you will let me know when you will be there. Your very sincere E. M. House BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 75 " I returned to New York [wrote Colonel House] as soon as the weather would permit, and had a conference with Woodrow Wilson. I asked if he knew of the feud that was going on between McAdoo and McCombs, and I indicated my sympathy for McCombs. At that time I knew McAdoo but slightly, having met him but twice. Wilson asked me not to make up my mind about the matter until I had learned the ins and outs of it by personal contact at Headquarters. “ I afterwards learned the wisdom of this advice, for I had not been in New York more than two weeks before I knew that there was another side. Later I found that it was almost wholly McCombs’s fault and that McAdoo was scarcely to blame at all. McCombs was jealous, was dictatorial, ... He was not well enough to attend to the campaign himself, and he could not sit by and allow McAdoo to carry on the work and get a certain amount of newspaper publicity. This latter was particularly galling to McCombs.” At this moment (September 25, 1912) Colonel House began to make those detailed daily memoranda which, taken together, form a diary the historical importance of which can hardly be overstated. Every night, with rare exceptions, during the following seven years, he dictated his record of the events of the day, whUe his recollection was fresh and definite and with an astounding frankness of expression. From the first of these memoranda it appears clear that during these weeks his main task was always the composing of quarrels. It was a function to which he had become accustomed from his days at school, where, according to a youthful friend, he loved to incite disputes between his schoolmates in order to have an opportunity to settle them. In September and October there were not merely the difficulties between the leaders at National Headquarters 76 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP which must be alleviated, but also the customary dis- agreement between the National Committee and Tam- many Hall. The New York organization had fought the nomination of Wilson at Baltimore and would evidently not “ tote fair ” in the election unless Wilson agreed actively to support the New York State ticket ; and this Wilson would not do if it meant endorsing the Tammany boss, Charles F. Murphy. As always, there was the danger that Tammany would trade its support of the presidential candidate against Republican willing- ness to permit the election of the Democratic candidate for Mayor of New York City the year following. And this danger was increased by Wilson's attack upon the bosses and his refusal to approve the renomination of Governor Dix, which Murphy demanded. At National Headquarters there were divided counsels. McAdoo, who may have himself hoped to be nominated for Governor, was willing to fight the bosses ; McCombs, both because ofihis feud with McAdoo and his political affiliations, was willing to endorse them heartily. House disliked the bosses and wrote on September 28, " I believe McAdoo would be good material for the Governorship.” But he held that an open breach with Tammany must be avoided at all costs. “ The New York situation is acute [wrote House, on September 25], and it is necessary for some ' definite policy to be decided upon. The break between Murphy and National Headquarters is becoming wider each day, and the newspapers are printing numerous false inter- views which make it yet wider. I am anxious to hold the party together, so that every available means may be used for the common good. My dishke of Tammany and its leaders is perhaps stronger than that of Governor Wilson ; yet, having had more political experience, I BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 77 am always ready to work with the best material at hand. My idea is to have them decide upon some unobjection- able Tammany man for Governor of New York who would not bring discredit upon the party. . . . “ There is much jealousy and back-biting at Head- quarters, and tales are fetched and carried without number until all harmony is lost. McAdoo and others are anxious to give me a room for my personal use. I do not desire a room. They want to give me half of O'Gorman’s.^ Everyone ohers me someone else’s room. McAdoo continues most cordial and belies the charges of his accusers. . . Wilson, fulminating against the bosses, was on the point of attacking Murphy and Dix by name and insisting that the New York nominating convention formally repudiate the control of Tammany Hall. It would have meant an open conflict between the National and the City and State organizations. “Governor Wilson [House wrote, September 28] came in last night from New England, leaving at twelve. He asked me to take him out in our motor for a conference. He was particularly anxious to discuss the State situation before making his speech at McCombs's dinner. McAdoo is urging him to come out actively against Dix and Murphy. I urged him not to do this. McCombs is the only Mnk between the bosses and Wilson. The Governor’s inclination is to go after them. He finally a^eed to give out a letter Monday without mentioning either by name. . . . “ October 2 ; The New York situation is still in a muddle. . . The solution finally discovered by Colonel House was not without its elements of humour. At least it pre- vented an open rupture between the National Democratic 1 United States Senator from New York, 78 BEGINNINGS OF A. FRIENDSHIP organization and the New York organization. Mr. Murphy, leader of Tammany, agreed to the demand of Wilson, edited by House, that no man should dictate to the nominating convention what it must do. Quietly he permitted the impression to percolate that Governor Dix need not be renominated. At the convention, he (according to a New York correspondent), " once Boss Murphy, now metamorphosed by the talisman of college men's ideals into Leader Murphy, said nothing, gave no orders— when nominations for Governor were called reported himself ‘ present, not voting 1’ ” The convention, thus freed from the despotism of the bosses, repudiating Dix, proceeded to nominate the Honourable William Sulzer, the purest product of the New York City organization. “ The advocates of the bossless con- vention had won and nominated a Tammany brave.” Thus House saved Wilson from the tactical mistake of a quarrel with Tammany, which would at this moment certainly have failed to dislddge the bosses and must have produced merely disorganization ; at the same time he persuaded Murphy ostensibly to yield to Wilson's leader- ship. Press reports gave him full credit : “Just what the wise Texan whispered into the Princeton ears no man may know. But the club did not fall on the Tam- many head. . . . The good ship is sailing strong and no breakers ahead. Without Tammany New York was gone. With Tammany New York City will give Wilson the largest vote ever recorded for a Democratic candidate. . . . The story of Democratic success is almost ready to be told. Only one thing can prevent— Wilson himself. If he makes no blunder ! He almost did in the matter of New York— but Ed House is still here.” ^ Later, when the leadership of Wilson in the party had * Press despatch by Pat Lay, New York, October 4, 1912. BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 79 been assured, House urged a vigorous assault upon Tammany; but a less propitious moment than the autumn of 1912 could not have been selected. More difficult, however, was the situation caused by the physical and nervous condition of the Democratic Chairman. Much of House’s time and energy was consumed in quieting the suspicions of Mr. McCombs, in persuading him to avoid indiscretions and to forget enmities. It was not the first or the last occasion upon which Colonel House served the cause of harmony by assuming the ungrateful role of buffer. “ October 3 : McCombs and McAdoo had an interview, and I hope that a more amicable relation will follow. The Governor ■ was particularly anxious to have this brought about, and said he knew that I could do it if it could be done at all. “ October 8 : I went to see McCombs. I do not like his af&hations or methods. He is very secretive and wiU only interview one person at a time, although he seems to have no secrets from me. He suggested getting rid of McAdoo by giving him the presidency of some railroad out West, which he said he could secure for him. ... “ October 13 : McCombs is very emphatic that no campaign promises, either direct or indirect, have been made. I talked to Governor Wilson, urging liim also not to make any promises. He says he has not, but he does not altogether trust McCombs in this direction. . . . “ October 24 : McCombs is in a panic, and believes there is a chance of losing New York, Illinois, and Wis- consin. . . . “ October 25 : I went to Headquarters at eleven and met McCombs as I was leaving. ... He was counter- manding everybody’s orders, without regard to authority. . . . McAdoo teUs me that the Governor thinks it best not to address him [McAdoo] in future, and McAdoo 8o BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP asked him not to consider him in any way. He said he would do the best he could until the campai^ was over, and then he wished to be forgotten. I did not tell McAdoo that the Governor was doing this at my suggestion and because I am afraid of an open scandal between McCombs and himself. . . . “ October 26 : Very little is being done at Head- quarters excepting routine work. I went over each department, after seeing McAdoo at nine at his hotel. McCombs is in conference most of the time with old- style politicians. The whole character of the callers has changed since he took charge, and for the worse. I fear Governor Wilson will have trouble on account of connections made at this time. . . . “ October 31 : McAdoo is not in evidence at all, and has almost effaced himself to secure harmony. ...” VI At the height of the campaign the country was shocked by the news that ^ fanatic had shot Mr. Roose- velt, who was on a speaking tour, and that, while he would recover from the wound, his personal campaign was at an end.^ Colonel House, in opposition to the members of the Democratic Campaign Committee, in- sisted that Mr. Wilson should cancel his speaking engage- ments, for it did not seem quite sporting for him to continue his vigorous campaign so long as his most redoubtable adversary was laid low. “ October 18 ; Everything is upset to-day over the attempted assassination of Theodore Roosevelt. . . . " I telephoned Governor Wilson at Princeton wMe Burleson was here, urging him to cancel all engagements 1 Mr. Roosevelt, whose life was saved by the manuscript of his speech and his glasses* case in Ms breast pocket, recovered so rapidly that he was able to address an enthusiastic rally in Madison Square Garden just before the election. BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 8i until Roosevelt was able to get out again. Wilson was at first doubtful, but wrote out a statement, which he read to me over the telephone, following my suggestions as to what to say. Ail of the Campaign Committee were against me in this. They wanted the Governor to continue speech-making, and so advised him. My thought was that if he continued to speak after T. R. had been shot, it would create sympathy for T. R. and would do Wilson infinite harm. The situation is a dangerous one and needs to be handled with care. The generous, the chivalrous, and the wise thing to do, so it seems to me, is to discontinue speaking until his an- tagonist is also able to speak. I am glad Wilson sees it as I do. He suggested that we might delay a decision until to-morrow and get the opinion of the full Committee, but I disagreed with this and said that the delay would be disadvantageous. Then, too, it would make it embarrassing if the Committee Offered from him, as they certainly would, for their individual opinions have already been expressed. Burleson thinks I took too much responsibility in advising contrary to the rest of the Committee ” The Colonel’s opinion carried the day, and Wilson’s speaking tour was abandoned. The effect of this gesture, combined with the exchange of cordial telegrams of sympathy and appreciation between Wilson and Roose- velt, was certainly not disadvantageous to Wilson's campaign. “ The best politics,” House used to say, “ is to do the right thing.” The attack upon Roosevelt immediately drew House’s attention to the danger of a similar attempt upon Wilson’s life, and he bethought himself of his old Texas friend the Ranger, McDonald. Captain Bill would furnish com- plete protection and ideal company for the Governor. There was also the advantage that McDonald, as House well knew, would waste no time in discussion as to T — 6 82 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP whether the trip from Texas were worth while or what preparations he ought to make. Colonel House to Captain McDonald [Telegram] Come immediately, tillery. New York, October 15, 1912 Important. Bring your ar- E. M. House Captain McDonald to Colonel House [Telegram] Coming. Quanah, Texas, October 16, 1912 McDonald Colonel House to Dr. D. F. Houston New York, October 22, 1912 Dear Doctor Houston :r ... I got the Governor to let me send for Bill McDonald after the T. R. assault. I merely wired Bill to come at once. ... He thought I was in trouble, so he borrowed a shirt from one of his friends, boarded the train without money (which he borrowed on the way), and landed here in a little over two days after leaving Quanah. I took him from the station to Headquarters, and it happened that Judge Parker and Norman Mack were in McCombs’s rooms when I brought Bill in. He had on his big white Stetson and a four days' growth of beard, and I need not tell you he created a sensation. . . . Mrs. Wilson told me on Sunday that she had slept better Saturday night than at any time since T. R. was shot. They all seem pleased with Bill. I arranged to keep him out of the papers, and he has refused to open his mouth to anyone about an3rthing. I told him when he came not to say a word to anybody, BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 83 and he is carrying it out literally. I heard a reporter ask him who I was, and that is the only time I have heard him speak. He told the fellow that he was a stranger in New York and did not know. The mayor and police of one town that I know tried to disarm Bill after he was out of the Ranger Service and had no right to carry arms, but they were unable to accomplish their purpose. I would like to see the New York police try it. Faithfully yours E. M. House Wilson and his protector became fast friends. A fortnight after McDonald’s arrival. House noted : " I arose at seven and went over to see Governor Wilson and Captain Bill at the Hotel Collingwood. They were just leaving for the train, but we had a few minutes’ conversation. Bill said the Governor was the finest fellow in the world, and the Governor seemed equally pleased with Bill and said he was taking good care of him.” After the election McDonald returned to Texas, with keen appreciation of his Eastern experiences, but without reluctance to leave the hard city pavements. He once complained to Colonel House ; “ Ed, I get awful tired of walking on these rocks.” He was not entirely un- critical of the protection provided eminent public servants by the Government. " November 8 : Old Bill arrived [recorded House], and after talking with him I think it is best for him to return home for the present. The Wilsons were sorry to see him leave. He looked over the Secret Service men to see if he thought them fit. He told me that they did weh enough, but he did not like their carrying •38’s. When he said this to the Secret Service men, 84 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP they did not like it and replied : ‘ A *38 will kill a man all right/ ‘ Yes/ said Bill, ‘ if you give him a week to die in/ I find that he has talked much of me and my political work in Texas to Wilson. The Governor wanted to know whether I had been successful in all my political campaigns and what kind of men I had chosen.” VII The last days of the campaign were not marked by the customary excitement, for the result of the election had become a foregone conclusion. The contest between Roosevelt and Taft had split the anti-Wilson vote so effectively that a Democratic landslide in the electoral college appeared certain. As election returns came in on November 5, it soon became clear that Democratic confidence in overwhelm- ing victory was fully justified. Mr. Taft carried only two States, Roosevelt oi^ly 88 electoral votes. It is true that Wilson’s popular vote was less than a majority, but his plurality in the electoral college was the greatest ever received by a presidential candidate, and he carried with him handsome Democratic majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives. “ I went to Headquarters [wrote House on the even- ing of election day], and saw a few people, but nothing of importance was going on. By half-past six o’clock it was evident that Wilson had won, so I sent him a telegram of congratulation. By seven o’clock returns were in enough to enable one to see that it was a Wilson landslide. " I went down to the Waldorf Hotel, where McCombs had invited^ guests to hear the returns. He had taken nearly one side of the hotel, and there were about twenty- five people there ” BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 85 It was a season of triumph for McCombs, who as Chairman of the Committee received fervid praise. It was one of equal although less obvious triumph for Colonel House, whose share in the campaign only a few of the more keen-sighted realized. He held no office in the party organization, his goings and comings at Head- quarters were unostentatious. But there was no thread in the campaign pattern which he had not touched, no symptom of party discord which had not evoked his genius for pacification.^ The new Wilson Administra- tion might have been wrecked at the moment of victory. This the President-elect understood and his gratitude to House was unfeigned. Two days after the election, replying to House’s note of congratulation, he declared that no small part of Democratic success must be ascribed to the counsels of the Colonel. Whether or not the victory at the polls could be capitalized to ensure a positive programme of reform legislation, was the question of the future, and to it Colonel House had already turned his attention. X < He wonld come into an office/ explained a Democratic Committee- man, ‘ and say a few words quietly, and after he had gone you would suddenly become seized with a good idea. You would put that idea forth and receive congratulations for it ; it would work out first-rate. Long after, if you thought the thing over, you would suddenly realize that the idea had been oozed into your brain by Colonel House during a few minutes* quiet conversation. You did not know it and the Colonel did not want you to know it. As a matter of fact, before the campaign was over, in his quiet way Colonel House came near being the biggest man about the works, although be did not hold any position and would not take one.* ** — CmfBni Opinion, vol. iv, no. 6, June 1913. CHAPTER IV BUILDING A CABINET Yon can never build a Cabinet to please everybody. . . . When you have about concluded that you have the proper man, someone will come along and condemn him so vigorously that it will make you doubt. There- fore, in the end, you will have largely to determine their fitness yourself. House to Wtlson, November 22, 1912 I T he victory of 1912 was the first won by the Democrats in a presidential election since 1892, an even twenty years. This long exclusion from power laid a tremendous handicap upon the party and its leaders when they came to organize an administra- tion ; for in the United States the minority suffers as much materially from being the under-dog as the majority suffers morally from an over-long lease of control. The older men of the party which has been in opposition have developed critical rather than constructive faculties, and it is long since they have exercised executive func- tions ; comparatively few younger men of capacity have been attracted to the party, and those few have had no administrative experience. What is worse, long political exile will have sharpened everyone’s appetite for office, and the first indication of success at the polls will sound like a dinner gong, gathering the ravenous horde of anxious place-hunters, whose ability is apt to be in inverse ratio to their eagerness. Mr. Wilson did not conceal from himself the particular dMculties which he, as leader of the party and President- 86 BUILDING A CABINET 87 elect, must face. He was without political experience except for his brief tenure of the New Jersey governor- ship. Although he always maintained that a college president found ample opportunity to develop political genius, he did not, at this time certainly, overestimate his own ability. He was threatened, furthermore, by a flood of enthusiastic and contradictory advice. His two chief campaign leaders, McCombs and McAdoo, were at daggers drawn . The man who exercised strongest influence in the party, Mr. Bryan, Wilson regarded as impractical and notoriously mistaken in his personal judgments. Other leaders, such as Underwood and Champ Clark, he had fought vigorously in the pre- nomination campaign. Still others, in Congress, upon whom he must depend for the success of his legislative programme, were ex-Populists, such as Gore of Oklahoma, or machine politicians, such as Stone of Missouri ; both types Wilson had attacked frequently and fearlessly, and their assistance in this .juncture was at least ques- tionable. Each and all of them, furthermore, if not applicants for office themselves, marshalled a solid phalanx of deserving Democrats who had long and faithfully served the cause when there had been no hope of immediate reward and for whom places must be found. As early in the campaign as September 7, House wrote to Waiter Hines Page : “ The wise man will not envy Governor Wilson even in success, for, as you say, the office-seekers will sorely beset him. They are cheerfully dividing up the honours now, and the numbers engaged in this pleasant pastime will increase as the campaign grows older.” It was inevitable that Wilson should turn to Colonel House for assistance. Apart from the warm affection 88 BUILDING A CABINET he had conceived for House, he knew the reputation for political sagacity which the Colonel had earned in Texas and he recognized the value of his services in the pre- nomination and electoral campaigns. House and Wilson, furthermore, were in close accord upon all important political issues. Both were ardent liberals, and Wilson’s S 3 nnpathy was not lessened by his realization that the Colonel’s idealism was touched by a very real sense of the practicable. The factor which counted most heavily in stimulating the confidence of Wilson was the obviously disinterested attitude of Colonel House. At the beginning he made it plain that he would ask nothing for his friends and wanted no office for himself. He was too much the philosopher to be attracted by the badge of public position, and he was convinced that he could serve the Administration more effectively out of office. “ I would not exchange the confidence and friendship that Governor Wilson seems to have for me,” he wrote in November, ” for any office in the land.” Nor would he give advice on appointments until the President demanded it. Colonel House to Dr. S. E. Mezes New York, November 4 , 1912 Dear Sidney: . . . My mail is getting heavy with applications, but I think I know how to handle it. As a matter of fact, I do not care two whoops in hades who gets the offices, and Governor Wilson knows it. . . . He has the opportunity to become the greatest President we have ever had, and I want him to make good. He can do it if the office-seekers will give him leisure to think, and I am going to try and help him get it The Governor spent practically all day with me BUILDING A CABINET 89 Saturday, most of the time at the apartment. It would have done your heart good to have seen him walk in after we had finished lunch, and Loulie’s expression when I asked him to join us. It is true that I took the food from under the servants’ noses as they were about to eat it, but the Governor enjoyed what he had neverthe- less. . . . Fraternally yours E. M. House Colonel House to Senator Culberson New York, Noveniber 5, 1912 Dear Senator : ... It is Governor Wilson’s intention to leave in ten days for a four weeks’ absolute rest, and during that time I suppose the boys will decide definitely upon what offices they will take. As far as I am concerned, I am not interested in the office end of it. ... I have urged Governor Wilson to leave these matters largely to his Cabinet, to the Senators and to the Congressmen, and let them be the bufier between himself and the hungry host. I rather think he will do this in his own defence, in order that he may have some leisure to consider the complex problems that will confront him. . . . It is that end of his Administration in which I am most interested. In other words, I am interested in measures and not in men, and what time I have I shall devote to helping him in that direction. . . . Your very faithful E. M. House With everyone else trying to tell the President-elect what he ought to do and everyone advising differently, and with Colonel House refusing to press any claims, Wilson characteristically put full trust in him. House was ready. Long before the election, regarding Wilson’s victory as assured, he had prepared to help him in every 90 BUILDING A CABINET way that he could ; and he knew that the first call for advice would be upon the subject of appointments. However honest he might be in his interest in measures rather than men, the personnel of the new Administra- tion was the first great problem to be faced. “ I am on constant watch for good material [he wrote on October 21] from which to select a Cabinet and other important places. I wish to be well informed if Governor Wilson should consult me.” There was no danger that House would not be well informed of those who desired office. The applicants themselves saw to that. Party leaders already recog- nized the influence he had acquired and guessed that his approval might be the determining factor in an appoint- ment. " A tremendous mail arrived from all directions,” he wrote immediately after the election. ” Everyone wants something.” AU attempts to disguise the import- ance of the position givenr him by the President-elect proved fruitless, for Mr. Wilson’s frequent visits to the small apartment on Thirty-Fifth Street were too well known. From October until the following spring, when in desperation he left for Europe, the assault upon the Colonel continued. Colonel House to Dr. S. E. Mezes New York, October ii, 1912 Dear Sidney: ... It is not a pose with me, this keeping out of the limelight ; but it is my judgment that I can do far more effective work and accomplish the things I have in mind better by the methods I have heretofore followed. I agree with you that it is going to be dif&cult to keep out of the papers. . . . The trouble is, the fact that I am close to Wilson is BUILDING A CABINET becoming known ; and, since everybody wants some- thing, they are doing their best to please me and this is the way they think to do it. A magazine is trying now to write me up and wants my photograph, but if they get it, it will be when I have lost my head more completely than I think I have as yet. Fraternally and hastily yours E. M. H. Pressure upon House was increased because Wilson had determined to go to Bermuda for a rest and before sailing was slow to confer with the politicians, who one and aU feared that they were not going to find a place in the picture. The Colonel reassured them and urged patience, at the same time that he pointed out to Wilson the need of showing consideration for their sensibilities. “ I telephoned to the Governor [he wrote on Novem- ber 14] and advised him to write a note to Mr. Bryan telling him that he would .confer with him after his return from Bermuda. He said he would do so at once. I am to see the Governor Saturday morning and will advise him concerning other matters pending. In my opinion he is making a mistake in not calling for advice from political leaders, as they will become disgruntled.” Two days later, before Wilson left, he and House drew up a tentative list for Cabinet positions and discussed the best means to satisfy those who, by their work in the campaign, felt that they had earned proper rewards. It was already agreed that Mr. Bryan must be given his choice of positions. As far back as September, House recorded that Wilson had accepted his argument that ” it would be best to make him Secretary of State, in order to have him at Washington and in harmony with the Administration, rather than outside and possibly in 92 BUILDING A CABINET a critical attitude. Mrs. Bryan’s influence, too, would be valuable,” Whatever his capacity, Bryan had come to Wilson’s rescue at Baltimore and might ask for political recogni- tion, Furthermore, his influence in the party was such that, if hostile, he could effectively block the legislative programme and perhaps wreck the Administration. Nothing illustrates more clearly the exigencies of govern- ment under the party system. Mr. Wilson did not want Bryan in his Cabinet and did not believe him fitted for the Secretaryship of State ; but it was undeniable that the new Administration could carry through its reform programme more effectively with Bryan in it. At least there would not be the danger to the public service that threatened in 1897, when McKinley, in order to provide a vacancy in the Senate which Mark Hanna might fill, appointed Senator Sherman Secretary of State,^ The claims of McCombs and McAdoo were placed in the forefront because of ' their campaign leadership. Wilson regarded the abilities of the latter highly, but he distrusted the former’s capacity, although he had long had for him a personal fondness. McCombs was in ill-health, lacked evenness of temper, and was ready to make alliance with the type of old-fashioned politicians whom Wilson hated. He had done much to stimulate enthusiasm in the pre-nomination campaign, but the experience of the electoral campaign itself seemed to indicate that his appointment to a Cabinet position would not make for harmony, even if he possessed the requisite administrative capacity. 1 William Roscoe Thayer wrote of this manoeuvre : " To force the venerable Sherman, whose powers were already failing, into the most important office after that of President himself, showed a disregard of common decency not less than of the safety of the nation.” {The Life of John Hay, ii, 156.) 93 BUILDING A CABINET “ November i6 : Governor Wilson telephoned me early [recorded Colonel House] and asked if it would be convenient for him to come over [to House’s apartment] at ten o’clock. He remained for an hour or more and we went over all matters in the most confidential way. Cabinet material was discussed. ... We discussed what to do with McCombs and McAdoo. He said he would give the former a first-class foreign appointment in order to get rid of him. He said he would be willing to ^ve him the CoUectorship of the Port of New York if it were not that he could build up a formidable political machine. I told him McCombs would not think of accepting the CoUectorship. I suggested McAdoo as Secretary of the Treasury, Burleson as Post- master-General. He thought Daniels would be better for Postmaster-General, but I thought he was not aggressive enough and that the position needed a man who was in touch with Congress. He agreed that this was true. “We talked again of James C. McReynolds as Attorney-General. We practicaUy eliminated Brandeis for this position. ... He asked again about offering Mr. Bryan the Secretaryship of State or Ambassador- ship to England, and I advised him to do so. He said that he would.” II With Wilson’s departure for Bermuda, House set seriously to work investigating the claims and the capa- cities of the applicants for office, from lowest to highest. Much of the work was intensely uncomfortable. " Visited Headquarters [he noted on November i8] and spent a disagreeable time with X and Y. Sug- gested to X the secretaryship of the Senate, which pays |6,ooo per year, but he scorns a position of this kind and wants something much better. Y is in the same frame 94 BUILDING A CABINET of mind. Y abused McAdoo viciously. When I pressed him, he could not verify any of his statements. He says he will depend upon McCombs to look out for his in- terests. . . . “ I am overwhelmed with office-seekers who have probably seen notices of Governor Wilson having called on me on the i6th. I am busy getting up a list of Cabinet possibilities with data attached, to send the President-elect for his information. ...” Colonel House to the President-elect New York, November 22, 1912 Dear Governor : . . . James C. McReynolds, of Tennessee, but more recently of New York, is worthy of consideration. Although a Democrat, Mr. Roosevelt made him special counsel for the Government in the suit against the Tobacco Trust and the Anthracite Coal Trust. He won the Tobacco suit and he has won the suit against the Coal Trust as far as it has gone. It is now in the Supreme Court. McReynolds severed his connection with the Govern- ment because of his disagreement with Mr. Wickersham regarding the dissolution of the Tobacco Trust. He contended that Wickersham’s plan nulhfied the effects of the victory. He is about fifty years old. He is considered radical in his views by a large part of the New York Bar.^ His character and legal attainments are of the highest. I lunched with Mr. Brandeis yesterday. His mind and mine are in accord concerning most of the questions that are now to the fore. He is more than a lawyer ; he is a publicist and he has an unusual facility for lucid expression. . . . ^ This reputation doubtless resulted from the vigour with which he had prosecuted the suits against the trusts. As a member of the Cabinet Mr. McReynolds displayed no radical proclivities, and after he assumed his seat on the Supreme Court he was generally regarded as one of the most conservative of the Justices. BUILDING A CABINET 95 A large number of reputable people distrust Mm, but I doubt whether the distrust is weU founded, and it would perhaps attach itself to any man who held his advanced views. Norman Hapgood^ lunched with us and I found in Mm an enthusiastic admirer of Brandeis. They are both going to Hot Springs for a few days as guests of Mr. Charles R. Crane. Franklin K. Lane, Democratic Interstate Commerce Commissioner from California, was with me a large part of yesterday. Lane is fine material, but he is contented with his present position and would not change it. You will have some difficulty in selecting your Secretary of the Interior. The West wants him, but it would perhaps be a mistake to select him from there. In the first place, he could not maintain himself with his own people and satisfy the East. If he satisfied the East, the West would rend him.^ It would also be well not to put an ultra-Eastem man in that position, for the West would resent such action. As you know, the East is nU for conservation and the Far West is for it in a limited way — that is, where it does not conflict with their material interests. The West is anxious to have the forests and mines opened up and used to an extent that would aid them commercially! They are also largely wedded to the idea of state versus national control, which I think is wrong, but wMch we need not go into here. There is one tMng I want to say, and that is tMs : You can never build a Cabinet that will please every- body. When you seek advice you will find but few agreements, even amongst your friends. When you have about concluded that you have the proper man, ^ Editor of Collier* s Weehlyt 1903-12 ; of Harper* s WeeUy, 1913-16 ; later appointed Minister to Denmark. ^ Mr. Lane, who was ultimately appointed, belied this prophecy. Although a Westerner and retaining the confidence of the West, he was generally spoken of by the Eastern press as one of the most capable mem- bers of Wilson's Cabinet. 96 BUILDING A CABINET someone will come along and condemn him so vigorously that it will make you doubt. Therefore, in the end, you will have largely to determine their fitness yourself. Please do not bother to answer my letters unless there is something you want me to do. Your very faithful E. M. House Mr. Wilson wrote from Bermuda, thanking House for his suggestions. He addressed him, as he had done since the summer of 1912 and continued to do for five years, as “ My dear Friend,” and signed himself “Affec- tionately yours.” He expressed himself as able to rest with an equable mind if the kind American people would not unload their correspondence upon him, and en- couraged House in a prospective trip to Washington. Colonel House’s visit to Washington was partly, as he expressed it, “ to find the lay of the land ” so that he might wisely advise Governor Wilson upon his return from Bermuda, and partly to discover means to harmonize the discordant factions in the party. The differences that had arisen during the campaign were largely per- sonal ; those that now threatened were political and seemed likely to cause more serious difficulties. There was disagreement over the legislative programme, especially in the matter of currency reform ; and a storm of greater or less severity seemed hkely to arise over the question of the single term for President, which was warmly advocated by Bryan and to which Wilson was strongly opposed. House set himself to persuade the party leaders to take no step which might later bring them into conflict with the President. He worked unobtrusively. Mr. Burleson, a Democratic leader in the House, asked Senator Gore what he thought of the Colonel, “ Take my word for it,” replied Gore, “ he BUILDING A CABINET 97 can walk on dead leaves and make no more noise than a tiger.” His work was none the less effective in that it was quiet, and it does not spoil the story to say that in the end the currency and single-term problems were both settled in accordance with Wilson’s wishes. Colonel Home to the President-elect New York, November 28, 1912 Dear Governor : I spent two strenuous but interesting days in Wash- ington. While there I had an hour with Chief Justice White, by appointment, and was with him at dinner later. Among those that called upon me were Speaker Clark, Hoke Smith, Gore, Culberson, Bob Henry, Bur- leson, Carter Glass, and many others. I mention these by name, for each of them had something interesting to say. Mr, Clark has not gottdh over his defeat. He is inclined to be friendly with you, but his hatred of Mr. Bryan amounts to an obsession and it is not unlikely that there will be a personal difficulty between them when they meet. Almost at the begmning, Clark asked me what you intended to do. I replied, “ About what ? ” He said, “About anything or everything.” I told him that was a pretty leading question and asked him to be more specific. I finally told him that you intended to carry out the Democratic policies as far as you were able with the aid of such leaders as himself and others. Before he left, he was telling me the story of his life and we were on very cordial terms. I think he would like to be invited to see you when you return, and I believe it would be a wise thing to do. . . . I had a most interesting hour with Mr. Glass. He candidly confessed that he knew nothing about banking 98 BUILDING A CABINET or the framing of a monetary measure. I congratulated him upon this, for I told him that it was much better to know nothing than to know something wrong. He, too, indicated a willingness to do everything in his power to give as speedily as possible a sound economic bill, and upon lines advised by you. . . . He expressed a desire to see you soon after your return, and I think the quicker you see him the better it will be. You will find him ready to co-operate with you to the fullest extent. Harvey was there for the purpose of furthering his plan for a single term. Mr. Taft favours this, and so does Mr. Bryan. Mr. Taft favours a six-year term, and Mr. Bryan leans to four years. Harvey told me that Bob Henry was work- ing with Bryan along this line and that was going to be our first difficulty. He was very pessimistic. He said that no one knew your viewpoint concerning the matter and that your friends were apathetic, and that before they realised it a measure would be passed through both branches of Congress and be ready for submission to the people. It does not require the signature of the President, but, if it did, Mr. Taft would sign it. Harvey is mistaken about your friends not being alert in regard to it, because I talked to Burleson and others and told them to watch every move. Harvey thought it would be a wise thing to com- promise on a six-year term which would include you. In talking with Gore about it afterwards, he said the difficulty there was that the Republican States would hesitate to lengthen the term of a Democratic President two years longer than was necessary. If the Republicans refused to lengthen the term of a Democratic President, then the Democratic States would in turn refuse to lengthen the term of a Republican President. . . . ^ The general consensus of opinion amongst those with whom I talked and who had met Bryan, was that he would work in harmony with your Administration BUILDING A CABINET 99 if he went into the Cabinet, but they all thought that there were two difficulties which should be met at the outset : the question of a second term and the further question of currency reform. . . . I obtained a great deal of valuable information from the Chief Justice. He talked to me frankly, with the understanding that what he said was to be repeated to no one excepting you. He cheerfuUy slaughtered nearly all the gentlemen about whom I wrote to you in my last letter. . . . Your very faithful E. M. House With the return of Mr. Wilson, conferences multiplied, and the following six weeks House devoted to sifting the claims of importunate apphcants and to a search for avail- able but less vociferous candidates. A series of excerpts from his daily memoranda will illustrate the process. No letters were exchanged with Mr. Wilson during this period, since the two were in constant touch through the telephone. “ December 6, 1912 : I had a long conversation with McCombs and Vick.^ I believe if I had been authorized to offer McCombs a foreign embassy to-day, he would have accepted it. Office-seekers are driving him crazy, I suggested a foreign position and he said that he did Dot have sufficient money ; but I told him that it would not take much. He asked where I would suggest his going — ^Vienna, Italy, or where ? . . . “ December ii, 1912 : Mr, David F, Houston came to dinner and spent the evening. We discussed the different Cabinet possibilities and otW matters. He knows that I have suggested him to the President-elect for Secretary of Agriculture. He thought it would be better to defer legislation on currency and tarifi until later, but I con- ^ Walter F* Vick, one of Mr. McCombses cMef Uentenants in the electoral campaign* 100 BUILDING A CABINET vinced Mm of the importance of passing such measures before ah the patronage had been distributed. . . . “ December i8, 1912 : Governor Wilson came at half- past one. I talked to him about Morgenthau^ and suggested him for Turkey. He replied, " There ain’t going to be no Turkey,” ® and I said, “ Then let him go look for it.” . . . “ I thought if I were in Wilson’s place I would take only men I knew, that in making a selection it was like walking in the country — one could always imagine that something better was beyond, but upon reacMng the given point the view was stiU in the distance like the rainbow. ” Bryan was also discussed freely. I advised Mm to offer Bryan the Secretaryship of State, but afterwards to suggest that it would be of great service if he would go to Russia at tMs critical time. He thought Bryan would want to discuss with Mm the personnel of his Cabinet and that they could never agree. I argued that there were many people and tMngs that they could agree upon, as their object was really the same only their ways of getting at it were different. He might, I thought, mention the names of Burleson, Daniels, and others he was considering for the Cabinet who were also friends of Mr. Bryan. “ We discussed again the Attomey-GeneralsMp. . . . We went back to McReynolds and I thought he seemed to understand the different phases of the situation better than anyone I had talked to. He asked if I considered McAdoo suited for the Treasury, and I thought he was ; under ordinary conditions I should say an Eastern man would be a bad choice, but that in tMs instance I heartily approved McAdoo. “ December 19, 1912 : Governor Wilson called me over the telephone and said that McCombs was distinctly ^ Chairmaii of the Democratic Finance Committee and later appointed Ambassador to Turkey. 2 Turkey in Europe seemed about to disappear as the result of the defeats administered by the Balkan League. BUILDING A CABINET loi disappointed at the ambassadorial offer made him yesterday, and no decision was arrived at. He wanted to know again about Bryan and my advice about it. I advised being cordial in making the otfer,^ and to make it plain afterwards that he would appreciate his taking the foreign post [the Ambassadorship to Russia]. “B. M. Baruch, McCombs’s friend, told Wallace that he had advised McCombs not to accept office, but to resign from the National Committee and to go into the practice of law as soon as his health permits. McCombs seems terribly ‘ cut up ’ over the fact that Governor Wilson has not offered him all that he desired and that he tendered him an Ambassadorship instead of a Cabinet place. “ I called up Governor Wilson to talk things over, and he asked if I still held to my advice about Mr, Bryan, and I answered ‘ yes.’ This is the third or fourth time he has asked me this. It shows how dis- trustful he is of having Mr. Bryan in his Cabinet, . . . “ December 21, 1912 : Tumulty telephoned about the Governor’s and Bryan’s interview. Bryan was in fine humour and everything "was lovely.^ He asked me to send a further list of men whom I thought it best for the Governor to see. I had already sent in a list several days ago to Trenton. "McAdoo ... is now anxious to go to Staunton, where the Governor is to attend some celebration given in his honour on the 28th, and some of McAdoo’s friends are urging him to go, telling him he is effacing himself too much and will be forgotten. I advised to the contrary, but wished him to use his own judgment. “ December 23, 1912 [House and Colonel George Harvey taking lunch together] : Martin was also^ at lunch. Harvey told him that I was the best adviser the President-elect had, and that he thought I should be given the Secretaryship of the Treasury. Martin ^ Of the SecretarysMp of State. 2 At tHs interview Mr. Bryan was offered the SecretarysMp of State and tentatively accepted it. 102 BUILDING A CABINET “wanted to know, if my health permitted would I take it ? I replied, ‘ Not if I were as strong as a bull ! ' ; that, as it was, the Governor discussed everything frankly and without fear of misunderstanding, but that if I were an applicant for any position both he and I would feel the restraint. . . . “ The more I see of McAdoo, the better I like him. He is a splendid fellow, whole-souled, and generous, without a tinge of envy, and with it aU he is honest and progressive. “ December 29, 1912 : Tumulty was with me from five until half-past nine in the evening. We went over the situation in detail. He is very desirous of being Secretary to the President. “ I asked Tumulty how many letters of protest the Governor was receiving against himself for that position. He admitted that there had been five or six hundred. I inquired if he showed them to the Governor. He had not shown them all, but had always told him of the number received. He did not show him the letters which came that were favourable to him either. . . . “ January 5, 1913 : The Governor has invited Burleson, Palmer, Culberson, Gore, Hoke Smith, and Bob Henry, as I had suggested, to come to Trenton this week. Tumulty said the Governor did not want to invite them much, as he thought there was nothing that he wished to discuss with them, Tumulty explained to him that I thought he should see them in order to compliment them rather than to expect much help from their advice. He then consented to see them. " January 7, 1913 : McAdoo came at five and re- mained until seven o’clock. We discussed Cabinet possibilities. He wanted to know what my general idea was, and I told him that I thought the Governor had poor material to select from. McAdoo replied, ‘ I believe you are right, and you may include me too,’ I disclaimed any thought or reference to him, but he cheerfully included himself. I explained that my reason for sa3dng this was that the Democratic Party had been BUILDING A CABINET 103 out of power so long that no one had been in training or in process of development for public office. “ X tells me that he understands from Thomas Nelson Page and others that Y is anxious for a recon- ciliation. Martin says Y has a plan for disposing of Bryan. I answered that a lot of people were busy with such plans, but I thought Governor Wilson and Mr. Bryan would be able to manage the matter them- selves. . . . “ January 8, 1913 : I told him [Wilson] he was now leaving Texas out of the Cabinet. His reply was, ‘ I want you to go m the Cabinet.’ ... He urged me not to give a definite answer for the present and said he very much wished me to be a member of his official family, that it seemed to coincide with the fitness of things. " He generously asked me what place I would like, evidently leaving me to choose. I regard this as a very high compliment, for the reason that he has offered no one a place in the Cabinet up to now excepting Mr. Bryan, whom we agreed upon just after the election . . . as a pohtical necessity. Of course, I shall not take any office, although I would dounuch to oblige him and to be of service. My reasons are that I am not strong enough to tie myself down to a Cabinet department and, in addition, my general disinclination to hold office. I very much prefer being a free lance, and to advise with him regarding matters in general, and to have a roving commission to serve wherever and whenever possible.” To such reasons for remaining out of office should be added one which Colonel House may not have definitely formulated, but which must have affected him at least subconsciously. His experience with the Texas Governors had taught him that, however much in sympathy he might be with their general policy, questions of detail must arise on which his opinions would be at variance from theirs. He believed that in essential matters he 104 BUILDING A CABINET and Wilson would agree in principle, but they might conceivably disagree as to method. If he were in an official position such disagreement would compel his resignation, unless he were to be placed in the unpleasant position of carrpng out a line of action which he dis- approved. So long as he remained in a private capacity, he could give what advice he chose ; and if the President did not follow it, House could shrug his shoulders and turn his attention to other matters in which Wilson might accept his guidance. “ Had I gone into the Cabinet,” House once said, “ I could not have lasted eight weeks.” Outside of the Cabinet he lasted for eight years. Ill The serious, although rather unconventional, responsi- bilities laid upon the shoulders of Colonel House during the process of drafting Cabinet possibilities were not lightened by the political inexperience of the President- elect and his temperamental inability to develop confi- dential relations with the party leaders. “ Such men as Speaker Clark [so ran a despatch from Trenton to the New York Herald], Representative Oscar W. Underwood, Senator Hoke Smith, Senator Culberson, and many others of importance in the Democracy have journeyed to Princeton and gone away saying they had no more information than when they came. One of them said to me : ‘I know that Governor Wilson was elected President on November 5. I know that he will be inaugurated on March 4. Further than that I know nothing about what has happened or is going to happen.’ Several of the leaders frankly say, when asked what will happen after March 4 : ‘You will have to ask either the President-elect or Colonel House.’ ”1 ^ The Herald, February 19, 1913. BUILDING A CABINET As the days passed the pohticians took th^tEopej and their ideas to House, who, somewhat by his position, nevertheless worked steadfastly to make them feel less out in the cold. “ Making the suggestion through you,” wrote McCombs to House on January 2, of a proposition for Wilson’s decision, “ is the only way I know of handling the matter.” “ February 17, 1913 : X called at five o’clock [re- corded House]. He wished to tell me many things, but particularly how very competent he was to be Secretary of the Treasury. He seemed hurt that Wilson had not c^ed him into consultation, or sent for him, or noticed him in any way since the election. His position, he seemed to think, entitled him to great consideration. I explained that the President-elect had not called his friends into consultation, and those who had been with him had made the appointments themselves and had not come at his invitation. This was invariably the case, as far as I knew, with the exception of Mr. Bryan, Speaker Clark, Mr. Underwood, and some members of the Senate and House. He left in a fine humour, and promised to write me his views if I would convey them to the Governor. . . .” “ February 19, 1913 : Y came at half-past five. He complained bitterly of the way the Governor was treat- ing him ; that he did not consult with him or tell him about any of his plans. I asked if he knew of anyone else that he consulted or to whom he told his plans. He confessed he did not, and I told him he had no right to complain. ... He said there was a bitter feeling among the party leaders that they were not being con- sulted, and not taken into confidence. Of course he exaggerates this.” It was all the more important that when it came to the composition of the Cabinet the wishes of the party leaders should be carefully considered ; for if, after io6 BUILDING A CABINET keeping his own counsel (or that of Colonel House), Mr. Wilson chose a Cabinet of independents, he would soon find a rebellious party in Congress. House was frankly troubled. “ Walter Page lunched with me to-day [the Colonel wrote on January 14]. I found that he had been ad- vising Governor Wilson very much along the lines I have. . . . " I tried him out as to the department in which he was most interested. If the Governor appoints him, I shall advise that he be given the Interior. I told Page that I was fearful that the Governor was thinking of appointing too many independents and that he was not looking for rock-ribbed Democrats.” The Colonel struck the same note on the following day in a talk with Mrs. Wilson, whose influence with her husband he evidently counted upon. “ I told her that the men the Governor had in mind for his Cabinet were nearly all irregular party men and that most of them had voted for Taft four years ago. I cited as an instance. She spoke up immediately and said, “ But you would not keep him out of the Cabinet on that account ? ” I replied no, not in his case, but I would not put in too many with the same sort of record, for the reason that the moment the Cabinet was announced their political records would be exposed. " I thought that in twenty years from now no one would know how the different departments of the Government had been run and that the President’s fame would rest entirely upon the big constructive measures he was able to get through Congress ; and in order to get them through he had to be on more or less good terms with that body. This, I thought, was one of the most important things he had to consider, for his future reputation would rest almost whoUy upon it.” BUILDING A CABINET 107 Of all the politicians, the one whose influence during the first legislative session would be most valuable was, of course, Mr. Bryan ; and it was natural that House should suggest that he be given a voice in the composi- tion of the Cabinet, or at least an opportunity to com- ment upon the tentative slate which Wilson had drafted by early January. The Governor agreed, House recorded on January 10, that it would be well for the Colonel to go to Miami, where Bryan was building a Southern home, and explain Wilson’s plans. “ He said I could talk to him freely, but that it was to give him, Bryan, information and not to ask his advice.” The newspapers of the East had taken unholy plea- sure in picturing Mr. Bryan in a truculent frame of mind and inclined to dictate Mr. Wilson’s pohcy and appoint- ments. House discovered the reverse to be true. ” He is in a delightful humour,” the Colonel wrote Wilson on January 29. “ He likes the names suggested for the famUy gathering.” And as House developed his views he found Bryan careful not to press any specific appoint- ments with undue ardour and surprisingly mild in his criticisms. Colonel House to the President-elect Miami, Florida, January 30 , 1913 Dear Governor : I had a long conference with our friend last night and again to-day. . . . He is very earnest in his advice that a Catholic, and perhaps a Jew, be taken into the family. I told him T[umifity]’s appointment as Secretary would cover the one, but he thought not. He suggests Governor Higgins of !]^ode Island as a possible choice. He shows a very fine spirit and is exceedingly anxious for your success. He also shows no disposition whatever to interfere, even io8 BUILDING A CABINET in his own department. He says he would like to name his first assistant unless you have someone you want to place there. He knows all the disadvantages to him of accepting place and mentions them in detail, but he says that those things must not be taken into account. He thinks the Pacific slope should be recognized, but he does not seem to get beyond Phelan and Lane, although I do not think he would seriously object to anyone excepting Teal. For the first time, I think, he is finding out how difficult it is to form this body. He likes the suggestion you made to me for Germany [Professor Fine of Princeton], but has no one in mind for England. . . . He has accepted aU your conclusions so cordially that it has been a pleasure to me to discuss matters with him. Your very faithful E. M. House “ January 30, 1913 : Mr. Bryan was as pleased with his new place [recorded Colonel House] as a child with a new toy. He is really a fine man, full of democratic simplicity, earnest, patriotic, and of a fervently religious nature. Mrs. Bryan is the ‘ salt of the earth.’ She has all the poise and good common sense which is lacking in her distinguished husband. . . . “ January 31, 1913 : It was so warm that we did not go through the Everglades. Mr. Bryan came over in the evening and we had another political talk. He was much distressed when I told him that Governor Wilson had offered the Chinese mission to Dr. Charles W. Eliot. He thought it the poorest selection that could be made, for the reason that Eliot was a Unitarian and did not believe in the divinity of Christ and the new Chinese civilization was founded upon the Christian movement there. I asked him to state his objections in writing, not only as to Dr. Ehot, but as to any member of the BUILDING A CABINET 109 proposed Cabinet. I said as far as Eliot was concerned, it was too late ; but I did not believe Dr. Eliot would accept, for he had told the Governor that he would take it only if his wife approved and he was afraid she would not. Mr. Bryan was hopeful she would not.” " He is only trying to help,” wrote House again to Wilson, ” and does not mean to urge.” ” Everything he said,” the Colonel noted later, ” showed a fine spirit in Mr. Bryan and seemed to me to be a hopeful sign for future harmony.” It appears from the terms of the following letter that Wilson left these negotiations entirely to House. Colonel House to the President-elect St. Augustine, Florida February 6 , 1913 Dear Governor; Our friend has asked me many times whether I had heard from you in response to his suggestions. He wired me just before he left for Havana, asking the same question. If I were you, I would send him a line indicating that you appreciated his interest and had found his suggestions helpful. He will be back in Miami next Thursday, and if he found a note from you awaiting him it would please him greatly. . . . Your very faithful E. M. House IV Upon Colonel House’s return, early in February, Wilson felt himself prepared to make the definite appoint- ments. It was already settled that Bryan should be Secretary of State. McAdoo had accepted the Treasury portfolio, and Burleson was to be offered that of Post- no BUILDING A CABINET master-General, two selections urged by House from the beginning. For Agriculture, Wilson had determined upon the distinguished economist, D, F. Houston, Chancellor of Washington University, another close friend of House. Josephus Daniels, a North Carolina editor, and W. B. Wilson, once a miner and an active albeit conservative labour leader, were to be given the portfolios of the Navy and of Labour respectively. There remained those of War, the Interior, Justice, and Commerce. " February 8, 1913 : The President-elect writes that he needs to see me for a final conference about the official family. He asks me to sound Houston on the Secretaryship of Agriculture. On that case he is clear and his mind made up, but he thinks it best for me to open the matter with him. The Treasury has been offered and accepted as we planned.’' In the conferences between Wilson and House which followed, the latter urged the appointment of J. C. McReynolds and F. K. Lane, the first because of his record as special prosecuting attorney in anti-trust suits, the second because of his record on the Interstate Com- merce Commission. Wilson did not know McReynolds, and on February 15 the Colonel recorded that the latter was invited to House’s apartment while the President- elect was there, “ ostensibly to discuss the appointment of a District Attorney here. The Governor liked Mc- Reynolds.” On the following day Mr. Lane came over from Washington, for Wilson had asked House to sound him as he had already sounded the other appointees. The conference crystallized the Colonel’s conviction that Wilson would make a mistake if he left Lane out of the Cabinet. BUILDING A CABINET III " I informed him of what we had in mind for him. The Interior, in his opinion, was the most difficult post in the Cabinet, but he would take it if we wanted him to do so. He said he would take anything we thought him best suited for, but that he was content to remain where he was as Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission. “ Feeling responsible for Lane, I drew him out upon all the leading questions, and I found that he has a remarkably strong, virile mind. My opinion of him increased materially, much as I had thought of him before. There will certainly not be a stronger or more dominant force in the Cabinet. “ Norman Hapgood came and I brought them together, and we had a fine hour. After Lane left, Hapgood expressed his enthusiastic admiration for him and said he thought he would suit the position for which we had him in mind wonderfully well. I asked that he write a letter to this effect, telling him I wanted him to share the responsibility with me because the President- elect had never met Lane and knew him only through me,” The difficulties and complexities of political Cabinet- making are illustrated by the story of the succeeding days. One after the other, objections cropped up which seemed to destroy the availability of men Wilson wanted. His choice for Attorney-General was A. Mitchell Palmer, whose activity on the floor of the Balti- more Convention had gone far to decide Wilson’s nomina- tion. Opposition in certain quarters proved to be so strong that he was instead offered the Secretaryship of War. This, however, he felt he must decline, in deference to his Quaker principles. Inauguration day was approaching, was barely a fortnight away, and Wilson realized that no time could be lost if his Cabinet were to be completed by March 4. II2 BUILDING A CABINET " I asked him not to worry [wrote House], that the getting of Lane in the Cabinet was of much more import- ance than the losing of Palmer for Attorney-General ; that Lane could take that place, if necessary, and fill it with distinction, and that we could keep Baker ^ for the Interior. . . . " February i8, 1913 : Newton Baker [recorded House] rang me up to say that he had arrived. When I was in Princeton, the Governor wrote him a note asking him to come to New York on Tuesday or Wednesday, as was most convenient, and to telephone me and that I would make an appointment for him to meet the Governor at my apartment. I asked Baker to dine with us at seven o’clock and I requested him not to let his presence in New York be known and, above all things, not to let anyone know he was coming to my apartment or was having an appointment with the President-elect. , . , “ I met Governor Wilson and brought him to the apartment. We had about forty minutes before Baker came, and we discussed the Cabinet and other appoint- ments. . . . “ Baker came and we had a very delightful dinner ; politics were not discussed at all, stories were told, Mark Twain and various other persons and matters were talked of. After dinner I left the Governor and Baker. . . . “ In about a half-hour, I returned. The Governor said he had offered Baker the Secretaryship of the Interior and that he was considering the matter. Baker finally decided he could not take it. He said there was no one to carry on the work in Cleveland which he had begun, and he thought the government of our American cities was the greatest disgrace to our citizenship ; that Cleveland was emerging from that state and would soon be an example to her sister cities throughout the land. ‘ ‘ Both the Governor and I urged him to take a broader view of the situation and do the bigger work. He finally ^ Newton D* Baker, reform Mayor of Cleveland. BUILDING A CABINET 113 decided to take the matter under consideration for the night, and said if he changed his mind he would wire me to-morrow, quoting a line from Shakespeare which I would understand.” The cryptic line from Shakespeare was never sent, and it was found necessary to look further for a Secretary of the Interior. Baker’s refusal led Wilson definitely to decide that he would return to House’s original suggestion of McReynolds as Attorney-General. The Colonel pointed out that Walter H. Page might be offered the Interior and Lane be shifted to the War Department. Wilson acceded and authorized House to see whether Page would accept. He at once called him upon the telephone, but learned that he had left town ; he there- upon sent him a telegram asking him to call as soon as he returned. Chance plays its part in history. Had Mr. Page been in town, he would have been offered and would have accepted the Secretaryship of the Interior, and he would not have gone to London as Ambassador. But before his return, the party leaders in Congress learned of the suggestion and objected strongly. Page, they pointed out, was a Southerner, and no Southerner should be Secretary of the Interior because of his control of pensions. In view of these objections, Wilson decided to keep Lane in the Interior and look for another man for War. House was left to explain his telegram to Page to the best of his ability when the latter returned. He proved equal to the interview, which might conceivably test his tact and powers of invention, “ February 24, 1913 ; Walter Page arrived in response to my telegram, '^en I wired him we expected to place him in the Interior and move Lane up to War, but BUILDING A CABINET 114 in talking with the Governor last night it was decided best not to put a Southerner in that place. “ I told Page the reason we had summoned him was because there was likely to be a slip-up in some of the Cabinet places, and we wanted to know definitely whether he could be used in case it was necessary, I also told him the Governor wished me to discuss with him the material already gotten together. He suggested, and I advised, his going at once to Trenton to take the matter up with the Governor.” A few weeks later House told Page how near he had been to becoming Secretary of the Interior, a story which excited in Mr. Page more amusement than regret. The final choice for the portfolio of War was delayed until the last moment. Colonel House had strongly recommended Mr. H. C. Wallace, who later became Ambassador to France, Mr. Wilson approved the selec- tion and offered the post to Wallace. But the latter found it impossible to accept. The ultimate decision was made on the spur of the moment. During the morning of February 24, House recorded : " Tumulty suggests, and we are going to look up, a New Jersey man, Vice-Chancellor Garrison, and see whether he will fill the bill.” Wilson evidently lost no time, for in the evening : " Tumulty telephoned while Page was here, saying that the Governor had sent for Vice-Chancellor Garrison and was very much pleased with him, and had offered him the post of Secretary of War.” The reader can hardly escape a shock of surprise at the apparently nonchalant manner in which the President- elect chose his Cabinet. In reality he had received an immense quantity of carefully sifted information, and BUILDING A CABINET 115 the eligibility list of possibilities was drafted with care. But he made his final selection with a suddenness of decision that startled House himself. “ The thing that impresses me most [he recorded] is the casual way in which the President-elect is making up his Cabinet. I can see no end of trouble for him in the future unless he proceeds with more care.” The Cabinet, as finally selected, was a melange of administrators selected because of personal ability and of political leaders whose influence demanded recognition. The number of purely political appointments was less than is customary, a tribute to Wilson’s original deter- mination to consider ability alone in his appointments. Because of this fact and also because of his consistent refusal to discuss the Cabinet intimately with anyone but House, the wiseacres were largely at fault in their prognostications. Ten days before the Inauguration, the New York Herald announced " Rifts in Cabinet Secrecy.’ ’ But the list which it published of the probable Cabinet proved to be far from accurate.^ Of the ten final appointees, only four were recognized beforehand by the Herald as possibilities. The publication of the official family aroused more surprise than enthusiasm. In Republican circles the new Cabinet was naturally regarded as inferior, and by the country as a whole it was looked upon as mediocre. This was inevitable, since Wilson’s choice was limited not merely to Democrats but to radicals who would approve of the drastic reforms he contemplated. For half a century the Democratic party had been out of power, except for the two terms of Cleveland’s Presi- dency ; and during that period there had been a steady ^ See A.ppendix to chapter. ii6 BUILDING A CABINET gravitation of men of practical ability into the opposite political camp, which was more and more affiliated with the great money and business interests. “ It has thus come about [a New York paper pointed out] that most of the men eminent in the administration of national affairs have become defenders of existing conditions, in spite of the growing importance of a newly awakened national consciousness of intolerable wrongs in the political and economic life of the country. . . . Such men as seem to give promise of solid ability and administrative success lack importance in the public mind. . . . [Mr. Wilson] expects the country to be surprised by the absence of commanding or dis- tinguished figures in his selection, but feels that the men he is to call into power will in time develop reputa- tions that will justify him,” ^ Colonel House himself was satisfied rather than enthusiastic, and in meeting the criticism of his friends emphasized the difficulties of the problem more than the innate strength of the Cabinet. “ Walter Page [he noted on February 24] came after dinner and told of his trip to Trenton. He regretted that it was too late to keep Daniels out of the Cabinet. The President-elect had already written him. I knew this, because he told me he intended writing McReynolds, Daniels, and Burleson notes on Sunday. ... He said to Page, ' You do not seem to think that Daniels is Cabinet timber.’ Page replied, ' He is hardly a splinter.’ “ In discussing the Cabinet, Page thought it dis- tinctly mediocre and thought the country would so regard it. I asked him how he could better it ; and when he attempted to do so, like aU the rest he failed signally. ... I think, in all the circumstances, we have done well.” ^ Evening Mail, New York, January 17, 1913* BUILDING A CABINET ii APPENDIX Thc^^Hemir^ List The Cabinet as ot Februa/y 22. Appointed. Secretary of State W. J. Bryan W. J. Bryan Secretary of the Treasury . W. G. McAdvO W. G. MmAdoo Secretary of War Charles R. Crane Lindiey M. Garrisc Attorney-General A. ]Mitchcll Palmer J. C AIcReynoMs Postmaster-General . f Josephus Daniels 1 Albert S. Burleson Albert S. Burleson Secretary of the Navy Lewis Nixon Josephus Daniels Secretary of the Interior /Alva Adams 1 Edward L. Norris F* K. Lane Secretary of Agriculture Obadiah Gardiner D F. Houston Secretary of Commerce and ! rW. C. RedMd Labour rLouis D. Brandeis hw B. Wilson ] { (Labour) CHAPTER V THE SILENT PARTNER The source of Ms power was . . • the confidence that men had in his sagacity and nnselfishness, E, S. MafUn, %n " Harper's Magazine” February 1912 I M r. house is my second personality. He is my independent self. His thoughts and mine are one. If I were in his place I would do just as he suggested. ... If anyone thinks he is reflecting my opinion by whatever action he takes, they are welcome to the conclusion.” Such was the reply given by President Wilson to a politician who asked whether House represented him accurately in a certain situation. It indicates the degree of confidence which he placed in the Colonel. The President made it clear that, although House had refused official position of any kind, he was determined that the Administration should not lose the political services which House was qualified to perform. On the very day of his inauguration he asked and summarily accepted his recommendations for important appointive posts. “ The President-elect telephoned [Colonel House wrote on March 4] and asked Loulie and me to meet his family party at the Shoreham Hotel at 9.45, in order to accompany them to the Capitol for the inauguration ceremonies. I took Loulie to the Shoreham and left her with the Wilsons, but I did not go to the Capitol myself. I went instead to the Metropolitan Club and THE SILENT PARTNER 119 loafed around with Wallace. Functions of this sort do not appeal to me and I never go. “ Mrs. Wilson invited us to the White House to see the fireworks. When we arrived we found the President was over in his office. I went there and was with him for a few minutes in order to teU him that I had in- vestigated John H. Marble for Interstate Commerce Commissioner, in place of F. K. Lane, and had found him satisfactory. The President had never met Marble and had made no inquiries concerning him further than mine. He said he would send his name in to-morrow, along with the names of his Cabinet. He made the appointment in this way in order to avoid the great pressure which would be made upon him by candidates for this important office. . . . “ March 8, 1913 ; The President asked me to be at the White House this morning at nine. “ The offices w^ere nearly deserted at so early an hour. The President was dressed in a very becoming sack suit of grey, with a light grey silk tie. It was rather an informal-looking costume, but very attractive. I sat with him for nearly an hour and we had a delightful talk. We discussed the Cabinet mainly, and he laugh- ingly told me his estimate of each one and how they acted at the first meeting. . . . The President spoke finely of Bryan and said their relations were exceedingly cordial. . . . “ The President suggested that we could have a cypher between us, so when we talked over the telephone or wrote we could discuss men without fear of revealing their identity. He took a pencil and started out with Bryan, saying, ‘ Let us call him “ Primus,” ’ McAdoo is already known as ‘ Pythias,' McCombs being ‘ Damon.’ Garrison he suggested as ‘ Mars,’ McReynolds ‘ Coke,’ Burleson ' Demosthenes.’ ” Thus began House’s career as Silent Partner It ^ The appeliation was first used by Peter Clark Macfarlane in an article in Collier's, and soon became general. 120 THE SILENT PARTNER was a relationship which rested chiefly upon the political co-operation of the Colonel in meeting the problems of government. His labours were of the most varied kind, and he sought every opportunity to ease the load that bore upon the President, to bring him information, to work out details of policy. There was, however, an essential personal basis to the relationship, since it would have been impossible for a man of Wilson’s temperament to put full political confidence in a man who did not evoke his affection as an individual. I have an intimate personal matter to discuss with you [he said to House in the summer of 1915]. You are the only person in the world with whom I can discuss everything.^ There are some I can tell one thing and others another, but you are the only one to whom I can make an entire clearance of mind.” The letters of Wilson to House invariably displayed an intensity of personal feeling that would have astounded those who attributed to him about the same degree of warmth as that of a Euclidean proposition and failed to realize the human qualities that lay concealed under his armour of exterior austerity. He wrote him fre- quently of his desire to talk with him and the need and desire for his advice on many a complicated matter. At the end of the first legislative session, he put his feeling into emphatic language. “ Your letter on the passage of the Tariff Bill [the President said] gave me the kind of pleasure that seldom comes to a man, and it goes so deep that no words are adequate to express it. I think you must know without my putting it into words (for I cannot) how deep such ^ TMs was after Mrs. Wilson's death and before the President's re- marriage. THE SILENT PARTNER 121 friendship and support :^oes with me and how large a part it constitutes of such strength as I have in public affairs. I thank you with ail heart and with deep affection.” The friendship between the two, however rapidly it bloomed, was progressive. It is not uninteresting and is perhaps significant to trace its development through the forms of salutation used by the President in his letters. They met in November 1911, and until the following spring Wilson addresses him as ” Dear Mr. House.” But after his nomination, in August 1912, he begins to address him as ‘‘ Dear Friend,” signing himself “ Faithfully yours,” or “ Sincerely 3’ours.” After his election in November 1912, he signs himself "Affectionately 3"ours,” and this is constant with the salutation of ” Dear Friend ” for tw'O and a half v'ears. In moments of great emotion, as at the time of Mrs. Wilson’s death, he addresses him as “ My dear, dear Friend.” In the summer of 1915, at the period of the Arabic crisis when he was torn by doubt and worry, the President begins to address him as ” Dearest Friend,” a salutation which remains invariable until after his re-election in November 1916. In January of 1917 the President reverts to the form of address, ” My dear House,” although he continues the conclusion, “Affectionately yours.” Otherwise it is impossible to detect in Wilson’s letters any change of tone. It is certain that the political relationship between the two men remained as close during the twm years that followed ; but it is possible that their personal friendship was most intense between the years 1912 and 1917. Close spiritual communion was not dependent upon physical propinquity, for the heat drove Colonel House far from Washington in the spring and frequently several months would pass without their meeting. Separation 122 THE SILENT PARTNER seems to have made no difference in their understanding. ‘‘ I never worry when I do not hear from you,” wrote House. "No human agency could make me doubt your friendship and affection. ... I always understand your motives,” At the end of each summer, enter- prising and ill-informed newspapermen would regularly feature a " break.” "You are a little behind your schedule this year, my friend,” said House to a reporter one September day, after the publication of the annual story. During the cool months, however, Wilson and House saw much of each other, for the latter made frequent trips to Washington, and on each of these trips Wilson devoted long hours to intimate discussions with his adviser. The President lacked the capacity and inclina- tion for meeting and entertaining varied types of people which, under the Roosevelt regime, made the White House a magnet for explorers, litterateurs, pugilists, and hunters — everyone who had an interesting story to teU. Wilson had the college professor’s love of a quiet evening by the fireside with the family, and an early bed, varied by a visit to the theatre, preferably a simple vaudeville. House was one of the few admitted to the small family circle. “ At night,” said Herbert Corey in the Commercial Advertiser, “ after Mr. Wilson had wound the clock, and put out the cats and politicians, House stayed for a little further talk.” To the President’s study House brought the impressions he had formed of public opinion, gathered from his numerous contacts with office-holders, business men, and editors, and there Wilson gave free vent to his political theories, his aspira- tions, and his fears. There, too, the President found relaxation in reading poetry and essays to his friend. THE SILENT PARTNER 123 “ May II, 1913 : I spoke to the President about conserving his strength, and suggested various means by which it could be done. I thought it was essential. He said it looked as if the people were tr\ing to kill him, and he spoke of the loneliness of his position, in a way that was saddening. . . . “ I spoke of his probable renomination and re-election. He replied, ‘ Do not let us talk about that now. ily dear friend, if I can finish up my legislative programme, I do not desire re-election.’ I urged him to keep up his courage, for if he ever faltered in the slightest he would lose his leadership and influence. He realized this and declared he would maintain his courage to the end. “ October 16, 1913 • One thing the President said, which interested me, was that he always lacked an}" feeling of elation when a particular object was accom- plished. When he signed the Tariff Bill he could not feel the joy that was properly his, for it seemed to him that the thing was over and that another great work was calling for his attention, and he thought of this rather than the present victory. “ November 12, 1913 : He [Wilson] said he believed in the Executive becoming the leader in putting into law the desires of the people. He thought there was no danger in this course, for the reason that unless a President had the force of public sentiment back of him, he could never get a law through. That the reason he himself had been successful with the tariff and the currency bills was because the people demanded them, and Congress knew it. It was not the pressure from him, but the pressure of the nation back of him. “ He read some extracts from his works on govern- ment, in order to define better his views. He expressed himself as being in sympathy with the movement for amending the Constitution with less difficulty than at present, . , . “ He said he had not slept well the night before ; that he had nightmares, and that he thought he was THE SILENT PARTNER 124 seeing some of his Princeton enemies. These terrible days have sunk deep into his soul and he will carry their marks to his grave. “ December 22, 1913 : At dinner there was no one present but the family, and the conversation ran along general lines. I asked the President how high he ranked Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. He said, very, very high. He had also noticed that great orations and great poems, when spoken or written under deep emotion, were simple in language. He mentioned Burke as an example. Some member of the family took exception to this opinion and cited Browning and also suggested that Shakespeare made his heroes say grandiloquent things under stress of great emotion. . . . “ I spoke of his success, and he said his Princeton experience hung over him sometimes like a nightmare ; that he had wonderful success there, and aU at once conditions changed and the troubles, of which every- one knew, were brought about. He seemed to fear that such a denouement might occur again. . . . “ It was twenty minutes to tw’elve when we left his study for bed. He was solicitous of my welfare and came into my room to see that everything was properly arranged. “ April 27, 1914 • The President spoke of not feeling at home anywhere now ; that is, he had a feeling that he had no home. He said he felt the same way when he was at Princeton and occupied the house of the President ; that while he was perfectly comfortable and happy in his surroundings, yet he always had that unsettled feeling if as he had no permanent abiding-place. '‘April 28, 1914 : At breakfast I spoke of Edward S. Martin’s delicious humour, and I thought he wasmot only humorous but had as much good sense as anyone I knew. The President replied that ‘ humour and good sense go together.’ . . . ‘ ‘ I asked if he would like to be editor of a daily paper. He replied that nothing would appeal to him less, for the reason that no one co^d write every day an opinion of 125 THE SILENT PARTNER value. It was difficult enough to do this once a week, but impossible to do it each day. He said he enjoyed Punch ven" much. That ‘ while there were no laughs in it, it was full of smiles.’ “ May II, 1914 : No one dined with us excepting Grayson/ and after dinner he left us. The President read poems to me for nearly an hour. It was Words- worth, Matthew Arnold, Edward Sill, and Keats. What he particularly liked was ‘ A Fool’s Prayer ’ by Sill, and ‘ A Conservative ’ by Gilman. When he finished reading, I took out my budget.^^ “August 30, 1914 : The last morning I was with the President [in the country] he planned to play golf early enough to get back for lunch and leave on the 2.40 train for Washington. It was my intention to leave . . . when he started for the golf field. This necessitated our getting up early and about the same time. He arose a half-hour earlier than was necessary, merely to give me the uninterrupted use of our common bathroom. This illustrates, I think, as weU as anything I could mention, his consideration for others and the simplicity of the man. I notice, too, in his relations with his family that he is always tender, affectionate, and considerate. “ September 28, 1914 : We talked much of leadership and its importance in government. He has demon- strated this to an unusuffi degree. He thinks our form of government can be changed by personal leadership ; but I thought the Constitution should be altered, for no matter how great a leader a man was, I could see situations that would block him unless the Constitution was modified. He does not feel as strongly about this as I do. “ November 7, 1914 : There were no outside visitors for dinner, but the President artfully evaded getting alone with me in his study. He was afraid I would renew the McAdoo-Tumuity controversy. However, he need ^ Dr. Cary T. Grayson, physician to the President. ® Meaning the items of political business that demanded the President's attention. 126 THE SILENT PARTNER not have worried. We had a delightful evening. He began by talking about German political philosophy and how wrong their conclusions usually were. He spoke of himself as a disciple of Burke and Bagehot. This is literally true, for he is always quoting from one or the other, mostly from Bagehot. “ He began to speak of a flexible or fluid Constitution in contradistinction to a rigid one. He thought that Constitutions changed without the text being altered, and cited our own as an example. At the beginning, he thought, there was no doubt that there was no dif- ference of opinion as to the right of the States to secede. This practically unanimous opinion probably prevailed down to Jackson’s time. Then there began a large sentiment for union which finally culminated in our Civil War, and a complete change of the Constitution without its text being altered. “ Just then the ladies came in the sitting-room where we were, and I got him to read some poems, something he very much likes to do. He read William Watson’s ‘ Wordsworth’s Grave,’ and afterwards, at my request, Gray’s ' Elegy.’ He also amused himself with any number of limericks. We did not go to bed until around 10.30. “ December 19, 1914 : As usual, no one excepting the family was present at dinner. After we had finished the President read aloud for nearly two hours, ‘ The Adventures in Arcadia of the Idle Rich.’ ” When President Wilson came to New York, he almost invariably stayed wfith Colonel House. The two would motor in the country, often to Piping Rock, followed by the Secret Service automobile and three cars of newspapermen who hovered around the President “ like birds of prey,” the Colonel wrote, to be ready in case of an accident. More pleasant were the evenings spent in the small apartment on Thirty-Fifth Street and later on Fifty-Third Street. House disconnected the THE SILENT PARTNER 127 telephone, barred the door, and left to the President the blessed choice between going to bed or a talk upon some subject unconnected with politics — ^literature, ethics, the immortality of the soul. Like Napoleon, Wilson enjoyed suddenly descending upon his friends. “ November 14, 1914 : Last night Loulie and I went to dinner and theatre with the Bertrons. He had the Belgian Minister and Madame Havenith. The play was ‘ The Only Girl,’ which I found amusing. Upon my return to the apartment I found a call from the White House. In answering it, they told me the Presi- dent would arrive at six o’clock this morning and would expect me to breakfast at six-thirty. This changed my plans and I had to notify the Police Commissioner and several others, so it was well after midnight before I went to bed, and I arose at half-past five. “ The matter of entertaining a President within such confined quarters as our little apartment is not an easy undertaking, especially since I have no clerical force excepting my one secretary. “ October 8, 1915 : To-day started off with the usual bustle incident to a visit from the President. Telegrams, telephone calls, Secret Service men, newspaper reporters, notes, etc., etc. However, the confusion will cease the moment the President arrives, for I do not permit the telephone to ring and we are undisturbed by letters, notes, telegrams, or visitors. When he is once here, everything appears as peaceful as if there were no such things as noise and confusion in the world.” II House’s admiration for the President’s qualities was as keen as his personal affection was deep. He regarded Wilson’s power of leadership as supreme, and in certain 128 THE SILENT PARTNER respects he placed a high estimate upon his intellectual qualities. “ I have seen a great deal of the President on this %dsit [he wrote April 17, 1914], and we have opened our minds to one another without reserve. I am impressed by the analytic qualities of his mind and the clearness with which he expresses his thoughts. I have come in contact with minds of greater initiative and imagina- tion, but never one that had more analytical power and comprehension. “ November 14, 1914 : The President ... is efficient in his manner of working. For instance, when we were discussing his message to the people concerning the Belgian Relief funds he said : ' Now let us decide what points are best to cover.’ He took a telegraph blank having lines on it, and began to take down in shorthand the different points, he making some suggestions and I making others. There were about five points to be covered, and he asked me to think if that were all. When we concluded, there was nothing more ; he called his stenographer and dictated the message in full. “ He has one of the best ordered minds I have ever come in contact with, although he is always complaining of forgetfulness,” On the other hand, Colonel House was too objective not to observe certain qualities in the President which weakened him as an executive and the effects of which might ultimately seriously endanger his influence. “ One peculiar phase of the President’s character develops itself more fully from time to time [he wrote, November 22, 1915] ; that is, he ‘ dodges trouble.’ Let me put something up to him that is disagreeable and I have great difficulty in getting Mm to meet it. I have no doubt that some of the trouble he had at Prince- ton was caused by this delay in meeting vexatious problems. THE SILENT PARTNER 129 Another phase of his character is the intensit}^ of his prejudices against people. He likes a few and is ver}’ loyal to them, but his prejudices are many and often unjust. He finds great difficulty in conferring with men against whom, for some reason, he has a prejudice and in whom he can find nothing good. “ J:.'/)’ 10, 1915 ■ I am afraid that the President’s characterization of himself as ‘ a man with a one-track mind ’ is all too true, for he does not seem able to carry along more than one idea at a time. I say this regret- fully, because I have the profoundest admiration for his judgment, his ability, and his patriotism. “ December 8, 1915 ; The President, as I have often said before, is too casual and does the most important things sometimes without much reflection.” An example of such casualness is to be found in Mr. Wilson’s speeches, which at times he delivered almost impromptu. He had the power of arranging in his head, at short notice, the order of the topics he would treat and even of constituting the phrases he would use. On May ii, 1914, he came from Washington to deliver a memorial speech at the Brooklyn Navy Yard as tribute to the sailors who had died in the capture of Vera Cruz. House met him at the station and asked him about the speech. “ He had not prepared any- thing,” wrote the Colonel, but he would think it out en route from the Battery to the Navy Yard. It is his way of doing. Sometime he will make a serious blunder. It is an occasion for something great, and he may or may not rise to the occasion.” Unfortunately, President Wilson lacked the power to conceal his prejudices and he was not equipped by temperament or experience to appear a good “ mixer.” A Senator passed the word to House that “ the Senators are in an ugly mood and critical of the President. One THE SILENT PARTNER 130 grievance is that when they go to the White House for conferences, they are offered nothing to drink excepting water and nothing to smoke.” “ The President,” House commented, ” does not drink excepting occasionally at meals and he never smokes ; consequently he does not offer such things to his guests.” More serious was the fact that the President did not convey the impression of great respect for the Senators, either individually or as a body. “ Sena- tor ,” he hazarded, “ is the most comprehensively ignorant man I have ever met.” And later, referring to the same statesman, Wilson said to House, “ Someone wanted to know the other day if I didn’t think So-and- So the most selfish man in America. I replied, ‘ I am sorry, but I am already committed to Senator .’ ” Such remarks, frequently as apt as they were indiscreet, did not tend to promote cordial relations between the two branches of government. Mr. Wilson, however, evidently felt that the criticism passed upon him for aloofness and cold self-confidence was quite unjustified. ” December 22, 1913 [conversation between House and Wilson] : I said my long experience with public officials had made me fearful of anyone after they were elected to office ; that the adulation of friends and partisans and the position itself seemed to go to their heads and they did not do rational things. ... He thought there was no fear of this with him ; that his long university training had shown him how necessary it was to confer about important matters ; that he seldom went into a conference and came out with the same ideas as when he went in. “ April 15, 1914 : I asked [Wilson] whom he con- sidered the greatest man in the early days of the Re- public. He thought Alexander Hamilton was easily THE SILENT PARTNER 131 the ablest. We spoke of Washington and how nincb he depended upon Hamilton's advice. I thought this in itself indicated Wa>hin3ton’s greatness. The fact that he was abie to pick out Hamilton from among his associates, as his guiding mind, and that he used him in this way, showed a breadtli of view that was remark- able. I told Iiim that ali the really big men I had known had taken advice from others, while the little men refused to take it. . . . “ At another time in our conversation, he remarked that he always sought advice. I almost laughed at this statement, for McAdoo had just been telling me to-day that he was at Wliite Sulphur with the President and his family when the despatch came from Admiral Hayo concerning his demand of Huerta to salute our flag, and he said the President never even mentioned the matter to him. The President does get a lot of information and suggestions from other.^, but it mostly comes gratuitously and not by his asking. ilcReynolds, Houston, Lane, and ali the others have the same storj* to tell. . . . “ April 18, 1914 : Houston and I lunched with Martin [recorded House]. Henry Watterson was also there. He spoke kindly of the President and said they did not differ regarding his policies, but he was a man that he, Watterson, could not successfully co-operate TOth, indicating that the President was cold and in- different. I told him that as far as my own experience had been, he was just the opposite, for I had never had a sweeter, kinder, or more affectionate friend than Woodrow Wilson. . . . “ June 27, 1914 [in London] : I lunched with Page.^ Afterwards we went into the private park in front of his house and talked for an hour or more. He asked me to bring to the attention of the President the fact that he, the President, was not seeing enough business men and was not talking to them, as he expressed it, ® in their language.’ He thought the President had a ^ Walter Hines Page* Ambassador to the Court of St. James's* THE SILENT PARTNER 132 Lroad and philanthropic view of the situation, and that everything he was doing for the country was absolutely right, but he failed to give proper assurances to the business world that he had their welfare, at heart and was not unfriendly as they thought. He suggested that the President should invite some of them to lunch and show them some marked social attention. I did not think he would do this— he was not constituted that way ; that I had been at the White House a great deal, but, with the exception of seeing Cleveland Dodge there once, I had not met anyone other than the immediate family. “ I told him, too, how very tired the President was and how he had to conserve his strength, and that we must take him as he was and not as some people would like to have him. He said a prominent American told him the other day that the President did not confer with anyone excepting me ; ... he thought a President should not confine himself to a single individual. Page asked how he knew this was true. He replied that it was a matter of common knowledge in America. “ I told Page the President consulted with the individual members of his Cabinet about their depart- ments, but he did not consult with them on matters affecting their colleagues, and I thought he was right. If he did this, he would soon have every Cabinet officer meddling with the affairs of the others, and there would be general dissatisfaction.” Keenly aware of the wave of criticism that threatened the President because of his retired habits, and realizing that Wilson’s strength lay in the formulation and exposi- tion of policy rather than in the despatch of business through personal conference. House set himself to the labour of innumerable interviews and multifarious corre- spondence, which might offset the criticism and lighten the burden of detail that weighs upon every President. He intercepted importunates on their way to the White House and promised to arrange their business with the THE SILENT PARTNER 133 President more rapidly than they could themselves. He sifted applications for appointments. He discussed industrial relations with capitalists and labour leaders. He advised the chiefs of industrial corporations how to settle their difficulties uith the Government. And afterwards, reporting the gist of these interffiews to the President, he brought him into touch with the currents of opinion and affairs. “ March 22, 1913 : Mr. Frick came at eleven. He wished to know whether I thought it was possible to settle the United States Steel Corporation suit outside of the courts. He declared that he came of his own initiati\'e and no one knew he was doing so. He wanted the matter kept confidential, excepting the President and Attorney-General. We discussed the matter at some length. I pointed out the difficulties, with which he concurred. He seemed fair. I promised to mention the matter and to see what could be done, , . . “ 2 slarch 24, 1913 : I told him [Wilson] about Mr. Frick's call and his suggestion in regard to the United States Steel Corporation suit. Before the President replied, I said, ‘ You had better let me tell Frick that you referred me to the Attorney-General and suggested that whatever proposal came to you should come through the Attorney-General’s Office.' The President smiled and said, ‘ "Tou may consider it has been said.’ “ We discussed it at some length. The President thought that the Steel Corporation should have the same consideration as any other, neither more nor less, and that they should be allowed to make a proposition for an agreement as to a decree of court in the suit. . . . '"April 18, 1913 : I went to the White House early and met the President on his way to the memorial service held for the late President of the Honduras. I found a large number of people waiting, Mitchell Palmer being one of them. I asked if I could not attend to his matters for him, explaining how busy the President was and how 134 the silent partner uneasy we were for his health if the pressure continued. He said he wanted to know about Guthrie’s chances for an ambassadorship. I was able to tell him that the President had him down for Japan. I asked, ‘ What next ? ’ He wished to know about Berry for Collector of the Port of Philadelphia. I was able to tell him that McAdoo and I had threshed that out the day before and we would both recommend his appointment. “After that he wanted to know about Graham, who wishes to go in the Attorney-General’s Office. I told him that McReynolds and I had discussed that the day before and that he intended to appoint him. This satis- fied Palmer and he went back to the Capitol. “Jerry Sullivan from Iowa wa's waiting to see the President, and I treated him as I did Palmer. He had just been appointed on the Appraisers’ Court in New York. ... He was uncertain as to whether he ought to leave Iowa and wished to know how much time he could have to decide. ... I asked him not to bother the President, but to take it up with me and I would thresh it out with the Attorney-General and take it to the Presi- dent in concentrated form. He had several other desires, which I advised him to put in writing and to send to me at his convenience. “ I wish I could always be here to do these things for the President and give him time to devote himself to the larger problems which confront the country. , . . “August 2, 1913 : John Mitchell, President of the Federation of Miners, and Timothy Healy, President of the International Brotherhood of Stationary Firemen, lunched with me to-day. I talked to them earnestly concerning the future of labour. I urged upon them the necessity of taking a broad view, and not letting the unimportant things of to-day interfere with the larger ones which are to come. . . . “ November 19, 1913 : I lunched with Charles Grasty of the Baltimore Sun. The other guest was Mr. Daniel Willard of the Baltimore and Ohio. I found Willard had a clear knowledge of railroad rates. Many of the THE SILENT PARTNER 135 facts given me by Secretary Lane, Commissioner Marble, and Frank Train biiil are mi'^leadimr. Mr, Willard is very agreeable. He used the tabieclofii instead of paper to make diagram'^ and to illustrate his pioints, and he ate no lunch to speak uf, b-ut talked all the time, though not tiresomely. ...” Not the least important functixn tsken over by tlie Colonel was that of receiving complaints against the Administration- which his personal friends, who tre- quentiy did not share his admiration for the President, passed on to Mm with a rugged disregard for his peace of mind. With journalists and editors he kept always in close touch, and they seemed to find in him a man to whom it was worth while to send criticism. Mr. E. S. Marlin to Colonel H'>mc :Jay 18, 1915 Dear House : . . . Cass Gilbert was at lunch. I said to him: “ The most that I shall do to-day will be to send clippings to House. Why do people do such things for House ? And then we went on to discuss House. Well ! I hope House is pretty well and that the swivel in his honourable neck is working easily, so that when Ms head is turned with consortations with the mighty he can twist it back without too much effort. Good luck ! E. S. Martin f 1914 Dear House ; I commend to your thoughtful consideration the story I read in the paper, that in some districts in India where they held a bee and cleaned out the tigers, the wild pigs so multiplied that they ruined the crops. Are the wild pigs going to . . . devour us when we pass the anti-trust Mils with the labour union exemptions and muzzle the railroads and skin the millionaires ? 136 THE SILENT PARTNER I think that is quite a parable about the tigers and the wild pigs. The I.W.W.’S, the labourites, the socialists, all the cranks and all the hoboes, they are the wild pigs. Yours E. S. M. May II, 1915 Dear House : . . . Woodrow, after a three-day conference ^ex- clusively with himself, made a short speech yesterday which I didn’t like ; but no matter. I wished he had talked to himself and conferred with someone else. They say he has not conferred one single lick with Bill Bryan . . . and that is good. So we profit by the virtues of Woodrow’s defects. . . . I think Wilson will do right, but if he gets sloppy I’m going to get right in with the Powers of Darkness [Roosevelt and his followers] and help drive the Bryan and Daniels crowd out into the wilderness. This I say, not that it is true, but to enable you to feel the temper of the public. . . . Good luck. E. S. M. Mr. George W. Wickersham to Mr. E. S. Martin [forwarded to Colonel House) New York, February 3, 1914 My dear Martin : Your editorial for February ii is very sane. The trouble with Mr. Wilson is that he lives in an imaginary world. He fancies that a thing should be so, and it is so. Which is all very well until a large enough number of people begin to inquire, “Is it so ? ’’ Then, like “ the unsubstantial fabric of a vision,” it vanishes. Unlike it, it does leave a mark behind. Yours faithfully George W. Wickersham THE SILENT PARTNER 137 Mr. James Speyer to Colonel House York, March J2, My dear Coloxel House : I am glad you are coming back soon I I am satisfied that the gentlemen in Washington do not realize the seriousncbs of the financial situation through the general impairment of railroad credit. The Interstate Commerce Commission shows no disposition to hurry its decision, as to an advance in rates ; on the contrary, they have again extended the time for hearings and are asking more questions, etc. ileantime gross and net earnings are declining and the weaker roads like the Erie, Southern Railway, Chesapeake and Ohio, etc., cannot sell their bonds e.xcept at bankruptcy figures, if at all. I can only repeat that, in my opinion, which I do not express publicly, we are face to face with tlie possibility not of one but of several receiverships of the bier railroad systems. And you know how harmful that would l>e and how slow the recovery, ilr. Rea’s statement, of which I enclose a copy, is absolutely true and so is the enclosed article from the Ra{lu.ay Gazette. Something must be done and done soon, in a big and courageous way, to stop these attacks by Government agencies both federal and state, if disaster is to be averted. We need a practical and constructive policy and measures. I wish I could write more cheerfully, but even I am not sufficiently optimistic to close my eyes to existing conditions. With kind regards Sincerely yours James Speyer Major Henry L. Higginson to Colonel House Boston, Massachusetts January 13, 1915 My dear Colonel House : ... It does not seem clear to Washington that the action there and in the States is keeping business men on pins, and that, having lost considerable money and lost 138 THE SILENT PARTNER almost entire confidence, they are not willing to risk their credit. They have simply withdrawn their money in a large way from active business, and are waiting to see whether it is safe for them to pledge their names and their honour in carrying out either old or new enter- prises. ... It is not what Mr. Wilson’s Administration has wished ; it is not his intention or that of Congress, no doubt, but they do not see, they do not realize how people feel. I was glad to vote for Mr. Wilson, and have liked a great deal that he and Congress, with his guidance, have done ; but this shipping bill is a terrible mistake. If we can only have peace and nothing new, trust placed in railroad directorates and in other great concerns, we shall go on very well. . . . Perhaps these matters could be laid before influential men and do some good, and perhaps not. With kind regards, I am Very truly yours H. L. Higginson Mr. E. S. Martin to Colonel House New York, February lo, 1915 Dear House ; Your press agent is still working overtime. Who is he, anyhow ? Here are a few clippings. Our poor country is working along under shortened sail since you left.^ I don’t know any more than I can help about what is going on, and read the papers through smoked glasses. I understand that your friend W. W. has clenched his teeth through the remnants of the shipping bill and means to hold on. He has a heroic bite. I am afraid it is his destiny finally to adhere to something that wiU sink with him. But who can tell ? We are all in the Lord’s hands and should be hopeful, however anxious. . , . Yours E. S. Martin ^ For six montlis in Europe. THE SILENT PARTNER 139 House received the complaints cordially, explain^xl the situation, and promis'jd do what he could to belter it. To members of the Tabinet he pas.^ed on the criti- cisms and insisted iip'.*n the need of meeting the factors that produced them. “ Xovemher y, 1913 ; Bidx'p Brent came tit iialf-past five to tell of conditions in the Philippines. He says they have a very wrong impression of the Adniinistraiion, believing that the Democratic Party s advent to power means immediate self-government for them. He does not believe it possible to git'e them self-government until the school children of to-day become old enough to take an active part in public affairs. “ I complimented him upon the work he is doing, and suggested that any time he \\ns!ied to reach the President or to accomplish sometiiing which he could I O not accomplish through the ordinary channels, he could communicate with me.” Colonel House to Mr. William Garrott Brown New York, April lo, 1913 Dear Mr. Brown : Martin tells me that you think too many Southerners are being given office under this Administration. You are quite right, but it is hard to help it. The best material that has been suggested for office comes from the South, and it is almost as hard to get satis- factory Democrats from the North as it would be for a Republican Administration to get satisfactory Republi- cans from the South. In naming Mr. Page for England the President went into the subject carefully, and by process of elimination Mr. Page seemed to be the most available. And so it has been in ever}'’ instance. . . . It seems to me that we wiU have to assume the burden of responsibility and let it go at that. If the Administration succeeds, as we now hope, then it will THE SILENT PARTNER 140 be a great tribute to the South ; and if it fails, we must necessarily shoulder a larger part of the blame. . . . With warm regards and best wishes, I am Faithfully yours E. M. House Mr. E. S. Martin to Colonel House New York, October 21, 1915 Dear House : It uplifted me very much to talk to you. It always does. You must be a hypnotizer. Anyhow you always make me feel that we’re going to do our duty. Here’s next week’s Life with a good cartoon. More power to your elbow ! E. S. M. Colonel House to Secretary McAdoo AtrsTiN, Texas, March 7, 1914 My dear Friend : I am enclosing you two letters from Colonel Nelson of the Kansas City Star, which I think it would be well to have the President glance over. Every day some complaint of this sort reaches me. I never tire of reading the generous chorus of praise of the President’s first year in office, and no one knows better than we how richly he deserves it. However, long experience has taught me how quickly this may turn in other directions. If this should happen, I feel sure it will not be from any act of the President himself, but because those of us whom he has trusted on the watch tower have failed in their duty toward him. . . . Faithfully yours E. M. House III The extraordinary position of Colonel House, without office and yet an integral part of the Administration, THE SILENT PARTNER 141 was made possible not merely by the personal regard nf the President and tise infinite variet}’ of service? which House performed for him, hut by the intimacy of rela- tions he maintained with tlie Eabiiir-t. He carried on constant correspondence with them, sometimes personal, sometime? political, always cordial in character. Each time that he visited \Va?hinj,ti'»n ht- evidently took pains to study the problems of their departments and to acquire for them whatever information he could. Brief selectituis from his memoranda indicate the informality of their intercourse. “ Man'll 20, 1913 • From Burleson I went to call upon the Secretary of the Interior, and spent a ver\' pleasant quarter of an hour. After that I returned to the Cosmos Club, where I met McAdno and Houston. They immediately began to berate me for having put them in the Cabinet. They wanted to know what they had done to have such jobs imposed upon them. Houston said he had work enough to do for six healthy men. . . . “April 13, 1913: Secretary Lane came an hour before the time set for the dinner to be given Ambassador James Bryce. He desired to talk of Ms department and to outline some plans for the future. . . . “ November 24, 1913 : We arrived at the Bryans’ at nine and went almost immediately to bed. It was understood that w^e were to have breakfast at half-past seven, but, much to our relief, Mrs. Bryan knocked on our doors a few minutes later and announced that Mr. Bryan would take his horseback exercise before breakfast, so we would not have it until half-past eight — an un- usually late hour for the Bryan household. . . . “ November 25, 1913 : To-day was Cabinet day, and I remained to meet the different members as they came in, for there was sometMng I had to say to each. . . . “ December 12, 1913 : Houston and Burleson came around to see me. I first took up with them the question of Cabinet officers not making speeches without the THE SILENT PARTNER 142 President’s permission, and perhaps not making any speeches unless the President had something in particular for them to say to the country about their departments. I thought the present habit of members of the Cabinet making indiscriminate speeches was very bad, and often embarrassing. I suggested that if the President would designate them to speak upon certain subjects at certain times, what they said would have much weight and would be almost equal to a presidential utterance. “ I found there was some feeling among the members of the Cabinet because the Friday Cabinet meetings had been discontinued. I agreed to mention it to the President and ask him to resume them. Later in the day I did this, and the President consented to do so. “ The President was pleased when I told him I had spoken to a sufficient number of the Cabinet to ensure the adoption of my suggestion that no speeches should be made in the future without his consent, and only when he thought the occasion demanded it. . . . “ November 15, 1915 : Last night the Secretary of War sent a special messenger from Washington, bearing a letter for me concerning his report. He desired me to discuss with the President the advisability of putting his report out in advance of handing it to the President. The President does not wish him to do so, and I am to convey to Garrison this unpleasant information. Mr. Bryan has wired requesting that I ask the President to appoint a friend of his as Marshal here. This he also declined to do, because he said the man was not fit for that particular place. . . . “ December 22, 1913 : McAdoo’s carriage met me [upon arrival in Washington] and I drove to his home for breakfast. He came to my room in his pyjamas, half asleep. He had been up practically aU night so as to be in touch by telephone with the House and Senate Conference Committee, which did not reach a conclusion until five o’clock this morning. “ During the morning I remained in McAdoo’s private office, telephoning some of the Cabinet members and THE SILENT PARTNER 143 making some memoranda ol things I desired to discuss with the President. . . . “ Dccemhcr 23, 1913 : I walked with McAdoo to the Cabinet meeting and saw the others as they assembled. Redfield was particularly anAion.s to show me some statistics regarding our exports, which he considered inttavstiiig. . . . “ Janii>''ty 16, 1914 : I spoke to each member of the Cabinet as fhev came in, and talked to Lane about the conservation of our radium deposits, strongly urging it. . . . “April 28, 1914: McAdoo and I went back to the White House, as there was to be a Cabinet meeting. There I met all the Cabinet, but had no conversation with any of them excepting Houston. I advised him that the President felt he could not spare him from the Department of Agriculture for the present, but later would probably place him on the Federal Re.serve Board. . . . “ May 8, 1914 : From the Treasury I went to the White House Offices in order to see members of the Cabinet before they convened. McReynolds, Burleson, Lane, Garrison, and others each held me for a moment. Lane was anxious to know whether I thought it advisable for him to go to California at this time to take the LL.D. degree which the University of California has offered him. I advised taking it up with the President and being governed by his wishes. ...” No more striking example of the cordial feeling of Cabinet members towards Colonel House can be found than the offer made by the Postmaster-General and the Attorney-General to resign, if their withdrawal would make it easier for the President to appoint House Secre- tary of State. This occurred in the early autumn of 1915, after Bryan’s resignation. “ Burleson and Gregory [noted House on June 20, 1915] thought perhaps I was refusing to become Secretary THE SILENT PARTNER 144 of State because it would give Texas three men in the Cabinet and all from Austin, They therefore offered to send in their resignations if I would accept. “ When I told the President about Burleson and Gregory offering to resign so as to leave me free to accept the Secretaryship of State without embarrassment to him, he said, ‘ I am glad you told me, for it is something I shall always remember with pleasure.’ ” Colonel House to Postmaster-General Burleson Roslyn, Long Island June 21 , 1915 Dear Albert : Gregory has given me your message, and nothing has ever touched me more deeply. There is no consideration, I think, that would influence me enough to make me accept an office. My endeavour must always be in the path I have so long followed. If I could be brought to think of it at all, it would be to serve my friends and not to accept sacrifices from them. You and Gregory have made me feel that hfe is worth living and that all I have tried to do has not been in vain. Your friend always E, M. House. To House, members of the Cabinet brought the most varied problems. He responded with an unsparing expenditure of time and energy and, like Kipling’s hero, frequently showed them a quiet and safe way round, out, or under. They evidently relied upon his judgment in matters of appointments. “ Will you kindly have this pair looked up,” wrote McAdoo, “ and tell me what is thought of them ? ” And two days later : " Please hurry up report on Mr, Vernon [appointments].” And again, stiH later : “ Here is a sample of my troubles. Will THE SILENT PARTNER 145 you be good enough to look into the character of this man and let me hear from you quickly ? ” “ May 10, 1914 : Attorney-General McReynolds lunched uitli me ‘recorded House . We went over much the same ground covered in Wa-^hington. We discussed a vacant federal judgeship . . . and' I insisted upon his making an immediate appointment. The docket is becoming clogged and there is no reason for his delay. I had X to see him this morning in order that he might look him over. His only objection to him was that he had no chin. The two men I sent him last week as candidates for United States Marshals seemed to be all right excepting that they were too fat. I have another suggestion to make for an appointment, but the man has a large mole on the back of his ear. I shall ask him to be careful not to expose that side of his head. " Later in the day, Gregory and I were laughing at this eccentricity of McReynolds. Gregory says he is such a big, fine-looking fellow himself that he cannot get it through his head that anyone has any ability that is not built upon the same lines.” Attorney-General 2IcReynolds to Colonel House New York, May ii, 1914 Dear Mr. House : IVe devoted some time to the judgeship, and this is the way it lies in my mind : X is well recommended and would not be a bad appointment ; neither will he ever make more than an or^nary judge. He did not make a good impression on me personally. Y made a better impression, but I do not regard him as the very best kind of material. If I should act whoUy on my own impressions, I’d guess in favour of Y. However, if you gentlemen think it wisest to select X, I will recommend his appointment and take the I — 10 146 THE SILENT PARTNER chance. He said that he was not certain about acceptance if tendered. We ought to know whether he will, before any formal tender is made to him. Will you see that the rest is done ? Called you on the ’phone, but you were reported out with the President. Sincerely McReynolds House’s opinion was finally approved. With Gregory, who succeeded McReynolds when the latter was appointed to the Supreme Court, Colonel House’s association was even more intimate. The Colonel discussed frankly with him the relations of a Cabinet member with the President, and gave him the benefit of his own experience : “ Never to go into long-winded arguments upon any subject, but to state his position in brief terms and never repeat. That when he and the President agreed upon a matter, never to give him reasons for so agreeing, as the President was too busy to listen to unimportant details, I was sure he would always be able to see the President whenever necessary if he did not burden him with unimportant and unnecessary verbiage. . . . “ Gregory is very able and has been exceedingly successful with New Haven affairs, but it has not spoiled him in the least. He is one of the few that I have ever met who, I believe, would never get ‘ the big head ’ no matter how successful he became. He is not only able, but is as loyal as the Legion of Caesar.” Colonel House to Attorney-General Gregory Pride's Crossing, Massachusetts August 20, 1914 My dear Friend : , . , I am so eager for your success and so anxious it may be brought about without any impairment of your THE SILENT PARTNER 147 strength that there are many suggestions that have come to me since our last talk. Do be careful about making appointments too soon. Take your time about them and do not let friendship have any undue influence upon you. . . . Afiectionaiely yours * E. }.I. House On his side, IMr. Gregory wrote continually to House, evidencing invariably the strongest affection both for him and for the President. “ How can I e^'er repay such confidence or justify it? ” he wrote on August 22, 1914. ” How can I ever even up matters ’uitli you. who have given him so exaggerated an idea of my ability ? ” And four days later : “ Come to Washington soon, give us all the suggestions 3"ou can spare, and do not doubt that I know you to be, as ^■'ou have been for years, m\' very best friend.” Apparently the Cabinet counted on House not merely to discover available material for appointments, but also to inform unsatisfactory office-holders that they need not expect reappointment or continuance. The function could not have been attractive. House writes to i^IcAdoo : " I am always ready to meet any suggestion that you make, but if you know Mr. X at all you would know that it would be utterly impossible for me or any- one else to notify him ‘ in a tactful way ’ and ‘ in a way not to hurt his feelings ' that his services w'ere to be discontinued. I would as soon undertake to square the circle or to prove the fourth dimension.” Mr. X, who was evidently a gentleman to be handled diplomatically, seems to have made difficulties, for some time later Mr. Gregory wrote as follows to the Colonel : 148 THE SILENT PARTNER Attorney-General Gregory to Colonel House Washington, November 25, 1914 My dear Friend : I went to the White House last night and had a long talk with the President about X. I do not think the President will agree to appoint him to the — - position, although a final conclusion was not reached. The President made a memorandum of X’s case and is going to make an effort to provide for him in some way, and I will keep the matter in mind. I do not want X, however, to be eternally bombarding my private secretary and me with telegrams demanding his immediate appointment to the place, and I must say that he is making a nuisance of himself. I wish you would get this idea conveyed to him in some diplo- matic way. , . . Sincerely and affectionately yours T. W. Gregory Much more interesting and congenial was the task which Colonel House set himself whenever in Europe — that of studying all sorts of reforms so as to be able to pass on new ideas to the heads of departments in Wash- ington. " This afternoon [he wrote in London, June 20, 1913] Sir Horace Plunkett came to call and remained for an hour. We discussed the betterment of the farming class along the lines of more effective farming, farming credits, co-operative marketing, and the making of country life more pleasant and desirable. He wished me to come to Ireland and visit him for three days before we sail, and I have promised to go. I am much interested in this phase of governmental work. I want to see what has been done in Ireland under his direction so that I may take some practical knowledge of it to the Presi- dent and to Secretary Houston for their information.” THE SILENT PARTNER 149 House knew of the lifetime of service which Plunkett had devoted to the science of agricultural improvement and to its application to Ireland, of his friendship \nth Roosevelt, and his love for America. He looked upon him as among the most eminent of living British states- men, and he hoped to win his interest and help in the solution of American agricultural problems. Plunkett, on his side, had been on the watch for a chance to come into contact with the new Democratic Administration and was delighted to find in the President’s adviser a congenial spirit, between whom and himself sprang up an enduring companionship. “ Thus began,” said Plun- kett, twelve years later, ” this precious friendship of my later years.” ^ Sir Horace Plunkett to Colonel House Washington, D.C., October 16, 1913 My dear Colonel House : You leave me wondering how you can show such extraordinary kindness to a stranger in the land, of whom you know so little, and how I can ever repay such hospitality and help. Yesterday morning and last night will long remain delightful memories. You gave me the opportunity I badly needed to explain things to Mr. Houston, and in this, judging by his kindness to me to-day, I think I must have had some success. I had a most useful time with him and others at the Depart- ment this morning and shall probably resume my studies to-morrow. I paid my respects to the President and was shocked to see him looking so worn. The change since January last is terribly marked, and you ought to try and force Mm to take a week’s complete rest the moment the strain is relaxed — even at the sacrifice of some public business. You vail be glad to know that already the atmosphere ^ Conversatioa with the author, August i, 1925* 150 THE SILENT PARTNER at the Department of Agriculture has noticeably changed. I am going to think quietly over what I have learned and shall probably write you from Battle Creek a sug- gestion for a line which, if taken by the President in his first annual message, might greatly assist the Agricultural Department, You would know whether to mention it to the President, Any suggestions I may have from time to time for the Department I shall send direct to the Secretary. . . . With renewed thanks and kind remembrances to Mrs. House, I am Sincerely yours Horace Plunkett Most characteristic is the following letter, which suggests the remarkable position held by Colonel House. Mr. Lane had in mind resigning from the Cabinet in case a certain other high office should be opened to him. Quite obviously he regarded House’s approval as neces- sary, and yet his fondness for the Colonel was such that he was unwilling to embarrass him by approaching him directly. Secretary Lane to Dr. S. E. Mezes Washington, July 4, 1916 My dear Sid : , . . Now don’t think me importunate or cheeky or impatient. I’m here to do my “ bit.” I’ll stand guard all night without a whimper. All I want is for you, in that superlatively tactful way of yours, to find out if my chances are worth considering at this time — and if they are, will the Colonel make them something better than mere chances. If they are not, I shah, continue sawing wood, and whistling most of the time. I am not asking for what Ned calls “ buU-con ” or for any pat on the back. If you can give me a tip, I THE SILENT PARTNER 151 shall be obliged ; if not, I shall be as always your most devoted and sometimes humble servant, F. K. L. P.S. Treat this rather frivolous epistle upon a most important subject as entirely between us. I wouldn’t for a good right leg want Colonel E. to think me to be butting in. IV The activities of Colonel House were not confined to assisting the National Administration. We find him in consultation with the Boston city authorities when appointments were to be made, and the New York City and State Democrats looked to him for counsel and aid. An infinite number of lesser problems were cheerfully deposited upon his doorstep by friends, acquaintances, and strangers. He soothed disgruntled journalists, and discussed the plans of inventors tvho w’ould save the Republic from material destruction in the next war and social enthusiasts who would preserve its soul during the peace. “ I have had as fine a collection of cranks to-day [he WTote on October 20, 1913] as it has been my lot to meet for a long time. Mr. Brj^an sent one, Secretary Daniels sent another, and I inherited yet another from the President. The talk has ranged all the w'ay from ofiice- seeking to the control of the planetary system. . , . " October 23, 1914 : My, my, w’hat a busy day ! Commencing with ^Governor Glynn, McAdoo, Dudley Malone, Commissioner Adamson, former Corporation Counsel Archibald Watson, Stuart Gibboney, Clarence Shcam, Montgomery Hare, Francis Lynde Stetson, McAneny, and so many others I cannot even think of them. Every phase of the New York state election has been referred to me to-day. Telegrams, party notices, THE SILENT PARTNER 152 arrangements for meetings, have all passed up for visa. I am literally tired out and shall he glad when the elec- tion has come and gone. . . . “ May 23, 1914 [on an Atlantic liner] ; I had several wireless messages, one from Mrs. , who desires her husband, who is now Consul at , appointed to the vacancy in London. Even at sea there is no rest from the office-seekers. . . . “ November 4, 1914 : Loulie and I took the 12.08 for Washington. Major-General went with us by invitation. I shall be more careful next time, for he literally talked me to death. If he can fight as hard as he can talk, no enemy in the world could resist him. . . Colonel House regarded his position in public affairs with philosophical eye and not without a touch of humour. “ The funny part of it is,'' he wrote to his brother-in-law, “ that people seem to think that I have done something unusual, when as a matter of fact it is only because the newspapers have begun to say extrava- gant things about me. Such, however, is the stuff of which fame is made.” The interest of the Colonel’s life was beyond question, but none the less it must have proved wear5dng. The more people realized the difficulty of reaching President Wilson personally, the more strenuous were the efforts they made at least to reach House. ” The Governor comes in again this afternoon [wrote House to Dr. Mezes] to spend the night with me and go to the theatre. It is an exceedingly pleasant diversion to have him, but you have no idea how much work it entails. “ As soon as the papers blaze forth in the morning, my troubles immediately begin anew and I receive communications from unheard-of quarters as well as from friends who have been lost for many years. . . .” THE SILENT PARTNER 153 And later : “ I am suffering from the after-effects of the President’s \isit. All the latent cranks in the country are at me. Some to kiU,^ some to amuse, but most of them to instruct concerning what is best to be done in every phase of government. ...” House also asked himself what would be the effect of his growing reputation upon the mind of the President and others in official positions. The role of Sminence grise was one that demanded a never-failing tact. It may have been flattering to be so placed that every- one should regard his consent to a proposal as equivalent to success, but it was politically perilous as well as physically tiring. Colonel House to Dr. S. E. Mezes New York, April 24, 1913 Dear Sidney: ... I was in Washington ten days, and wffien I re- turned I literally had to wade through mail to get to my desk. Every office-seeker and every crank in the United States is on my trail, and I get photographs from all sorts and conditions of people who think in this way they can impress their identity more securely upon me. It all comes from the newspaper notoriety, and the end is not yet. The next edition of Collier’s, I believe, is to do the thing in grand style. The article is to be entitled “ The President’s Silent Partner.” I urged them to name it anything but that, but nothing but that would satisfy them. They said that title had much ^ The following, aithoiigli belonging to a later period, is typical of the tlueatening letters House received : Sorry I missed the President wiieo lie left your home* I liad a nice bullet for him for a wedding present ! I get him yet and you to, because you are a facker. A friend of Justice/* 154 the silent partner more punch in it than any other. I agree to that, but I am afraid that I will get some of the licks. I do not know how much of this kind of thing W. W. can stand. The last edition of Harper’s Weekly spoke of me as " Assistant President House.” I think it is time for me to go to Europe or take to the woods. Fraternally yours E. M. House House decided to go to Europe, where he spent the summer of 1913. But he returned to find his influence undiminished and his energies engaged in a succession of major problems, at first domestic and then international in character. CHAPTER VI THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK President Wilson has brought his party out of the wilderness of Bryan- ism. It has been a great exhibition of leadership. New York Tribune ^ December 24, 1913 I “ /■’ I xHE main thing, I think [wrote House to Wilson, I July 31, 1915], is always to do the job better I than anyone else has ever done it, and the political end will take care of itself. This has always been my theory, and I have found it satisfactory and successful.” This note, which recurs continually in House’s letters, would doubtless have surprised many persons who, without adequate information, looked upon the Colonel primarily as a political manager and an expert in party tactics. Another misconception lay in the belief that House acted as a brake upon the President, constantly restraining him from over-enthusiasm in reform and urging caution in speeches and legislative measures. His papers by no means bear out this sup- position. One may deduce from them, indeed, the definite conclusion that the Colonel was the more radical of the two and was ever in fear lest this Administration, like so many others, once it came into power should be content merely to govern and forget to pave the path for progress. House always insisted upon the need of courage and of radical reform. A clear example of his feeling is found in two conversations, almost a year 155 156 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK apart, between House and the President, The first occurred at the moment when tariff lobbyists were threatening the pohtical annihilation of Wilson if he persisted in driving through the Tariff Bill without regard to the demands of special interests. The second took place when reactionary forces were stirring feeling against him because of his proposed anti-trust legis- lation, “ May II, 1913 ; Captain Bill McDonald once told me that he attributed his still being alive to the fact that he had never hesitated the fraction of a second, but had always gone straight towards the point of danger, and the courage of the other fellow had always failed. I urged this attitude upon the President as strongly as I knew how, and told him it was the most essential thing of all. , . . “ April 27, 1914 : We talked of the desirability of pusMng the progressive cause forward. I thought unless we did this, we could not justify being in the position we were. We spoke of the political results of such a course, and came to the conclusion that it was best not to consider that aspect at all, but to go resolutely forward with the reform programme and let the future take care of itself.” The extent of Colonel House's influence upon the legislative plans of the Administration may be gathered from a remarkable document, which deserves some attention. In the autumn of 1912, immediately after the presidential election, there was published a novel, or political romance, entitled Philip Dru : Administrator. It was the story of a young West Point graduate, in- capacitated for military service by his health, who was caught by the spirit of revolt against the tyranny of privileged interests. A stupid and reactionary Govern- THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 157 ment at Washington provokes armed rebellion, in which Dm joins whole-heartedly and which he ultimately leads to complete success. He himself becomes dictator and proceeds by ordinance to remake the mechanism of government, to reform the basic law^s that determine the relation of the classes, to remodel the defensive forces of the republic, and to bring about an international grouping or league of powers, founded upon Anglo- Saxon solidarity. His reforms accomplished, he gives effect once more to representative institutions as for- mulated in a new American Constitution, better fitted than the old for the spirit and conditions of the twentieth century. As a romance, the book was not notable, for the effort of the anon5mious author had evidently been spent upon the careful working-out of the political and social ideas of the young Philip Dru rather than upon its literary form. Certain reviewers, however, were piqued by the daring and the ingenuity of these ideas and, treating the book as a political manifesto rather than a novel, acclaimed it as a remarkable publication. Speculation as to the personality of the unknown author, who was described merely as "a man prominent in political councils,” naturally followed. There seemed to be general agreement that he could not belong to either of the two older parties. “ We trust he is to be found among the Democrats,” wrote one reviewer, ” but we greatly fear he is of the New Party.” Another reviewer was of similar opinion : “We trust that the author’s counsel and assistance will be available at Wash- ington, if not during the present Administration, surely when the Progressive Party assumes control.” There were, indeed, numerous suggestions that Mr. Roosevelt himself was the author. 158 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK Five years after its publication an enterprising book- seller, noting the growing influence of House in the Wilson Administration, wrote with regard to the book : “ As time goes on the interest in it becomes more intense, due to the fact that so many of the ideas expressed by Philip Dm : Administrator, have become laws of this Repubhc, and so many of his ideas have been discussed, as becoming laws.” And he ends with the question, “ Is Colonel E. M. House of Texas the author ? If not, who is ? ” Colonel House was, in truth, the author ; to his other occupations he had added that of novelist. He tells us himself in a brief memorandum how, in the autumn of 1911, he conceived the idea of writing a novel as a medium to express his economic and political theories. That winter in Austin he was seriously ill. “ When I began to convalesce at home, and before I was able to get about, I wrote Philip Dm : Adminis- trator. I was surprised at the rapidity with which I wrote, for I was not certain when I began that I could do it at all. . . . “ I was also surprised to find how much I was in- terested in doing this kind of work. I had written platforms, speeches, etc., for different candidates and officials, and newspaper articles for campaign purposes, but this was an entirely new departure. I did not spend more than thirty days upon the first draft of the book. Mezes read and approved it, and I sent it to Houston to look over, largely with the view of getting his judgment as to the economic features of it. " He kept the manuscript until I passed through St. Louis on my way East. He declared his behef that it was economically sound, but held that the fiction in it was so thin that he advised rewriting it as a serious work, as he had suggested originally.” THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 159 Colonel House to Dr, D. F. Houston Austin, Texas, March 12, 1912 Dear Doctor Houston : ... I expect to elaborate somewhat concerning the functions of the National Government. I particularly want to make it clear that the Executive and his Cabinet vill be more nearly akin to the English Premier than to the French, inasmuch as I want him to have the right to propose measures directly and without referring them to a committee. If you have any suggestions along this or any other lines, please let me have them. I have done some padding — as, for instance, the story of the tenement fire — ^which I expect to take out later and put in more serious stuff. It is not much of a novel, as you \rill soon discover ; at the same time, unless it were known bv that name its audience would be reduced at least ninety-nine per cent. If it w^as called what I really mean it to be, only those who think pretty much as I do w'ould read it, and those I am trying to reach would never look at it. Faithfully yours E. M. House But this was the spring of 1912, and all of House's energies were taken up with the pre-convention cam- paign that ended mth the nomination of Wilson. The early summer he spent in Europe. Evidently not wishing to give the time necessary to putting it into the form that Mr. Houston advised, by elimination of the romance, and fearing that a scientific essay would not reach a large public, he decided merely to smooth it out so far as possible while on the Atlantic. “ I worked assiduously on Philip Dru all the way over and all the way back, but had no time for it in Europe. . . . We returned early in August, and the i6o THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK first thing I did was to shake myself clear of Phili-b Dru. “ E, S. Martin read the manuscript and wanted me to rewrite it, saying that ‘ some of it was so good that it was a pity that parts of it were so bad.’ I had no time, however, for such diversions, for the political campaign was engrossing my entire time and the pub- lisher was urging me to give him the manuscript so it might be advertised in the autunrn announcements. “ I was so much more interested in the campaign than I was in the book that I turned it over to the pub- lisher, having determined to let it go as it was.” Whatever the literary merits of Philip Dm, it gives us an insight into the main political and social principles that actuated House in his companionship with President Wilson. Through it runs the note of social democracy reminiscent of Louis Blanc and the revolutionaries of 1848 : “ This book is dedicated to the unhappy many who have lived and died lacking oppor- tunity. ...” “ The time is now measurably near when it will be just as reprehensible for the mentally strong to hold in subjection the mentally weak, and to force them to bear the grievous burdens which a misconceived civilization has imposed upon them.” Government, accordingly, must be inspired by the spirit of charity rather than the spirit of ruthless efficiency. Especially must privileged interests be excluded from governmental influence, for by the nature of things their point of view is selfish. Through the book also runs the idea that in the United States, government is unresponsive to popular desires — a “ negative ” government. House calls it— ■ for it is at more pains to do nothing with safety than to attempt desirable reforms which might disturb vested interests and alienate the voters. “ We have been THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK i6i living Tinder a Government of negation.” The theory of checks and balances has developed so as to re-enforce this negative character of government ; closer co-opera- tion between the President and Congress, perhaps in the direction of parliamentary methods, is necessary if the tendency of American government is to be made active and positive. The specific measures enacted by Philip Dru as Administrator of the nation indicated the reforms desired by House. The Administrator appointed a ” board composed of economists and others well versed in matters relating to the tariff and internal revenue, who . . . were in- structed to work out a tariff law which would contemplate the abolition of the theory of protection as a govern- mental policy.” “ The Administrator further directed the tax board to work out a graduated income tax. . . .” Philip Dru also provided for the “ formulation of a new banking law, affording a flexible currency bottomed largely upon commercial assets, the real wealth of the nation, instead of upon debt, as formerly. ... Its final construction would completely destroy the credit trust, the greatest, the most far-reaching, and under evil direction the most pernicious trust of all.” “ He also proposed making corporations share with the Government and States a certain part of their net earnings. . . .” Such were some of Dru's plans which shortly found actual life in Wilsonian legislation. No wonder that Cabinet members like Mr. Lane and Mr. Bryan com- mented upon the influence of Dru with the President. I— II i62 the administration starts work “ All that book has said should be,” wrote Lane, " comes about. . . . The President comes to Philip Dm in the end.” ^ Other excerpts indicate the extent of House’s pro- gressiveness. “ Labour is no longer to be classed as an inert com- modity to be bought and sold by the law of supply and demand.” Dru “ prepared an old-age pension law and also a labourer’s insurance law covering loss in cases of illness, incapacity, and death.” “ He had incorporated in the Franchise Law the right of Labour to have one representative upon the boards of corporations and to share a certain percentage of the earnings above the wages, after a reasonable per cent, upon the capital had been earned. In turn it was to be obligatory upon them [the labourers] not to strike, but to submit all grievances to arbitration.” To such an extent had Colonel House formulated his ideas upon national problems before the election of Wilson. “ In regard to Philip Dru,” wrote House in 1916, “ I want to say that there are some things in it I wrote hastily and in which I do not concur, but most of it I stand upon as being both my ethical and political faith.” II Four great legislative problems confronted Wilson, and their solution constitutes his chief claim, in matters of domestic politics, to the title of statesman. They concerned the revision of the tariff, with the introduction ^ LeUm of Franklin K» Lane^ p. 297* THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 165* of an income tax law, the creation of the Federal Reserve* banking system, the control of trusts, and the regulation of industrial relations. In meeting them Wilson dis- played the inspiring leadership essential to success ; he showed himself as convincing and sympathetic when he dealt with Congress as a whole, as he was reserved in his dealings with individual Congressmen. By the end of the special session which passed both the Tariff and Currency Acts, his moral supremacy was firmly estab- lished and his mastery of the party was complete. He was hailed as the Moses who had led the party out of the legislative ineffectiveness supposedly characteristic of all Democrats. In each of the great problems House took deep interest. He brought to the President the variety of opinions which he cuUed from his numerous personal contacts, he utilized his relations with party leaders to assist the passage of the bills through Congress. But it was in the currency question that he took chief interest, for this he had long studied and from its solution might be expected positive, tangible benefits in a short time. As cotton planter and one-time banker in Texas he appreciated the dangers of an inelastic currency, and as a liberal he distrusted the financial power which certain metropolitan banking firms were able to wield over national commerce and industry. Organized capital, “Wall Street” in popular par- lance, had secured a control of banking credits which, if it were extended, might place the industrial life of the country in the power of private and at least partially irresponsible interests. Against this so-called “credit trust ” Mr. Bryan had protested in 1896 : “ Let the Government go out of the banking business,” the financial magnates had cried ; to which Bryan retorted, “ Let i64 the administration STARTS WORK the banks go out of the Government business.” If private individuals could release or withhold credits at will, it meant a control of industry and inequality of opportunity at complete variance with traditional American principles. Colonel Rouse to Senator Culberson Magnolia, Massachusetts July 26, 1911 Dear Senator : ... I think Woodrow Wilson’s remark that the money trust was the most pernicious of all trusts, is eminently correct. A few individuals and their satellites control the leading banks and trust companies in America. They also control the leading corporations ; and if they are to be permitted on the one hand to use the corporations as a bar against loss to any speculation which they may make, and to use on the other hand the banks and trust companies to borrow all the funds they may need for such speculations, the stockholders of the corporations which they dominate and the business world that de- pends upon funds from the trust companies and banks which they dominate, are bound to suffer. . . . Faithfully yours E. M. House During the autumn of 1912 and the spring of 1913, even in the midst of the campaign and the process of forming a Cabinet, House worked constantly on the currency problem, in order to be prepared to assist the President when he should meet the congressional com- mittees. The task which Colonel House set himself was primarily to prevent the President-elect from com- mitting himself to any one scheme until the problem had been thoroughly studied ; later he guided the measure so that it was left in the control of experts and preserved THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 165 from the heresies of political incompetents. The Colonel was the unseen guardian angel of the bill, constantly assisting the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairmen of the Senate and House Committees in their active and successful labour of translating it into law. Wilson, who was accused of a tendency to avoid advice, proved himself in fact to be far from the self-confident doctrinaire pictured by his opponents, and in the matter of currency reform he was determined that the bill should be founded upon expert opinion. “ The greatest embarrassment of my political career [he said to an enthusiast on this subject] has been that active duties seem to deprive me absolutely of time for careful investigation. I seem almost obliged to form conclusions from impressions instead of from study, but I intend to go much more thoroughly into this matter before saying anything about it ; and I heartily agree with you that this, the most fundamental question of ail, must be approached with caution and fearlessness and receive dispassionate and openminded treatment. I wish that I had more knowledge, more thorough acquaintance, with the matters involved. All that I can promise you is sincere study. I wish that I could promise you a constructive ability.” Colonel House was indefatigable in providing for the President the knowledge that he sought. He collected in his study the banking laws of every nation of Europe. He gathered reports and abstracts from college professors of economics and banking. But he laid chief stress upon his frequent conferences with the bankers themselves, especially those who had had practical experience in drafting previous bills for Republican Administrations. " Decernher 19, 1912 : I talked with Paul Warburg over the telephone regarding currency reform. I told i66 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK of my Washington trip and what I had done there to get it in working order ; that the Senators and Congressmen seemed anxious to do what Governor Wilson desired and that I knew the President-elect thought straight con- cerning the issue. “ February 26, 1913 : I went to the Harding dinner and talked with the guests invited to meet me. It was an interesting occasion. I first talked to Mr. Frick, then with Denman, and afterwards with Otto Kahn. “ March 13, 1913 : Vanderlip and I had an interesting discussion regarding currency reform. ” March 27, 1913 : Mr. J. P. Morgan, jun., and Mr. Denny of his firm, came promptly at five. McAdoo came about ten minutes afterwards. Morgan had a currency plan already formulated and printed. We discussed it at some length. I suggested that he should have it typewritten and sent to us to-day.” ^ “ The Governor [recorded Colonel House on January 8, 1913] agreed to put me in touch with Glass, Chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee, and I am to work out a measure which is to be submitted to him. " He spoke of his fear that Bryan would not approve such a bill as I have in mind. I said it was better to con- tend with Mr. Bryan’s disapproval and fail in securing[any bill at all, than it was to get one which was not sound. ” March 24, 1913 : I had an engagement with Carter Glass at five. We drove, in order not to be inter- rupted. . . . “ I urged him not to allow . . . the Senate Committee to change what we had agreed upon in any of the essential features. He promised to be firm. I advised using honey so long as it was effective, but, when it was not, I would bring the President and Secretary of the Treasury to his rescue. “ I spoke to the President about this after dinner and advised that McAdoo and I whip the Glass measure into 1 Typewritten, in order to avoid the impression that might be given by a printed plan that Morgan's were so sure of their financial power that they could impose a cnt-and-dried plan. THE ADMINISTRATION blAKi^) vvuimv xuy final shape, which he could endorse and take to Owen ^ as his own. My opinion was that Owen would be more hkely to accept it as a presidential measure than as a measure coming from the House Committee on Banking and Currency.” The Currency BiU was brought into the House of Representatives early in the extra session, its main features unchanged from the first drafts decided upon by the President, McAdoo, and the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees. The initial difficulties threatened by certain elements in the party which tended towards economic freethinking, were safely passed. There remained, however, the opposition of a number of Senators, behind which lay the dislike of the bill expressed by prominent Eastern bankers, who evidently feared that it meant a weakening of Wall Street’s power and an amateur or political control of national financial problems. House spent much of his summer in defending the bill and more of his autumn in securing political support for it. “ July 23, 1913 [conversation vith Josiah Quincy, former Mayor of Boston] : I tried to show him the foUy of the Eastern bankers taking an antagonistic attitude towards the Currency Bill. The Administration is endeavouring to serve the country as a whole, and it is the better part of visdom for the Eastern bankers to join hands in working out a measure for the general good. “ Quincy wanted to know what I thought the result would be of their threat to withdraw their national bank charters and take out state charters. I thought the threat was puerile, and not to be discussed, and that the bill would be passed no matter what action they took in that direction.” On the following day House dined with the members ^ Chairman of the Senate Committee. SlAKlb WORK of the Boston Clearing House Association to discuss the bill. He went in no optimistic frame of mind. “I have a feeling,” he wrote, “ that they are not coming for the purpose of discussing the measure with open minds, but are antagonistic to it. I shall be alone to defend the measure.” His forebodings were apparently realized, for he noted after the dinner : “I found the bankers singularly barren of suggestions. They seem to stand upon the general proposition of being against the Administration bill, but without any constructive suggestions looking to its betterment.” House found more consolation and satisfaction in a long talk with Major Henry L. Higginson, at the end of August. ” I can well understand [wrote House] why he is considered by many, Boston’s first citizen. We talked of the currency question and I found that he had a breadth of view unusual amongst those of his calling. He seemed to want what was best for the entire country, and not something for his particular locality and pro- fession. I explained with what care the bill had been framed. Just before he arrived, I had finished a review by Professor Sprague of Harvard of Paul Warburg’s criticism of the Glass-Owen bill, and wiU transmit it to Washington to-morrow. Every banker like Warburg, who knows the subject practically, has been called upon in the making of the bill. Major Higginson seemed thoroughly satisfied with the endeavours the Adminis- tration have made to construct a good and beneficent measure. Colonel House to Mr. E. S. Martin Beverly, Massachusetts Dear Martin ; September 2 , 1913 , . . The Currency Bill should go through the House next week, but it will have a harder road in the Senate. THE ADMINISTRATIOIN' STARTS WORK 169 I have been working upon it assiduously. McAdoo has been here three or four times, and it seems to me that I have seen every banker and political economist in the East. The bankers, sad to relate, know next to nothing about it, and none of them agrees as to what is best. The only unanimity of opinion amongst them is that the bill should be made for them and be operated by them, and they cannot understand that the manufacturers, merchants, railroads, farmers, and others have any rights in the premises. I think the bill is getting in good shape. Houston was with me last week and he says that in his opinion, and in the opinion of ninety per cent, of the political economists throughout the country whose opinions are of value, it is the best bill that has ever been constructed — infinite!}* better than the Aldrich Bill. . . . Faithfully vours E. M. House “ October 19, 1913 : I saw Senator Reed of Missouri in the late afternoon and discussed the currency question with him. He says the President seems to be more concerned in regard to haste than he does as to the measure itself. In this, of course, he is mistaken. The President is satisfied vith the measure approximately as it is, and he knows that Reed and the other Demo- cratic Senators who are delaying it are doing so from a failure to study the measure as it has progressed through the House, and he is impatient in consequence. “ October 31, 1913 : Paul Warburg was my first caller, and he came to discuss the currency measure. There are many features of the Owen-Glass Bill that he does not approve. I promised to put him in touch with McAdoo and Senator Owen, so that he might discuss it with them. “ Senator Murray Crane ^ followed Warburg. He has been in touch with Senators Weeks and Nelson of the ^ Republican Senator from Massaclinsetis* lyo iJtlJt AUMlWlblKATlUN STARTS WORK Currency Committee, and urged them to bring about quick action in order that the business community could have done with this uncertainty and could go ahead with the renewed hope a proper currency measure will give them. He telephoned me later that he had been in communication with Washington, and he advised that we bring some pressure upon the Democratic insurgents of the Committee. I called up McAdoo immediately and asked him to convey this information to the President and to gently start the pressure. I also arranged for him to meet Warburg here on Monday. “ November 17, 1913 : Paul Warburg telephoned about his trip to Washington. He is much disturbed over the currency situation and requested an interview, along with Jacob Schiff and Cleveland H. Dodge. Mr. Dodge came in advance of the others. He said he felt obliged to come at their request, because they had just given him a substantial subscription for the Y.M.C.A. fund. He had a feeling that the President knew what he was doing and did not need any more advice than he was getting from the channels he himself selected. I told him I shared this view and that, since all the experts disagreed, it left one in doubt as to what to do. “ Mr. Schih and Mr. Warburg came in a few minutes. Warburg did most of the talking. He had a new sugges- tion in regard to grouping the regional reserve banks, so as to get the units welded together and in easier touch with the Federal Reserve Board. Mr. Schiff did not agree as to the advisability of doing this. He thought the regional reserve banks should be cut down to four and let it go at that. “ They wanted me to go to Washington with Mr. Warburg and Mr. Dodge, Mr. Schiff saying I was the Moses and they would be the Aarons. He asked if I knew my Bible weU enough for this to be clear to me. I told him I did. I combated the idea that the President was stubborn in his stand upon the currency measure. I thought he had to be firm and had to make up his mind as to what was good and what was bad in the innumer- THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 171 able suggestions that came to him, and that was all he was doing. I advised against going to the President with new suggestions. I thought they should be taken to Secretary McAdoo, Senator Owen, and Mr. Glass ; if they agreed as to the advisability of accepting them, the President would probably also accept them.” Pressure from both sides and from above, as exercised by the President, finally compelled the acquiescence of the opposing Senators ; and on December 20, “ a gala day ” House called it, the Federal Reserve Bill passed the Senate. It was hailed generally as a greater triumph for Wilson even than the Tariff Act, and in the Colonel’s matured judgment was the most important single legis- lative act of the entire Wilson Administration. Even the strongly Republican New York Tribune could not withhold words of commendation : “ President Wilson has brought his party out of the wilderness of Bryanism. It has been a great exhibition of leadership.” Few persons suspected the share taken by Colonel House in the formation and passing of the Federal Reserve Act, and he said nothing that might enlighten the public. Towards the end of December 1913, after the Senate had approved the biU, House was discussing it with two outstanding journalists, Lawrence of the Associated Press and Price of the Washington Star. “ I wish you would let me tell about your activities in making the bill,” said the latter. But the Colonel was obdurate in his insistence upon silence. “ Will you stay over to see it signed ? ” asked Lawrence. But now that the main job was accomplished, House admitted he lacked suf&cient interest in any mere ceremony to keep him in Washington. 172 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK in As events developed, Colonel House’s connexion TOth the Federal Reserve Act was by no means ended when it became law, for there remained the problem of the appointment of the five Governors of the Federal Reserve Board who, with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the co- ordinating body of the system. The personnel of the Board was obviously a matter of the first importance, not merely for the sake of administrative efficiency, but also because the easiest way to win public confidence in a measure which has been questioned is to appoint men whom the public admires and trusts. Colonel House acted in much the same capacity when it came to the appointment of the Board as he did in the selection of the Cabinet ; that is, he gathered lists of possibilities, interviewed them, culled opinions about them, sifted the names and passed them on to President Wilson and Secretary McAdoo. The following excerpts are typical : “ January 19, 1914 : Mr. X came to lunch. I had a very frank talk with him, saying I had thought of him in connexion with the Federd Reserve Board and in- tended to present his name to the President provided I did not find someone else whom I thought better fitted for the place. The more I see of him, the more I like him. He is not the biggest mentality I have met, but he has good sense and has many fine qualities. “ Mr, y came to be looked over for the Federal Reserve Board. He differs from X inasmuch as he is an applicant, while I sought X out myself without any suggestion from anyone. ... He is older and has had more experience, but he is not so fine a type. I played the part of schoolmaster, as usual, and questioned him closely about himself and his business career. THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 173 “ January 21, 1914 : After dinner we [Wilson and House] went to the President's study as usual, and began work on the Federal Reserve Board appointments. I insisted that it was the most important constructive legislative measure that had been passed since the foundation of the Republic and thought its success or failure would largely depend upon the personnel of the Board. He replied, ‘ My dear friend, do not frighten me any more than I am now.’ I saw no need for alarm, because for this particular Board there was plenty of good material to choose from. . . . “ In discussing the Federal Reserve Board, there was one man whose name I presented by sapng that he had been getting his friends to endorse him and had secured many eminent people to ask for his appointment. The President replied to this, ‘ Let us eliminate him without further discussion.’ ” Secretary McAdoo to Colonel House Washington, February 15, [1914] Dear Colonel: ... I wish some people would quit trying to put over political appointments on the Board ! That is the most insidious and difficult thing to deal with. I am firmly opposed to making these banks political instru- mentalities, and yet I am going to offend many of my best friends because they can’t see the importance of eliminating politics absolutely from the organization of the banks. Of course this doesn’t apply to you ! I’m speaking of politicians. With warm regards, always Cordially yours, W. G. McAdoo Colonel House to the President Austin, Texas, February 21, 1914 Dear Governor: I find that Mr. X of DaBas is too old to be considered, so he wiU have to be eliminated. 174 the administration STARTS WORK Burleson, who is here to-day, tells me that Doctor Y, of whom you speak, is a crank of the first water and would not do. I do not know Mr. Z, and the objection to him might be that he is not sufficiently prominent for his appoint- ment to carry weight. That is something to be con- sidered in this Board if it is to be thought of in the same sense as the Supreme Court. I can think of some men that I am sure would be equal to the job, but they would not carry confidence and therefore would be poor appointments. If the elder Simmons were appointed for the two-year term, you could replace him by Houston afterwards, if you desired. Then, with Miller from the Pacific Coast and Wheeler or someone else from Chicago, you would have the West taken care of. . . . If Z does not bear inspection, then your suggestion of Gregory^ would not be bad. Gregory is something of the same type as Carter Glass, and, while he knows nothing of the matter now, yet within six months he would be as weU-informed upon the subject as Glass was after that period of time. Call me when you need me, for I am always under orders. Yours with devotion E. M. House P.S. Any recommendation made by members of Congress should be prima facie evidence of unfitness, and I would not take any suggestions from that quarter without the most careful investigation. What I mean is that their recommendations would be political, and therefore largely worthless. " March 25, 1914 : Houston, McAdoo, Williams, and I [wrote House] discussed the division of the country into districts and the location of the regional reserve banks. ^ T, W, Gregory, later Attomey-GeneraL THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 175 “ In the evening the President and I dined alone and went immediately to his study to have an old-time business session in regard to the Federal Reserve Board. I found he had added no names to those I had given him before I left for Texas. We concluded, however, that I should get up some new material and submit it to him next week, when he hopes to be able to visit me in New York.” Colonel House io the President New York, April 3, 1914 Dear Governor : I am terribly disappointed that you could not come this week, and more particularly since Mrs. Wilson’s condition is the cause. I have been working assiduously towards getting a list of suggestions to submit to you for the Federal Reserve Board. Since you are not coming, I am enclos- ing them in this. If Richard Olney would take the two-year term, it would be fine, for Houston could then be appointed to succeed him. I have asked a number of people whose opinions are worth while, in regard to Olney, and they all approve it. I do not know whether he would accept, but I have been told that he might do so. There are a number of names on the list that seem to me admirable, but they would need a little more looking into. If you wiU indicate the ones that appeal to you, I will investigate further. . . . Affectionately yours E. M. House During the following weeks, McAdoo and House had many conferences, as a result of which the President was ready by the end of April to make his appointments. House would have been pleased to have Houston ap- pointed Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, but Wilson would not consent to his leaving the Cabinet 176 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK at this time. “ I wish there were two Houstons instead of one/’ he had told House on February i8. " I really do not see how I can spare him from the Secretaryship of Agriculture, particularly at this juncture when we are considering rural credits and when we are just beginning to be able to guide the farmers in new direc- tions. We have not yet entirely convinced them of our usefulness.” Instead, the President accepted House’s suggestion of offering the post of Governor to Richard Olney of Boston, Secretary of State under President Cleveland and one of the most distinguished figures of the party. Paul Warburg of New York, because of his interest and experience in currency problems under both Republican and Democratic Administrations, and W. P. G. Harding as a leading banker of the South, had always been sponsored by House and were accepted by the President. To represent the Middle West and the Pacific Coast, H. A. Wheeler of Chicago and A. C. Miller of California had finally been selected, Warburg, Harding, and Wheeler were professional bankers, Olney a lawyer, and Miller a college professor whose distinction in the field of economics had brought him into the Department of the Interior. Political affiliations were not a factor in their appointment ; but of the five two were Republicans, two Democrats, and the fifth an independent. Notes made by House of conversations with Wilson in April tlirow light on the final process of appointment. “ April 15, 1914 : We motored for an hour and a half and had a delightful talk. We discussed the Federal Reserve Board at length, and McAdoo’s attitude toward the different names proposed. I had taken the precau- tion to thresh these matters out with McAdoo and could tell the President his state of mind. I am anxious for THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 177 this Board to administer the currencj- law successfully, for I am certain the President’s reputation in history will rest largely upon its success or failure. “ April 28, 1914 : After dinner we went to the office for the President to sign his mail. We read the l^Iexican despatches together and aftenvards got down to the real finish of the Federal Reserve Board. He took Ms pen and wrote down their names : Richard Olney first, then Paul Warburg, Harding, WTieeler, and Miller. He turned to me and said, ' To whom would j’ou give the ten-year term ? ’ I advised giving it to Miller, which he did. He gave Olney the two-year term, Warburg four years, Harding and Wheeler the six- and eight-year terms. “ I told him McAdoo preferred Hamlin.^ He replied, ‘ But I prefer Olney and I happen to be President.’ He also said, ‘ McAdoo thinks we are forming a social club.’ This, of course, w’as because McAdoo had con- sistently urged a Board that w’ould work in harmony with him.” Olney, however, found it impossible to accept. He wrote the President that he had undertaken trusts which he could not resign and that the provision requiring each member of the Board to give Ms entire time to its work would prove an insuperable obstacle to his accept- ance. ” You can hardly be sorrier than I am,” he said, ” that I am able to do so little in aid of an Administration whose first year of acMevement makes it one of the most notable the country has ever known.” The appoint- ment was therefore given to Mr. Hamlin, according to McAdoo’s wishes.® ^ Mr. Hamlin was an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury whom Me Adcx> desired to take out of the Department and put upon the Board. ^ A further change in the original composition of the Board resulted from Mr. Wheeler's inability to serve. After some delay the place was given to F. C. Delano of Chicago. lyS THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK IV The close of the first legislative session of the Wilson Administration was a season of triumph for the Demo- cratic Party. Two of the major problems had been met with vigour and honesty, and settled, in principle at least, to the satisfaction of the nation. The income tax provisions of the Tariff Act and the Federal Reserve System of the Currency Act established a solid basis upon which national finances could rest securely during the days of stress that followed the outbreak of war in Europe. The triumph of the Administration was the greater in view of the failure of the preceding Republican Administrations to settle the currency problem. The main principles of the solution finally carried through by Wilson, the Republicans had advocated, individually or collectively ; but they had lacked either the courage or the strength to write them into law. Wilson’s success justified largely the inclusion of Mr. Bryan in the Cabinet. The Commoner’s sense of loyalty had kept him from an attack upon the Federal Reserve Act which, it would appear, he never entirely understood ; but had he been outside the Cabinet, with his influence in the party, he could have destroyed the measure which failed to accord with his personal doctrines. Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House London, December 20 , 1913 My dear House : . , . I’ve just read of the passage by the Senate of the Currency Bill. What a record that is I The Tariff Act and the Currency Act at one sitting. I don’t know the final form of the currency measure, but no matter. The getting of it through is an unmatched achievement. . . . It’s aU wonderful ; and I’ll be proud to do or to THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WOKii 179 endure anything for the man at the helm who steers the old ship in this fashion. If Fd lived a hundred years ago Fd have said, " There’s the hand of God in this.” Yours W. H. P. Mr. Jacob W. Schiff to Colonel House New York, December 23, 1913 My dear Colonel House : I want to say a word of appreciation to you for the silent, but no doubt effective work you have done in the interest of currency legislation and to congratulate you, that the measure has finally been enacted into law. We aU know that an entirely perfect bill, satisfactory to everybody, would have been an impossibility and I feel quite certain fair men will admit that unless the President had stood as firm as he did, we would likely have had no legislation at all. The bill is a good one in many respects, anyhow good enough to start with and to let experience teach us in what directions it needs perfection, which in due time we shall then get. In any event you have personally good reasons to feel gratified with what has been accomplished, and trusting that this feeling may increase your holiday spirit, I am with good wishes Faithfully yours Jacob W. Schiff Secretary Lane to Colonel House Washington, D.C., December 25, 1913 My dear Colonel : . . . This should be a glad time for you. I know of no one who has more fully realized his ambition or who may with more justification take pride in the good he has done. I was sorry not to see you when the President signed the Currency Bill. He made a speech in all ways worthy of himself — ^which is sa5dng much. . . . Sincerely yours Franklin K. Lane. i8o THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK The fact that he had had some share in the legislative accomplishment of these months was the reward that House sought for the pains and effort he had given to help in making Wilson's Administration a success. To a friend who wrote complaining that House's aversion for holding office would deprive him of the public credit that belonged to him, the Colonel replied : “I am satis- fied with the consciousness of having taken part in things that are worth while." The sentence was not entirely accurate, for, although Colonel House was obviously careless of the fact that the extent of his activities was not widely suspected, he wanted to exercise his energy in a broader field. He was wearied by the details of party politics and appoint- ments ; even the share he had taken in constructive domestic legislation did not satisfy him. From the beginning of 1914 he gave more and more of his time to what he regarded as the highest form of politics and that for which he was peculiarly suited — ^intemational affairs. They shortly became his main preoccupation, and it is in this field that he rendered his greatest services. CHAPTER VII ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY If some of tlie veteran diplomats could have heard ns, they would ha%"e fallen in a faint. S%f William Tyrrell to Mouse ^ November 13, 1913 I ^ T OTHING is more strange than the chain of \| circumstances which finally brought President ^ ^ Wilson to play a role of supreme importance in the affairs of the world, and to centre his whole being upon a policy of international service. At the beginning of his political career, and even during his first two years as President, diplomatic questions were of far less interest for him than his legislative programme ; he was slow to develop what might be called a definite policy, and he left his Ambassadors to work out their problems themselves. Shortly after the appointment of Mr, Page as Ambassador to St. James's, Colonel House reports that he asked Wilson " if he had given Ambassador Page special instructions. ... He had not, but took it for granted that he would be diplomatic and conciliatory.” This seems casual, but we may remind ourselves that neither the traditions of the Democratic Party nor the background of Mr. Wilson could lead to the expectation of keen interest in other than domestic matters. The Democratic platform touched on foreign affairs only in a brief reference to the Philippines, and Wilson himself in his first inaugural address confined himself entirely to questions of social and industrial reform. For Colonel House, on the other hand, foreign problems were always of the first interest and importance. When he says that he shaped his early career so as to prepare him and permit him to satisfy his penchant for pohtics, he interpreted the word " politics ” in its broadest sense, and included international relations. During his career in Texas he had never ceased to study current diplomacy ; and running all through his varied activities as the President’s adviser in 1913 there is obvious the desire to free himself from details of domestic politics and to find time to help in the formulation of a positive foreign policy. With the passing of the legis- lative programme of 1913, he felt convinced that the moment had come for Wilson to lay its broad foundations. A year and a half later, on June 24, 1915, he wrote : " To my mind, the President has never appreciated the importance of our foreign policy and has laid undue emphasis upon domestic affairs. I thoroughly approved this up to the end of the special session of Congress, when the tariff, banking, and such other measures were involved. . . .” However slow to formulate a positive policy. President Wilson was acutely aware of the danger that always menaces American interests abroad when a change of administration occurs, and to his credit be it said that he fought constantly against the threatened intrusion of the spoils system. His first choices for the more important diplomatic posts were President Eliot, Richard Olney, Professor Fine of Princeton ; and before his inauguration he expressed to House his desire to elevate " the foreign service by appointments as nearly akin to that of Dr. Eliot as he could find favourable material.” The problem was not a simple one, in view of the difficulty of discovering distinguished Americans with the neces- JLwV-' i kJ V/X X -w ’1 ” ^ sary combination of intellectual background and material resources, and also in view of the purely partisan influ- ences which regarded the foreign service as primarily designed to furnish occupation for political supporters. The invincible good-nature of Mr, Bryan made it hard for him to refuse an application for a diplomatic or consular appointment, especially when made by some loyal adherent of i6-i in ’96. Surely such a one had earned his reward ! ^ House was entirely of the President’s opinion. He urged that even the highest consular offices should be kept under Civil Service Regulations, and it was at his insistent recommendation that diplomates de carriere, such as William Phillips and H. P. Fletcher, who had proved their ability under Republican Administrations, were brought back into the diplomatic serffice or pro- moted. And he warned the President against appoint- ments that might seem connected with business interests. “ April 18, 1913 ; I told Mr. Bryan [recorded House] of my conversation with the President regarding the question of keeping the Consuls under the Civil Service. , . . The President stated that he would hold to Roose- velt’s executive order in regard to Consuls. Mr. Bryan is a spoilsman and is in favour of turning the Republicans out and putting in Democrats. He argued strongly and eloquently for his position. I remained quiet, for my ^ Thus the Secretary of State wrote to the Receiver of Customs in San Domingo, who had been appointed through the influence of Mr* McCombs : Now that you have arrived and are acquainting yourself with the situation, can you let me know what positions you have at your disposal, with which to rew^ard deserving Democrats ? . * * You have had enough experience in politics to know how valuable workers are when the campaign is on ; and how difficult it is to And rewards for ail the deserving. . . . Let me know what is requisite, together with the salary, and when appointments are hkely to be made.” (Letter dated August 20, 1913, and pubhshed in the New York Sun, January 15, 1913.) i84 aspects of FOREIGN POLICY sympathy is with the President’s policy even though it keeps some of our very good friends from their desires. “ January i6, 1914 : We discussed the President’s Civil Service views [House wrote of a later conversation with the Secretary of State], which, of course, do not agree with Mr. Bryan’s. I can see some feeling develop- ing between them ... on the question of patronage. Mr. Bryan has no patience with the Civil Service. He said the President told him I had recommended , and the President desired to appoint him. Mr. Bryan said, ‘ Of course he can do as he pleases, but I am certain is one of those supercilious persons who will be constantly looking down upon me.’ ” Colonel House to the President New York, October 8, 1914 Dear Governor : One or two people have asked me to suggest X for the Mexican Embassy. I hardly think it is necessary to caution you about this, but I feel that perhaps I had better do so. X, I have always been told, was a part of the Y, Z Oil Company and a bosom friend of Z. The fact that you offered him Argentina makes them feel that he would have a chance for this place, which I have no doubt he would accept quickly enough. When this appointment is made, I would be certain that the appointee was chemically clean from oil or ore. Affectionately yours E. M. House When it came to the more important diplomatic appointments, Wilson appealed constantly to House for information and advice. At one moment the President commissioned him to discover an applicant’s attitude on religion, as he was being considered for China and the President wanted to know whether or not he was an ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 185 orthodox Christian.^ House undertook the delicate task, and the following day put the presumptive candi- date through an examination on religious principles. “ He did not seem to have any worth while," recorded the Colonel, and the appointment was not made. With House the President discussed at length the choice of men for St. James’s, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, and Paris. For the Court of St. James’s, Wilson expressed himself as anxious to find a man who could continue the traditions established by Adams, Bayard, and Hay. But first President Eliot, and then Richard Olney, declined the post. Colonel House, who was himself frequently suggested for this position, urged Walter Hines Page. The latter was personally magnetic, possessed a genial and discriminating wit, and could boast of a distinguished journalistic career. On March 20, House, recording a conversation with the President in which Mr. Wilson expressed his discouragement at the lack of material for the important ambassadorships, wrote : “I think he will eventually offer the London mission to Walter Page." “ March 24, 1913 : We first took up foreign appoint- ments [House noted of a later conversation with iilr. Wilson]. He thought that Walter Page was about the best man left for Ambassador to Great Britain. I was not only the first to suggest Page for this place, but, since Eliot and Olney declined it, I have advocated him earnestly. He asked if I thought Page would take it. I assured him that he would, and promised to find out definitely to-morrow. “We discussed a great number of other people for foreign appointments. ... I thought Thomas Nelson Page should have Italy, and he agreed. . . . 1 This interest upon the part of Mr. WUson was dictated Jlr. Bryan’s insistence that none but an orthodox Christian could be appointed as Minister to China. i86 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY “ March 26, 1913 : ' I called up [Walter] Page anc said, ‘ Good morning, Your Excellency.’ He wanted t( know what it meant. I replied it meant a great deal He seemed quite agitated and asked whether I was noi joking. I replied that I was not, for the President hac authorized me to ask him if he would accept the Am bassadorship to the Court of St. James’s. We arrangec for him to call at 4.30. " Page arrived promptly. He was excited over th( news I had conveyed. He asked me to tell him exactly how it happened. I told him I had suggested his nam( to the President two months ago, ... I had talked tc the President from time to time about the matter, anc when I dined with him on Tuesday he had authorizec me to find whether he. Page, would accept. “ He was immensely pleased with the compliment but expressed doubt as to his ability to fill the place It was so entirely different from anything he had pre viously done. . . . “ March 28, 1913 : Walter Page telephoned arounc nine o’clock : ‘ I have decided to turn my face toward; the East,’ which meant he would accept the post tc Great Britain. I felicitated him and expressed m} pleasure. He wished to know the next move. I tok him I would notify the President and that he woulc write him a formal note offering him the Ambassador ship. “ I called up the President at Washington a littk after nine, to tell of Page’s acceptance. He replied ' That is fine ; I am very glad.’ He promised to write him at once. “ I telephoned Page to let him know how pleasec the President was. He expressed great appreciation foi what I had done. . . Having confided to House the mission of informing Mr. Page of his choice, the President thought little more about it and was apparently in no hurry to communicate himself with the appointee — an attitude which surprisee: ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 187 and troubled the new Ambassador and recalls the manner in which Secretary Houston had been appointed to the Cabinet : “ March 30, 1913 : Walter Page and Secretary Houston came to dinner [wrote House], and we had a delightful time. Houston and I tried to make Page feel happy in his new field of endeavour. He seems fearful lest he might not be able to maintain himself, and yet he said he had enough sporting blood to under- take it. He was somewhat disturbed because he had not heard from the President, and asked me whether I thought it was actually settled. " Houston then told of his experience. He said, ‘ I have never to this good day received any notification of my appointment as Secretary of Agriculture, excepting that which I received from Mr. House.’ And further, ' I was uncertain whether I should come to Washington, but I concluded I had better do so. I came, and I had no notification there. Finally some cards were sent to my wife and to me, inviting us to lunch at the White House after the Inauguration. We went, the President shook hands with me and said he was glad to see me, but nothing else. The President’s Secretary sent me word that the President expected me at the WTiite House at eleven o’clock the next day for an informal meeting of the Cabinet. I felt that matters were getting warm and I was getting nearer my job. I went to the informal meeting and, since I seemed to be expected, concluded that in due time I would be notified ; but I never was. Then I read in the newspapers that my name had gone to the Senate, and finally I received my commission.’ . . . “ Afril 12, 1913 ; I lunched at the White House [recorded House]. Loulie, Mr. and Mrs. Page, and Mr. and Mrs. Wallace were the other guests. Soon after lunch I rang up Mr. Bryan to teU him that Mr. Page desired to pay his respects. He asked us to come over to the State Department at once. Bryan was very i88 ASPECTS OF FORIGN POLCY gracious to Page, which pleased him because he has not said many Mndly things of Mr. Bryan. Page hoped Mr. Bryan w’ouid place him in the kindergarten and teach him as rapidly as possible the essentials of his work. Bryan laughingly replied, ‘ I will have to learn myself first/ . . ." These were busy days for Colonel House. It was the period when he was trying to concentrate upon the framing of the Federal Reserve Act ; but on the one hand the President, and on the other everyone who desired a diplomatic post, assailed him for advice and assistance.^ " March lo, 1913 : Another stream of callers all day, and long-distance telephones from Washington and elsewhere. This job of being ‘ adviser to the President ’ may have its compensations, but it certainly has its drawbacks. . . . “ March ii, 1913 : Again another day of office- seekers. Thomas Nelson Page called. He did not mention his own aspirations, but I brought up the subject myself. I told him that it had been the Pre- sident’s intention to appoint him either to France or Italy, but I was afraid now that he [Mr. Wilson] had reached Washington he would be stormed by those desiring the appointments for others. ” Page said he would prefer Italy to France, though France was a greater honour. . . . “ April 12, 1913 : The dinner to the French Am- bassador, Monsieur Jusserand, was interesting. I talked with Senator Lodge. He wants a man from Nahant retained in the Boston Custom House, and I promised to try and arrange it if he was competent. “ Thomas Nelson Page was at the dinner, and I informed him that if no change was made he would ^ The character and the amount of the work carried on by Colonel House suggests the advisability of including in the Cabinet a member without portfolio. ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 189 go to Italy. I advised him to keep away from the President, . . . “ April 16, 1913 : A Colonel who would be a Brigadier- General, and a Secretary of Legation who would be transferred from Japan to France, caught me at break- fast. The diplomat is wealthy, so I requisitioned his motor and had him take me from place to place until lunch time, . . . “ April 20, 1913 : Justice Gerard came to see me about his chances for ambassadorial honours. I thought they were shght, but they were better now than they had been. He laughed and said, ' I do not believe that until right recently I had any chances at all.’ That, I replied, was true, I told him, furthermore, if Mc- Combs and Morgenthau were given foreign appointments that five out of the nineteen major places would have gone to New York, which was out of all proportion to her share. He saw the point. He did not believe McCombs would accept. He evidently does not know McCombs ; he is as likely to do one thing as another. . . . “ September 29, 1913 ; X is sitting on the doormat again. Rumours that McCombs is not to take the Ambassadorship to France have started his hopes afresh. . . .” II Because of his interest in foreign affairs and diplo- matic appointments. House was brought into close touch with the Ambassadors, and the cordial relations that resulted went far to facilitate the special missions which he undertook in Europe during the war. Thomas Nelson Page wrote after his appointment : “ Neither letter nor cable can in the least convey the appreciation I have of your kindness to me since our first acquaintance, I am just going to let the debt stand as it is, and reckon ourselves as old friends whose community of feeling and sentiment does away with any count of mere time.” igo ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY Brand Whitlock wrote from Brussels : “ My dear friend, I hope it’s only un petit au revoir. . , . Your last letter brought me joy. . . . It increased, if that were possible, my desire to see you and to have again one of those long chats. ... I have need of such sympathetic intercourse.” Willard at Madrid, Penfield at Vienna, Morris at Stockholm wrote frequently to him, and House evidently spared neither time nor effort in keeping them informed of political developments at home. The Colonel’s correspondence with Gerard at Berlin and Walter Page at London was voluminous. ‘ ‘ I told Gerard [recorded House] that he would get very meagre information from the State Department concerning the happenmgs in Administration circles, and I promised to keep him measurably well-posted in order that he might confer without embarrassment with the Kaiser or the Minister for Foreign Affairs. * In turn, he said he would write me every ten days.” Colonel House’s relations with Mr. Gerard became of great political importance in the stirring days that were to come, for the Ambassador kept his promise. His war letters to House were pungent and prophetic, and through them President Wilson was to be informed accurately of the complicated forces that governed Germany. Nothing is further from fact than the legend that the President lacked available and authentic information of the political underworld on the continent of Europe. Mr. Gerard was excelled by none in the dignity and capacity with which he maintained the interests and furthered the policy of his Government in the most trying diplomatic situation of the war zone. He knew how to establish cordial relations with the ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY igi Berlin Government, and he gave thought to the details that make for friendliness. But he never forgot Bis- marck's aphorism : " A good Ambassador ought not to be too popular in the country to which he is ac- credited.” Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House Berlin, November 4 , 1913 My dear Colonel : Now that I have presented my letters to the Kaiser, I have something to report. Pursuant to your suggestion I stopped in London to see Page, and had to wait nearly a week for him, as he was in Scotland with Carnegie. I found him a most agreeable and attractive man, and, from all I heard in London, he is a great success. I spent the remainder of mj’ time in Paris, principally in furniture shops, but arrived here the 6th October. . . . The Kaiser was away and I was not received until last Wednesday. The Kaiser has permitted me to wear ordinary clothes, which disposes of the infernal uniform question, so there I am now better off than Page, who has to wear knickers to Court functions. Before seeing the Kaiser I called on the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-HoUweg — a very tall, pleasant, Abraham Lincoln sort of man. He is one of the few officials who does not speak English, but we got on very well in French and some German. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is aw'ay, but his substitute, Zimmermann, is a very jolly sort of large German who was once a Judge, which made us friends at once. The rest of my time I put in at Embassy work, of which there is plent}', and in calling on the various Ambassadors and calling on others who call on me. I think I have the house question settled and will take an old quiet-looking house formerly owned by Prince Hatzfeld, then by the von Schwabacho . . . and just now bought by an ad- joining bank. It will cost me a good deal to put it 192 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY in repair, but, as it is large enough for the Embassy offices, if I get the same aUowance as heretofore made, I shall pay much less rent than the Paris man or than Page in London, who, by the way, has secured a most suitable and “ fashionable ” house in Grosvenor Square. I have taken up a lot of things which former Am- bassadors did not. I am taking an active part in the American Benevolent Society, the American Church (where Lanier and I sit every Sunday in the front pew), the American Institute, and the American Lunch Club, the American Association of Commerce and Traders, etc., and my wife will become President of the American Woman Club, a very worthy charity which takes care of the numerous girl students in Berlin. We must have made a wonderful sight when we were presented to the Kaiser ; they sent the Royal carriages for us with footmen standing behind in powdered wigs, outriders, etc., though we looked rather dismal in our dress suits. In the glass carriages we must have looked hke a funeral. The Kaiser is a much more majestic- looking man than I expected. . . . We mostly talked business and sport, and he asked why we didn’t have an Embassy building in Berlin and congratulated me on at last housing the Embassy in a decent house. When I presented the staff to Mm, he asked why we did not all ride in the TMergarten and I told him we would challenge any Embassy in Berlin to any known form of sport. Friday I went to Potsdam by train in a Royal military carriage and was driven to the new Palace, where I was presented, alone, to the Empress. She is a tail, fine-looking woman, and we talked of nothing in particular, just " wMte conversation.” I made a speech at a German art banquet and have been doing a good deal of work for the Panama Ex- position. There is an agreement between England and Germany that neither shall exMbit unless both do. . . . Yours ever James W. Gerard ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 103 With Walter Hines Page, as with Geraid, *■' .-j'ntl House maintained constant and intimate rthiti -.hs. The new Ambassador to St. James’s was pleuM-d to have a correspondent to whom he might write frankly and through whom he might iniluence the President. When House came to London in June 1913, Page gn.'.'t^d film warmly and shared with him his hopes and dinicalti.s. “ I dined with Page last night 'wrote Colonel House on June 19] and remained with him until Jialf-past twelve. ... He finally walked home with me to our hotel. “ He had many curious and interesting experiences to relate and he was much disturbed at some of hi'^ social blunders. The one which distressed him most was at the Duke of Norfolk’s the other evening. He took Princess in to dinner and aftenvard.s, when they were in the drawing-room, he left her without being dismissed. The reason he did thi.s wa.s that lie had been reminded that he was the one to leave first, and for the moment he forgot that with a member of the Royal Family the reverse course was proper. “ He considered taking a duchess or royalty out to dinner was hard sledding. They refused to exert them- selves in the slightest to keep up the conversation, and he said it was the hardest work he had yet encountered in his Ambassadorial duties. He spoke particularly of the Duchess of . She was a woman of good sense, he understood, but she kept it quietly to herself when he was with her. He had gotten quite ' chummy ’ with the Duke of Connaught, and was doing all he could to make himself agreeable to the important people in England. “ He asks me to aid him in formulating some con- structive policy that will make the President’s Adminis- tration and his notable in the annals of this Embassy. He said of all men, I could help him most in this regard. He is always generous in his praise of me. I shall try TO 194 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY to outline some plan before I leave, for I have some tilings in mind which I think may redound to the advan- tage of both countries.” Mr. Page had great success in winning the regard and respect of the British people and the Government to which he was accredited. His bonhomie, his trans- parent honesty of purpose and method, his evident anxiety to discover means of promoting Anglo-American friendship, soon placed relations between the two Governments upon a cordial personal basis, which Page, like House, believed to be the only firm foundation for intercourse between nations. The Ambassador and his wife had won the hearts of the British even before the trying months of the war, in which Page’s hatred of German militarism intensified British affection for him. On July 12, 1914, Colonel House noted of a conversa- tion with the English journalist, Sidney Brooks : “ In speaking of the Pages, Brooks said Mrs. Page had made the greatest success of ‘ any Ambassadress within his memory.’ This is delightful to hear.” Mr. Page, however, as he himself confessed, was subject to moods. " I sometimes think,” he wrote to House, ” they are the dominant moods of my life, when I feel that I don’t want any official position at aU. . . . I have so long been entirely free and so independent that official restraint is yet unnatural.” He found it hard to sink his individual convictions in carrying out instruc- tions from Washmgton. He enjoyed his work, but the difficulties always attaching to the hfe of an American Ambassador abroad galled him, and his sensitive nature suffered under vexations which some of the other Ambassadors hardly noticed. To House he poured out ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 195 his soul In a letter of December 12, 1914, lie run- eluded ; ” I didn’t mean to write you all these things . . . . But I must once in a while blow oft" to soraebodv. Y^m have the misfortune to be the only man to whom I can blow off.” With characteristic frankness, the Ambas- sador let the Colonel understand with some d^-hnitent'S'; that he regarded the conduct of the State Department under Mr. Bry’an as worse than unfortunate. And yet at the conclusion of almost every long letter came the assurance that in the main he was enjoying his task, and the intimation that the vexations were minor by- products. " As for this Embassy,” he wrote April 27, 1914, " we're getting on better. We now get answers to questions, and if I had ever been disposed to complain, there’s no excuse for complaining now.” All the difficulties with which the State Department had to contend, House explained : the need 0! a period of experience, the pressure of political factors, the lack of funds. ” Please bear in mind too,” he wrote to Page, ” that just now the State Department is working day and night and is all too short of help. They expect a bill of relief from Congress shortly, and then you will get more secretaries and they will get more help.” With serpentine wisdom, he replied to Page’s criticism of individuals in Washington by repeating complimentary remarks which those veiy individuals had recently passed regarding the Ambassador. Thus, on October 29, 1914, in a letter to Page : “ Your criticism of X came to me the day that Wallace was telling me of a talk he had with him the day before, in which he, X, said : ' Y and Z together have not done as much as Walter Page, and yet they advertise themselves so well that the American people think that comparatively no one else has done anything/ This is to be forgotten.” 196 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY The relations of House with the American Ambas- sadors abroad were paralleled closely by those which he maintained with foreign diplomatists in Washington. Before the outbreak of the war he was on intimate, almost confidential, terms with Spring-Rice and Bem- storff, Jusserand and Dumba. He was thus admirably equipped to study plans for developing the positive foreign policy upon which he hoped President Wilson would soon embark. Ill Colonel House’s conception of such a policy was far- reaching. He believed that the time had passed when the United States could pose effectively as the protector of aU the American states, and he wanted to bring about a definite friendly understanding with the great South American states upon the basis of an equal partnership. He realized acutely the feeling in South America, hostile to the United States and based upon the consciousness that the Monroe Doctrine (as they interpreted it) was thoroughly one-sided and accordingly distasteful to Latm-American sensibilities. If it could be trans- formed into a common policy and a common responsi- bility in which all American states participated, it would, House insisted, benefit the United States no less materi- ally than morally. Such a partnership, he believed, might develop into a league for the preservation of peace and tranquillity in the Americas, and would be of the utmost service in handling situations such as had arisen in Mexico. This ambitious plan, reminiscent of Blaine’s Pan- American proposals, carried another, even more am- bitious, as its inevitable consequence. A general Pan- American Pact was bound to interest the European ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY lo; Powers, some of which, such as the British Empire. re also American Powers. Huu.'e was c»ne of the persons in the United States vrho realized before the war how thoroughly the previo'is thirty years had altered our relations with Europe and made rd th'.' United States, intellectualh’ and economi.''U!y, one the fanrhy of World Powers. Political conipani-jnsliip, Le waS contdneed, must follow. Never lacking in br'ldness, le was willing to accept the consequences ; and just as Ite felt that the mythical protectorate of the !Monroc Doctrine should be transformed into an American partnership, so he believed that the legend of political isolation from Europe w^as the outworn remnant of an age that was past. What he wanted was some sort of co-operative understanding with the great European P< Avers th.tt might help to preserve the peace of the world, in which the United States had vital material interest. Tiiis conviction w^as not lessened by lus realization that the European situation W'as critical and might at any moment result in a general European war. Such a policy imphed a frank recognition that the factors upon which American traditions re.sted had disappeared. If it w^ere to be developed successfully, a working understanding with Great Britain would be necessary, both because the presence of the British in Latin America could not wisely be ignored and also because the imperial pow’er of Great Britain was neces- sary to any feasible plan of international co-operation. Anglo-American relations w^ere not unfriendly at the beginning of the Wilson Administration, but a cordial and intimate understanding could not be reached until two clouds were removed, of which the most important, at least in the public mind, concerned the Panama tolls controversy. During the last year of Mr. Taft’s igS ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY Administration, Congress had passed an act exempting vessels engaged in coastwise trade of the United States from Panama Canal tolls, notwithstanding a clause in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 which provided that the Canal should be open to ships of aU nations on “ terms of entire equality.” Feeling in the United States, especially in Irish districts, favoured such exemption warmly, on the ground that it was “ reasonable,” and made an ” open canal.” A plank in the Democratic platform approved it. Feeling in Great Britain sup- ported with equal warmth the contention that, reason- able or not, such exemption directly contravened engagements taken in 1901 ; the issue was not one of logic, but simply whether the United States would keep its word. Even before Wilson assumed office, he and House seem to have agreed that, despite the overwhelming majority in Congress that favoured exemption, the American contention ought not to be upheld.^ It was of supreme importance to emphasize international ethics by an insistence upon the sanctity of treaties. On January 24, 1913, House discussed the matter with Wilson : ” I asked him concerning his views in regard to the Panama Canal tolls controversy with Great Britain. I was glad to find that he took the same view that I have, and that is that the clause should be repealed.” Action could not be taken by the President during the extra session of Congress. It was first necessary that he establish firmly his leadership, for what he ^ " Hie repeal of the tolls exemption was opposed by nearly all of the Democratic leaders in Congress, To drive the repeal through the House and the Senate, Wilson was compelled to have recourse to Cabinet members, especially Burleson and McAdoo/' (Note by E. M. H,) ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 199 planned was nothing less than a complete con\'ersioii of the party upon an issue intensely troubled by the strong anti-British feeling characteristic of many Demo- cratic strongholds. The topic v^'as therefore not raised during the extra session. Ambassador Pact* did not fail to call constant attention to tlie importance of the question, indulging in promises of the btnefits of repet- 1 that might be regarded as exaggerated. Ambassador W. H. Page io Colonel House London, Augitit 2S, 1913 My dear House : ... If the United States will . . . repeal tiF- Canal toll discrimination, we can command the British fleet, British manufacturers — anything we please. Till we do these things, they’ll regard us as mean and stingy and dishonourable on occasion and, therefore, peculiar and given to queer freaks ; they like us, but don't know W'hat to think of our Government. Our Government, they don’t trust or admire. . . . Heartily vours Walter H. Page If the British felt they had cause of complaint with the American Government over the matter of the Canal toUs, the American Government, on the other hand, felt that the British were hampering Wilson's policy in Mexico. The British Ambassador in Mexico, Sir Lionel Carden, was known to be am advocate of Huerta and was supposed to represent the British oil interests of Lord Cowdray. Huerta was believed to have made extra- vagant promises of concessions to those interests in the event that his regime became firmly established. The American Government assumed that the British Foreign 0£6ce stood behind the British oil interests and that 200 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY the British provisional recognition of Huerta meant that they would fight Wilson's policy of non-recognition. Obviously the difficulties with the British resulted largely from misunderstanding and misinformation on both sides. What was necessary was a frank interchange of views, and House welcomed the opportunity given him in the summer of 1913 to approach the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. It was on July 3, 1913, that the two first met, at a small luncheon given by Sir Edward at his house, 33 Eccleston Square. The only others present were Ambassador Page and Lord Crewe, then Secretary for India. Colonel House doubtless looks back upon the luncheon as an event in his career, since he came to have for Grey an affection and a respect unsurpassed in his relations with foreign statesmen. This feeling resulted in large measure from a singular community of personal tastes and ideals, which from the moment they met made a deep impression upon Colonel House. He found in Sir Edward a philosopher, like himself careless of conventional honours, with no apparent sense of his own importance, driven, over-hard perhaps, by what he felt to be his duty and taking no credit therefor. As statesman, moreover, the British Foreign Secretary approached House’s ideal, supremely distinguished as he was by sincerity of purpose and honesty of method ; above all a diplomat who did not regard diplomacy as a mysterious intrigue, but rather as a means by which the representatives of different states could discuss frankly the coincidence or the clash of national interests and reach a peaceable understanding. House was then and always convinced that foreign policy should be con- ducted like personal business, from which it differed only in degree of importance; and he wanted to introduce ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 2di into diplomacy the characteristics of personal intf with its code of individual honesty and frieiifllinc'-*^. In Grey he discovered a man with whom he could Irtal upon this basis. We shall find them discussing the mo.st delicate points of national policy with tlie frankness that officials of the same department of a government might use. Their first conversation was of imporiance, for it led in the autumn to an understanding on the two vexatious questions at issue. House explained Wilson’s Mexican policy and attitude on the tolls exemptions ; Grey intimated that British support of Huerta was neither definite nor final. “ Ji^ly 3, 1913* While Lord Crewe and Page were discussing the eradication of the hookworm in In<lia and other countries [recorded House] , Sir Edward and I fell to talking of the Mexican .‘lituation. I told him the President did not want to intervene and was giving the different factions every possible opportunity to get together. He wished to know whether the Presi- dent was opposed to any particular faction. I thought it was immaterial, as far as our Government was concerned, which faction w’as in power, if order was maintained. I thought our Government would have recognized Huerta’s proffisional Government if they had carried out their written promise to call an election at an early date and abide by its decisions. “ Sir Edward said his Government had not recognized the Huerta Government excepting as a provisional one, and that if Huerta undertook to run for President in spite of his promise not to do so, their recognition of him would come up again as an entirely new proposition. He intimated that in those circumstances they would not recognize him. “ He wished to know what would happen if we inter- vened, and suggested that perhaps the same condition 202 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY would prevail as in Cuba. I replied that this was a question for the future, but personally I did not believe intervention would be as serious as most people thought. “ We then drifted to the Panama Canal toUs question. He said his Government intended to put two propositions squarely up to our Government ; i.e. whether we desired to take up the discussion of the treaty as it stood, or whether we would prefer arbitration. His Government have no objection to our Government giving free passage to coastwise vessels, so long as it did not interfere with British shipping or was not unfavourable to it ; but just what plan could be devised to bring this about, he did not know. However, he was willing to take up the discussion with our Government in the event the free tolls were not abolished by the biU now before our Senate. “ I suggested that the matter should not be pressed for the moment, but be left open for the long session of Congress beginning in December. I explained that the President was exceedingly anxious to get through his legislative programme at the extra session ; that a reduction of the tariff and the reform of our currency system were almost vital to the success of his Administra- tion, and that in the Senate he had only a narrow margin on the tariff and he did not wish to press anything else until these measures were through. “ Sir Edward said he quite understood the President’s position and sympathized with it, and his Government were perfectly willing to allow the matter to rest as suggested.” Ambassador W. E. Page to Colonel House London, July 8, 1913 Dear Mr. House : I had an interview to-day with Sir Edward Grey about a matter of state business ; and, when I rose to go, he followed me to the door and stopped me and said that he owed me much for the pleasure I had given him in making him acquainted with you ; and he wished me ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 203 to tell you that he should expect to see you whc never you should come to London : " I was much inl'-rested in what he told me— a man that I’m glad tu know,” said he. I send you this while it is still hot in my mind. . . . It was a duchess last night — an east- and friendly one ; to-night it's a bishop, quality yet unknoun ; to- morrow night, the Russian Ambassador, a hno old SI iv whom I know. Yours heartin' W. H. P. Thus, at the moment when Anglo-American relations threatened to become clouded by popular feeling cjver Panama tolls, the personal intervention of Page and House Vv^ent far to secure complete ofhcial cordiality. Grey was evidently assured of the friendliness (T the President, as manifested through his personal adviser. On the other hand, the forbearance of the British in not pressing the tolls question con\dnced Wilson of what House and Page insisted upon ; namely, that Grey was anxious to work with the United States and that a cordial understanding was possible if only outstanding issues could be frankly discussed. That Sir Edward was impressed by the value of his talk with House is indicated by his decision to send his secretary. Sir William Tyrrell, to the United States to canvass the whole matter of Anglo-American relations with the President and his adviser. This was the more important in that the new British Ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, was ill and unable to take up his duties actively. Tyrrell proved to be an ideal selection. He shared the complete confidence of Grey and his views on international relations, so that not merely could he give to Wilson Grey’s exact ideas, but lie might claim from the President an equal frankness. No one ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 204 understood better the ins and outs of Continental politics, or realized more acutely how great an asset to the British American sympathy might become in case of trouble in Europe. He possessed, moreover, an almost boyish enthusiasm for the task in hand, which completely won the affection of the Colonel and the confidence of the President. He came in doubt as to the willingness of the Americans to co-operate with Grey. He returned convinced that they would play the game. “ Tyrrell’s back,” wrote Ambassador Page to House, in December, ” a changed man. He says that you and the President and Houston did it. That’s aU to the good.” House took pains to come into touch with Sir William immediately after his arrival, and explained to Wilson the importance of his mission. “ November ii, 1913 : The President saw me at once, although I had no appointment. I expressed concern in regard to Mexico and explained more in detail about Sir WiUiam Tyrrell. In talking to Sir William we were practically talking to Sir Edward Grey, and I thought it would be foolish not to utilize the opportunity in order to bring about a better understanding with England regarding Mexico. I told him of my luncheon engage- ment at the British Embassy on Wednesday, and thought if he would give me a free hand I might do some- thing worth while. He authorized me to talk to Sir William as freely as I considered advisable. . . . ” November 12, 1913 : I suggested again that in my talk with Sir Wiliiam Tyrrell it would be well to urge him to get England to bring the other Powers to exert pressure upon Huerta in order that he might eliminate himself. " The President asked me to come to the White House and remain with him overnight. I told him I had counted upon returning home, but my going de- pended upon the success of my interview with Sir ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 205 William. I promised to get in touch with him, the Pre- sident, as soon afterwards as it was convenient to Idin,’ provided anything worth while developed. He said he had wished to get with me yesterday. He aho told of how very tired he was. ...” Colonel House had met Sir William in Nev Yt»rk, but the decisive interviews took place in Wasbiiigton, at the British Embassy and the White House. " November 12, 1913 : At one o'clock Recorded House], I lunched with Lady Spring-Rice at the British Embassy. . . . " Sir Cecil Spring- Rice was not well enough io appear, and sent me words of regret. After lunch, Sir Wniiam Tyrrell and I went into anotiter room and discussed the questions uppermost in the minds of both. He began by showing me despatches from his Govern- ment and his own replies. He declared Lord Cowdray had no concessions from Huerta, and if he could get them in the future, his Government would not recognize their validity. He thought a deliberate attempt was being made to connect Cowdray with these matters in order to create a sentiment for intervention. He said Sir Lionel Carden was not antagonistic to America ; he was fair and would do in spirit, as well as in act, just what he was told to do by his Government. He admitted he was very pro-British, but, other than that, no criticism could be made of him. " I replied that both the President and Mr. Bryan held very different views of Lord Cowdray and Sir Lionel Carden, and I was glad to hear the other side. He spoke of Sir Edward Grey's desire to bring about a cessation of armaments, for he thought our present civilization would eventually be destroyed upon that rock. He thought, too, that an armament trust was forcing all Governments not only to pay excessive prices, but was creating war scares — ^they being the only people 2o6 aspects of foreign policy having any interest in having the different Governments keep up large expenditures for war purposes. ‘ ' We talked of the Panama tolls question. Sir William said Sir Edward Grey’s idea was that no possible good came to nations if either the letter or the spirit of a treaty were broken. He said the English people felt keenly upon this subject, and no one more so than Sir Edward himself ; and the only reason he held ofiSce was his desire to promote the peace of nations. “ I replied that the President felt as keenly as Sir Edward did about the inviolability of treaties, and I thought when he talked with him, the President would make his position clear. I expressed the desire im- mediately to bring the President and Sir William to- gether, and he was delighted to have the opportunity ” President Wilson was not generally expansive in conferences with persons whom he met for the first time, and House was somewhat surprised and even more pleased that the interview developed the degree of frankness that characterized it. “ November 13, 1913 : The President received Tyrrell in the Blue Room. He had on a grey sack suit, while Sir Wilham wore a cutaway. They both appeared a little embarrassed. The President opened the con- versation by saying I had told him of my conversation with him yesterday; and then outlined the purpose of our Government regarding Mexico, very much as I had done the day before. Sir William replied much as he had to me. The President spoke frankly and well ; so did Sir William. It was an extremely interest- ing discussion. “ The President, of his own volition, brought up the arbitration treaty and the Panama tolls question and, much to my surprise, told Sir WiUiam what he had in mind, not only as to his views, but also how he expected to put them into force. He asked him to convey to Sir Edward Grey his sympathy with the ASPECTS OF FOREIGN PULirr 2* ; view that our treaty with En^zlaiid ^1.' ir./C r :u sit; in- violable, but to ask him to have pati(ii*'c ui. ti- h- i.ad time to develop the matt* r properly. IP' tie-:.;: it .m overwhelming majority of our pec.ple laid lii.'. vitvs, but there was an oppjAtioii conipo-'d htiedv of Hi- bernian patriots, both in the Senab and out, tliat ahtays desired a fling at England. “We talked of the necessity of curlhnc armrnr.' i',t> and of the power of the nnancial world in oar p- ntr? to-day. Sir WiUiam was just as earnest in hi? opiaiun regarding this as either the President or I. . . . The iVt.- sident said, ‘ It is the greatest fight we all have on to-day, and every good citizen should enlL't.’ “ The hour was up, and the Pre;iden1 !;ad :< . !■ * for other engagements. ... I talked will: Sir Widnun for a moment after the President left. He pi- : -i tl with the interview and thanked me cordially. II- jitid he had never before had such a frank talk about n.<i.ttt‘jn of so much importance. We all spoke v ith the utmost candour and without diplomatic gloss. He said, ‘ If some of the veteran diplomats could hav'e heard us, they would have fallen in a faint.' Before leaving, we agreed to keep in touch with one another. He is to telephone me whenever he receives despatches which he thinks I should see, and I am to go to Washington when neces- sary.” IV The basis of House’s diplomacy was always complete frankness whenever he negotiated with men who were willing to place their cards on the table ; and the rela- tions he developed with the British through Sir William Tyrrell were intimate. Tyrrell responded readily. “You will forgive, I know,” he wrote to House on January 20, 1914, “ the frankness of my utterance, but that is the basis of our relationship, isn’t it ? ” As a result of this intimacy, a quite informal, but none the less significant, understanding was reached. )8 ASPECTS OF POKHKaiN rujLiui The British Foreign Office made plain to Sir Lionel irden that he must not take steps to interfere in any ay with Wilson’s anti-Huerta policy in Mexico, yrrell on November 26 showed to House despatches om Grey, plainly indicating this j and henceforth the dministration profited by the British influence. It hardly an exaggeration to say that the abdication and ight of Huerta, in July 1914, was directly ^related to le withdrawal of British support. Huerta s elimina- on was the first and perhaps the only diplomatic iumph won by Wilson in his Mexican policy, and it right that future historians should understand that mething of it was due to British co-operation. On the other hand. President Wflson promised to ush the repeal of the clause exempting American coast- fise shipping from the Canal tolls, provided the British rould not hurry him. To this they gladly agreed, and n December 13 House wrote to Page : Sir Cecil ipring-Rice will leave the Panama tolls question entirely a our hands.” The conversation with the British Ambassador to which House refers is interesting in view )f the events of 1914, for it indicated how thorougUy fir Edward Grey was determined to base his foreign policy upon the principle of the sanctity of treaties. “ II, 19^3 • ^ lunched at the ^ British Embassy. I was the only guest. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice and I talked of the Panama tolls question, and he agreed to leave the matter alone and let us take it up at our leisure and handle it in the way we thought best. He said that as far as the monetary end of it was concerned, the British Government would perhaps lose something more by their interpretation of the treaty than by ours i but the thing they had most in mind was main- taining inviolable treaty obligations . He said in southern Europe that question was constantly to the fore ; and the next time it arose after the United States had violated the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, the fact would be thorough!}" threshed out, and it would be said that Britain made no objection to the violation of a treaty where the United States was concerned, but when one of the smaller nations of eastern Europe did so a great hue and cry was raised.” House had taken up the tolls problem with Wilson in October, at a time when the President’s legislative programme seemed to be nearing completion, and he found Wilson determined to force repeal of the exemp- tion upon Congress, although he recognized that it would test his party leadership more than any question that had thus far arisen. The President thought ” that trouble would be encountered in the Senate, particularly in the opposition of Senator O’Gorman, who constantly regards himself as an Irishman contending against England rather than as a United States Senator uphold- ing the dignity and welfare of this country.” The Colonel, according to his habit, preferred to persuade the opposition before open debate began, rather than fighting out the issue in Congress. He brought the situation to the attention of Senator O’Gorman’s son-in-law, Dudley Malone, a warm sup- porter of the Administration, who had just resigned from the State Department to become Collector of the Port of New York. “ November 26, 1913 : Malone and I discussed the Panama tolls question. He indicated that Senator O’ Gorman would make a strenuous fight to uphold his position on this subject. I diplomatically showed him reasons for this country to keep on good terms with Great Britain I explained how the President’s hands I — 14 210 ASPECTS OF FOKEHaJN rujux^x would be tied in Mexico if he did not have the sympathy of Great Britain in his plans. Malone saw the point and agreed to help in bringing Senator O’Gorman around to a more reasonable view. He promised to start upon this at once, and I agreed to confer with O’Gorman later and try to persuade him to accept the President’s policy. . . . “ January 21, 1914 : We [Wilson and House] . . . decided it %vas best to bring the matter to the attention of Congress immediately, so that the British Government would have something to go on wEen Parliament con- vened February 10. \Ve decided it was best not to see Senator O’Gorman alone, but to call the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in as a whole, Republicans and Democrats alike, and explain the situation to them ; that it would be well to tell them how important it was at this particular time that our relations with Great Britain should be undisturbed ; that it was better to make concessions in regard to Panama rather than lose the support of England in our Mexican, Central and South American policy. “ The President has called the Committee for Mon- day. I shall look forward with some anxiety to the outcome. I suggested that a poll be taken of the Senate in advance, in order to find what support he would have. Senator James was decided upon for this work. Senator Stone would have been selected, but he has not been well and is in the South for the moment. The President said one of the strangest things that had come about was that he and Stone had become good friends and that the Senator seemed to have a positive affection for him. ...” It proved impossible to push the matter forward as rapidly as House had hoped, for the opposition was still strong in both Committee and Senate. It yielded, however, before Wilson’s insistence. On March 5, the support of the Senate Committee apparently assured to him, the President in a message to Congress formally asked the repeal of the clause exempting from tolls vessels engaged in coastwise trade. He based his demand chiefly upon the fact that everywhere, except in certain quarters of the United States, opinion held that the clause violated the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. ” Whatever may be our own differences of opinion [said Wilson to Congress] concerning this much-debated measure, its meaning is not debated outside the United States, Everywhere else the language of the treaty is given but one interpretation, and that interpretation precludes the exemption I am asking you to repeal. We consented to the treaty ; its language we accepted, if we did not originate ; and we are too big, too powerful, too self-respecting a nation to interpret with too strained or refined a reading the wmrds of our own promises just because we have pow'er enough to give us leave to read them as w^e please. The large thing to do is the only thing that we can aflord to do. . . The President also had in mind, of course, the value of British influence in meeting the Mexican problem, and to this he made veiled reference which excited endless speculation and of which he himself never gave public explanation. “ I ask this of you,” he said, “ in support of the foreign policy of the Administration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure.” The other matter of great delicacy was the elimination of Huerta and the understanding with Great Britain. The obvious determination of the President, the sense of loyalty to his leadership in the Democratic Party, and the active labours of Burleson and McAdoo, who had charge of getting the measure through House and Senate zr4 Aorjz.'u lo ur rwsxiifLxjx^ respectively, finally bore fruit. In June the repeal of the special exemption became law. From this time forward, the United States Government could count upon the S3mipathy of Sir Edward Grey. “ June 27, 1914 [London] : I lunched with Sir Edward Grey, Sir William Tyrrell, and Walter Page [wrote Colonel House]. We talked from 1.30 until 3.30. ... Sir Edward and I did practically all the talking, Page and Sir Wfiliam only occasionally joining in. “ We spoke first of the Panama tolls repeal biU. Sir Edward expressed pleasure at the fine way in which the President did it and without any negotiations between the IvTO Governments in regard to it. He spoke of his having done it of his own volition because of his high sense of justice. He purposes paying this tribute to the President in Parliament when a fit opportunity occurs." The fit opportunity did not occur, for only a month later the European war broke out and the mind of Sir Edward was caught by problems that were nearer home. But the sentiment of American friendliness lingered in the Foreign Office even during the vexatious discussions regarding blockade and neutral rights. Through his insistence upon the sanctity of international engagements, furthermore, Wilson was able to assume a tone in his controversy with Germany which would have been im- possible if he had 5delded to the dictates of expediency in the question of Panama tolls. CHAPTER VIII A PAN-AMERICAN PACT It Will be such a great accomplishment that there vril be nothing he [Wilson] can ever do aftenvards that can approach it in importance* Ambassador Naon to Colonel Hous*\ Decembet 29, 1914 I T he success with which President Wilson forced the repeal of the Panama tolls exemption upon an unwilling Congress, thus securing the goodwill of the British as well as vindicating the good faith of the United States, was followed almost immediately by the flight of Huerta from Mexico. This diplomatic victory was of even less significance than the fact that, by refusing to intervene actively in Mexico and by calling for the mediation of the A.B.C. Powers, he had given a powerful stimulus to the cordiality of South American feeling. Mr. Fletcher, Minister to Chile, wrote enthusiastically to House of “ the President’s success in the Mexican difficulties — turning, as he did, a situation fraught with dif&culties and danger to our American relations into a triumph of Pan-Americanism.” Colonel House was anxious to capitalize the advan- tage of the moment, in order to develop a positive and permanent Pan-American policy, based upon the prin- ciple of conference and co-operation. The world had ■witnessed the bankruptcy of European diplomacy, which the outbreak of the Great War made manifest in August 1914, and which, in House's opinion, resulted primarily from the lack of an organized system of international 213 214 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT co-operation. Such a system he was anxious that Wilson should develop for the Americas ; and when the Presi- dent visited him in November he laid his plans before him. “ November 25, 1914 ; I advised him [recorded the Colonel] to pay less attention to his domestic policy and greater attention to the welding together of the two western continents. I thought the Federal Reserve Act was his greatest constructive work and was the thing that would stand out and make his Administration notable. Now I would like him to place beside that great measure a constructive international policy, which he had already started by getting the A.B.C. nations to act as arbitrators at Niagara. I thought the time had arrived to show the world that friendship, justice, and kindliness were more potent than the mailed fist. “ He listened attentively to what I had to say, and asserted that he would do it and would use his speech at San Francisco, when he opened the Exposition, to outline this policy.” A few days later, so eager wus he to see such a policy developed while circumstances were propitious. Colonel House permitted himself a rare luxury — that of enforcing his verbal advice by a letter. Colonel House to the President New York, November 30, 1914 Dear Governor : ... As I said to you when you were here, I feel that the wise thing for you to do is to make your foreign policy the feature of your Administration during the next two years. The opportunity to weld North and South America together in closer union is at your hand ; do you not think you should take some initiative in this direction before your speech at the Panama Exposition ? You A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 215 might take that occasion to amplify it, but in the mean- time there are many things that might be done to give it further acceleration, . . . Affectionately yours E. M. House Some weeks later the plan had taken more definite form in the Colonel’s thoughts and he decided that he would go to Washington to impress it upon the President — a stiU more unusual step on his part and one that indicated how much importance he attached to the scheme. What Colonel House had in mind was nothing less than a rather loose league of American stales which should guarantee security from aggression and furnish a mechanism for the pacific settlement of disputes. The reader will doubtless observe that what House planned bears a close relationship to the League of Nations which Wilson ultimately advocated for the world at large. Especially significant is the account which the Colonel gives of the following conversation with the President, for it indicates that at this moment was bom almost the exact wording of Article X of the League of Nations Covenant. “ December 16, 1914 ; I then explained the purpose of my visit to Washington. I thought he [Wfilson] might or might not have an opportunity to play a great and beneficial part in the European tragedy ; but there was one thing he could do at once, and that was to inaugurate a policy that would weld the Western Hemi- sphere together. It was my idea to formulate a plan, to be agreed upon by the republics of the two continents, which in itself would serve as a model for the European nations when peace is at last brought about. “ I could see that this excited his enthusiasm. My idea was that the republics of the two continents should agree to guarantee each other’s territorial integrity and 2i6 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT that they should also agree to government ownership of munitions of war. I suggested that he take a pencil and write the points to be covered. " He took a pencil, and this is what he wrote : “ ‘ ist. Mutual guaranties of political independence under republican form of government and mutual guaranties of territorial integrity.^ “ ‘ 2nd. Mutual agreement that the Government of each of the contracting parties acquire complete control within its jurisdiction of the manufacture and sale of munitions of war.' “ He wished to know if there was anything else. I thought this was sufficient, taken in conjunction with the Bryan Peace Treaties which had already been concluded between the republics of the two continents. " He then w'ent to his little typewriter and made a copy of what he had written, and handed it to me to use with the three South American Ambassadors with whom it was thought best to initiate negotiations. We discussed the method of procedure, and it was agreed that it should be done quite informally and without either himself or the Secretary of State appearing in it until after I had sounded the different Governments at interest. We did this for another reason, and that was not to hurt Mr. Bryan’s sensibilities. It was agreed that I should explain the matter to Mr. Bryan and should tell him why it was thought best for me to do it rather than the President or himself. “ The President was evidently somewhat nervous about Mr. Bryan’s attitude. It was easy to see that he did not want him to interfere in any way with my procedure, and yet he was afraid he might be sensitive regarding it. I thought I could work it out satis- ^ Cf. Article X of the League of Nations Covenant: The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing pohtical independence of all Members of the League. In c^e of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression tiie Council shall advise upon the means by which Urn obligation shall be fulfilled/' A PAN-AMERICAX PACT 217 factorily, for Mr. Bryan is generous and big-minded in matters of this sort. . . . " December 17, 1914 : I arranged for an interview with Mr. Bryan at 9.30 this morning. I outlined the plan the President and I were preparing for the linking of the Western Hemisphere and showed him what the President had written, explaining why it wns thought best that I should do it. He acquiesced in a most generous way, which proved my forecast to the President was correct. . . . After but a few minutes’ conversation upon the subject of this proposed league, he began to discuss the Venezuela Minister’s proposal concerning the calling of a convention of belligerent and neutral nations, for the purpose of securing the rights of neutrals. He also discussed the Russian treaty, which had been tentatively suggested as being possible at this time. After that he got oh on prohibition, and I wms glad to take him to his office and proceed to other business. ...” Mr. Bryan, in truth, appeared to take but little interest in this Pan-American policy, for he had complete confidence in the “ cooling-off ” treaties he had arranged, which provided for a period of investigation, in case of dispute, before hostilities could be started. Some days later, after House had reported progress to the Secretary of State, the Colonel recorded : “ December 20, 1914 : Mr. Bryan seemed pleased with what had been done, but drifted off into the question of patronage and the best way to ‘ do up Senator X.’ ... He followed me all the way to the automobile, bareheaded in the cold bleak wind, to get in as much as he could upon that subject.” II Given a free hand. Colonel House proceeded with surprising rapidity. On December 19 he saw the three Ambassadors of the A.B.C. Powers and was much 2i8 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT encouraged by their attitude. What he planned was obviously to the advantage of the South American States, in that it would bring them into equal partner- ship with the United States and would transform the Monroe Doctrine from a protective assurance on the part of one state into a mutual covenant. Whether or not a Pan-American Pact of the kind he suggested would prove an effective guarantee of peace might be doubtful, but it would certainly eliminate the implication of inferiority which South America deduced from the traditional form of the Monroe Doctrine. To secure such moral advantages, however, the South American States must renounce all aggressive designs. Would they prove equal to the opportunity offered them ? The plan assumed also that the smaller Latin-American States had attained a degree of political stability which would permit them to maintain the promises which they made. The assumption was at least questionable. “ December 19, 1914 ‘ Justice Lamar telephoned that the Argentine Ambassador was back. I made an engagement with him at half-past eleven. I hurriedly gathered together what data I could get concerning Argentina and upon Naon himself. When the Justice introduced me, he excused himself for a moment and took Naon aside to inform him how thoroughly I repre- sented the President. He then took his leave. “ I began the conversation by complimenting Naon upon the advanced thought in his country, particularly in regard to penal reform. I considered the Argentine fifty or one hundred years ahead of Europe and the United States in that direction. I marvelled at the statesmanship that saw as long ago as 1864, when they had their war with Uruguay, that a victorious nation had no moral right to despoil the territory of the van- quished. After I had made these few remarks, I had fertile soil upon which to sow the seeds of my argument. A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 219 " Naon took the t5"pewritten memorandum which the President had given me and warmly approved both sentences one and two. He was tremendously impressed with the significance of the first article, and said it struck a new note and would create an epoch in govern- mental affairs. When I told him the President had written the memorandum on the typewriter himself, he asked permission to keep it. saying it would become an historical document of much value. " I urged him to communicate with his Government by cable and to give me an answer by Monday or Tuesday. He felt confident the reply would be favourable. He took my address in New York, and said he would com- municate with me without delay. I let him understand that when the South American Governments had acted upon the matter and it had been pretty well buttoned-up, I would step aside and have the President and Mr. Bryan act officially. When I left, he followed me to the door and said he considered it a joy to work toward the consummation of such a policy as ' your great and good President has promoted.' . . . “ At lunch I reported to the President the substance of my conversation with the Ambassador from the Argentine, and he was delighted. Naon thought I would have more difhculty with the Brazilian and Chilean Ambassadors. “ The President said in talking with them I could go very far, and he was emphatic in the statement that the United States would not tolerate . . . aggression upon other republics. “ In the afternoon I saw them both. Da Gama ^ was easy of conquest and with practically the same argument I used with Naon. Suarez ® was more difficult because he is not so clever, in the first instance, and, in the second, Chile has a boundary dispute with Peru. He asked if I knew of this, and I told him I did, but we would arrange in the final drawing of the agreement to cover such cases, since there were other boundary disputes which would have to be adjusted, like that 1 The Brazilian Ambassador. The Chilean Ambassador. 220 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT between Costa Rica and Panama. They both agreed to cable their Governments and strongly recommend the ratification of the proposal.” This was rapid work for the first day of negotiations and Colonel House, who knew something of diplomatic delays, did not conceal his satisfaction. He was pleased still more by the speed with which the Ambassadors of Brazil and Argentina extracted replies to his sugges- tion from their Governments. Brazil was the first to respond, less than a week after the original suggestion of the Colonel had been offered. Ambassador da Gama to Colonel House Washington, December 24, 1914 My dear Colonel House : I have just received the answer from my Minister of Foreign Affairs to the telegram I sent him on Saturday, 19th, transmitting the two propositions of the President’s project of convention. The answer was delayed pending further information that I sent on Monday and then consultation with our President, who gladly authorizes me to declare that both points of the President’s proposal are agreeable, it being understood that only American territories are contemplated in the first of those paragraphs. I suppose that the sounding having proved favourable, the formal overture of the negotiations will soon foUow. This will be an epoch-making negotiation. Yours sincerely DA Gama Colonel Home to the President New York^ December 26, 1914 Dear Governor ; I am enclosing you a copy of a letter from da Gama which I have just received and which I know will please you as much as it has me. A PAN-AMERICAN PACT As you know, I had a telephone talk with Naon ; but he spoke such broken English and the connexion was so bad, that I could not gather the sense of his message. He promised to write, but I have nothing from him yet. I gleaned enough to know that he wanted to have another conference ; therefore I told him I would be in Washington early next week. This is a matter of such far-reaching consequence that I feel we should pay more attention to it just now than even the European affair, for the reason that, if brought to a successful conclusion, the one must have a decided influence upon the other. . . . Affectionately yours E. M. Hox’se Three days later House went again to Washington, where he had a gratifying conference with the Argentine Ambassador. Naon handed to him the following de- spatch, which had just come in from Buenos Ayres : “ The Government receives with sympathy the proposi- tion with the understanding that such a proposition tends to transform the one-sided character of the Monroe Doctrine into a common policy of all the Ameri- can countries.” “ December 29, 1914 : Naon 'W’'as very enthusiastic [House recorded] over the entire proposal and said, ‘ It will be such a great accomplishment that there will be nothing he [Wilson] can ever do afterward that can approach it in importance.’ “ He thought Chile would hesitate to come in. , . . He had talked with the Chilean Ambassador since I was in Washington and had not received much encourage- ment. I told him that the United States w'ould not favour the acquisition of territory by the other republics, either by war or otherwise, and that Chile might as well accept that condition in a formal convention. He replied that Argentina held the same view and would 222 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT not willingly permit territorial aggrandizement in South America.” The Colonel returned to the White House to report to Whson. “We discussed the best means of buttoning-up the South American proposition, and it was agreed that he should see Senator Stone immediately upon his return ; and we again discussed whether it would be advisable to bring the matter before the entire Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, or before the Democratic members of it. He would not discuss anything of importance with Senator for the reason that he immediately gave it to the press ; in this instance it was necessary to have the matter presented to the country properly when they first heard it, and not get a garbled or dis- torted account from a political opponent. “ I told him Naon desired to know whether it was our purpose to make twenty-one different treaties or a single convention. I had replied that it was the intention to make a single convention, which the Presi- dent thought was right. Naon suggested, I told him, that the A.B.C. Powers and ourselves should first thresh out the terms to a satisfactory conclusion before bring- ing in the smaller republics. This, too, the President agreed to. “ December 30, 1914 : We had breakfast, as usual, at eight. The President and I talked a few minutes afterward and laid out the business that I should attend to. I made an engagement with the Chilean Ambassador for eleven o’clock. “ I found he had not heard from his Government. He gave a change of ministry as the reason, and was sure he would receive a favourable reply. I could not see how he could fail to do so. This was not really in accordance with Naon’s statement to me, but I found Naon wrong in the first estimate of the manner in which Brazil and Chile would receive the proposals. A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 223 “ January 13, 1915 : I found the Chilean Ambas- sador very cordial, but he had not heard from his Govern- ment regarding the President’s proposal. I toid him the Senate would adjourn in about sixty days and would not meet again for nearly a year, and that it was import- ant for him to get into communication with his Govern- ment again and ask them to send a response. I informed him of the favourable responses from both Brazil and Argentina ; but before proceeding to a further discus- sion of the convention we wished to hear from Chile. The President requested me to say to him that he had approached Senator Stone of the Foreign Relations Committee and had found him sympathetic, and he felt sure there wmuld be no difficulty from that source. . . . “ I went ... to see the Brazilian Ambassador to inform him also that the President liad taken the matter up with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and he would soon call them together for a more intimate discussion of the details of the convention. Da Gama was pleased with this procedure and thought it w^as wise for the President to get the Senate in line before any public announcement was made. “ I returned to the White House for lunch, and while the President was dressing for his golf I told of my morning’s work.” Chile was slow in responding, but on January 21, 1915, Colonel House received the following letter from Ambassador Suarez : Ambassador Suarez to Colonel House Washington, January 19 , 1915 My dear Sir : ... I wished to inform you that I have since two days the expected reply from Chile. It is favourable in principle and praises the idea as a generous and pan- american one. 224 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT Although it is sometimes not a little difficult to find the proper expressions to render an idea agreeable to several parties, I hope we shall succeed when the moment of discussing the development of our first accord comes. Mr. Bryan has told me lately to be in full acquaint- ance with the matter; and under this understanding I assume I can communicate with him in your absence. I am, my dear Mr. House, Very sincerely yours Edo. Suarez This was ambiguous, but House, who was on the point of leaving for Europe, to be engaged upon quite difierent but equally important affairs, urged the Presi- dent to accept the letter at its face value and push the agreement through. Colonel House to the President New York, January 21, 1915 Dear Governor : I am enclosing you a copy of a letter which has come from the Chilean Ambassador this morning. Everything now seems to be in shape for you to go ahead. I believe the country will receive tffis policy with enthusiasm and it wiU make your Administration notable, even had you done but little else. . . . Affectionately yours E. M. House III Colonel House left for Europe on January 31, 1915. Henceforth his time and his energies were chiefly occupied with the problems that arose from the Euro- pean war, but his interest never flagged in the Pan- American policy which he had done so much to inaugu- rate. He insisted upon its general value as an example, A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 225 which might later be follow’ed in Europe, of international organization in place of international anarchy ; he emphasized its special value in view of the persistent uneasiness resulting from the always unsettled Mexican problem. For the elimination of Huerta had not led to any diminution of disorder ; attacks upon American lives and property continued, and American public opinion, at least in certain circles, called for a positive policy that might end the crisis. House himself was constitutionally unable to approve a purely negative line of action, and, while he resized the dangers of forcible intervention in Mexico by the United States alone, he believed that with the co-opera- tion of the South American Powers, the mediation of which had already been utilized in 1914, the Mexican problem could be settled. Such a step would fit in perfectly with the plan for a Pan-American Pact. Just before leaving for Europe he urged it upon the President and the Secretary of State. “ January 24, 1915 : I suggested [to Wilson] that the Mexican problem could best be solved now by calling in the A.B.C. Powers and ourselves. The President thought this an excellent idea and that it was merely a question of when to put it in operation. I offered to see the Ambassadors to-morrow if he thought well of it. He believed this would be too soon, for conditions were not quite ready in Mexico for such a move, and he was afraid the A.B.C. Ambassadors would not want to move so quickly. . . . “January 25, 1915 : I talked to Mr. Bryan of my suggesting a commission form of government for Mexico, with the A.B.C. Powers and ourselves acting jointly. He thought fairly well of it, but was not as enthusiastic as the President. I talked of the South American concord and many other matters.” 226 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT Colonel House to the President Paris, France, March 15, 1915 Dear Governor : Since I have been over here, every now and then Mexico raises its head. It would be of enormous advantage to your prestige if you could place that problem well on the road to settlement before this war ends. I have heard it time and again— not directly, but through others — that the belligerent Governments will become insistent that order be restored there. Winslow^ tells me that he hears it constantly in Berlin. I have wondered whether you have taken the matter up with the A.B.C. Powers, as you contemplated when I left. This seems to me to be the wisest solution. I think you have now given them [the Mexicans] every chance to work it out themselves, and help should be offered them and insisted upon. . . . Affectionately yours E. M. House President Wilson, however, was unwilling to take so decided a step at this time. Three months later he himself drew a graphic picture of conditions in Mexico : “ Her crops are destroyed, her fields lie unseeded, her work cattle are confiscated for the use of the armed factions, her people flee to the mountains to escape being drawn into unending bloodshed, and no man seems to see or lead the way to peace and settled order. . . . Mexico is starving and without a Government.” Even so, he hesitated to take any positive action. Colonel House was in Europe from January to June. On his return he found that, despite the cordial approval given by Argentina and Brazil, no progress had been made by Wilson or Bryan in pushing the Pan-American ^ Laaier Winslow, attach^ in Berlin. A PAN-AMERICAN PACT Pact to a definite conclusion. Clearly, much of the delay might be attributed to the hesitations of the Chilean Ambassador, but it seemed plain also that tine Secretary of State had not taken up the matter with energy. He lacked the sort of ability necessary to translate ideas into facts. Mr. Brvan had imagination and foresight ; many of his ideas which began as sub- jects of ridicule ended b}’ becoming laws, but, except in rare instances, not through his own efforts. “ The most important event of the day 'recorded House on June i8, 1915] was a visit from Henry P. Fletcher, our Ambassador to Chile. We discussed the South American situation as it related to the proposal I made the President before I left, concerning the weld- ing of the tv^o continents. I find nothing has been done in this matter during my absence. The Chilean Ambas- sador and Government ha\'e been the cause of the delay. They evidently do not want to tie themselves to a non- aggressive policy. ... I do not feel, however, that the situation has been handled to the best advantage ; and I shall take it up with the President again and suggest some means by which it may be expedited. “ Fletcher thought if we got the A.B.C. Powers to declare for the Monroe Doctrine it would be sufficient. I told him that this would in no way be sufficient and that he did not grasp the idea or scope of it. We desired to see the Americas knitted together so as to give the world a policy to be followed in the future. Haste was necessary for the reason that the European war made the time opportune, and, if it did not go through before the end of the war, it might never do so. “ I suggested to Fletcher the advisability of his visiting the different South American countries to further the proposal. I thought if Chile continued to obstruct, we should go ahead without her. The smaller republics would agree and, with Argentina and Brazil, it made but little difference whether Chile came in or remained out.” 238 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT With the appointment of Mr. Lansing as Secretary of State, in July 1915, following Bryan’s resignation, new impetus was given to the proposals which House had initiated. “lam again urging action in that direction,” the Colonel wrote on July 18 to Thomas Nelson Page. A week later, Mr. Lansing came up to the North Shore to spend the day with him. “ July 24, 1915 : Secretary and Mrs. Lansing arrived on the 10.30 train. Lansing and I at once went into executive session and talked continuously until lunch. There was much to go over. I wished to tell him of European conditions, as I found them, and to give him an insight into what had been done in the Department concerning some important matters. . . . The South American proposal was one. I was surprised to find that Lansing was ignorant of what had been done. He said, as far as he knew there was nothing on file in the Depart- ment. I was surprised, too, that the President had not talked with him more freely and given him fuller in- formation concerning pending matters. . . . “ We took up the Mexican situation and he is getting under way the arrangement to have the A.B.C. Powers Join us in composing the difficulties there. He did not know the suggestion was mine and was made as far back as January and lying dormant until now. I do not think the President can altogether relieve himself of blame in this delay, for, while he would probably have gone ahead with it if ... he had had as Secretary of State a better executive, yet it might have been done even under the unfavourable circumstances with which he had to contend. . . . “ I find him [Lansing] thoroughly familiar with the machinery for such designs, and he seems to be energetic and ambitious to make a record.” Practical efiects of this conference were not slow to appear. In the first place, Mr. Lansing took up at least A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 229 part of the suggestion that Colonel House had made the preceding January'’ and which the President and Secre- tary Bryan had not pushed fonvard ; namely, that the South American Powers should be called in to assist in the settlement of the Mexican problem. In August, upon the invitation of Mr. Lansing, the diplomatic representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Uruguay met at Washington to discuss the Mexican settlement. From this conference there resulted an invitation to the different Mexican leaders to meet in pacific conference to arrange for general agreement and orderly elections. All the leaders, with the exception of the chief of the Constitutionalists, Carranza, agreed to the invitation, and yet it w’as Car- ranza w'ho seemed to exercise the widest powders in Mexico and whose co-operation w^as essential. Wilson did not deceive himself into the belief that Carranza w'as friendly to the United States, but both the President and House recognized in Carranza’s lieutenant, Obregon, certain qualities which might prove equal to the problem of Mexican pacification. “ Sefiember 23, 1915 : We breakfasted at eight [wrote House]. After breakfast Tumulty talked to me for nearly an hour. The President rescued me and took me up to his study. We discussed Mexico. He laughingly said that Carranza had once or twice put it over us and in a very skilful way. He thought when the A.B.C. Conference resumed on the 8th of October, we would perhaps have to recognize Carranza. We were both of the opinion that General Obregon was responsible for the accelerated fortunes of Carranza and that he would perhaps finally turn out to be the ‘ man of the hour ’ in Mexico. We agreed that if Carranza was to be recog- nized he must first guarantee religious freedom, give amnesty for all political offences, institute the land A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 230 reforms which had been promised, give protection to foreigners, and recognize their just claims.” Despite the steady negative returned by Carranza to the invitation to meet with the other Mexican leaders the conference of American states at Washington refused to be snubbed ; in October it decided that the Carranza regime constituted a de facto government in Mexico and recommended its recognition. This recognition was granted by the United States Government on October ig. The Mexican problem was not thereby settled, but general opinion would probably have agreed with that of Ambassador Gerard, who wrote Colonel House in October ; “ Carranza has his faults, like most of us, but it seems to me that it is the proper thing to recognize him and a good solution of a bad situation.” Once again the method of solution was of more importance than the result. Students of the Latin- American situation insisted that it was of the first sig- nificance that the United States should have taken this step in conjunction with and upon the recommendation of the chief South American states. President Wilson did not fail to capitalize the friendly sentiments aroused in South America when he delivered his annual message : ” The moral is that the states of America are not hostile rivals, but co-operating friends, and that their growing sense of community of interest, alike in matters political and alike in matters economic, is likely to give them a new significance as factors in international affairs and in the political history of the world.” Under the influence of this display of the United States’ desire to co-operate rather than to control, Mr. Lansing found it possible to continue discussions on the A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 231 definite Pan-American Pact. On October ig, House wrote to Walter Hines Page : “ Lansing is pushing the South American proposal. The President, Lansing, and I went into this thoroughly some two weeks ago and decided upon a course of action which we belie^^e will accelerate matters and perhaps bring it to a conclusion before Congress meets.” As a result of long discussion, the original proposition made by House had been revised so as to eliminate one obvious source of practical difficulty ; namely, the veto upon the private manufacture of arms. For reasons which the League of Nations Commission later were to find cogent, the abolition of private manufacture was deemed not feasible. Indeed, the new draft of the Pact carried merely a provision for an automatic embargo on munitions in case of revolutionary attack upon an existing government. Articles pro\iding for investiga- tion and arbitration in the settlement of disputes were added. The first and most important article, guarantee- ing territorial integrity ” and “ political independence under republican forms of government,” was retained. Secretary Lansing to Colonel House WASHiNGTOJii, November i8, 1915 My dear Colonel House : I enclose a revision of the four propositions for the proposed Pan-American Convention.^ Possibly the President has already sent you a copy, but I am doing so on the supposition that he has not. Before Ambassador Naon sailed, I submitted to him the propositions and he was entirely satisfied with them. This morning I saw the Brazilian Ambassador and he also approved. This afternoon I asked the Chilean Ambassador to come and see me, and after a long dis- ^ See Appendix to chapter* 232 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT cussion of the whole question he changed his views in regard to the convention and said that he could see no reason why Chile could not accept the propositions as redrafted. I urged on him the advisability of speedy action and he agreed that he would at once communicate them to his Government and ask that the new Cabinet, which comes into ofiice on December 20th, would act immediately and cable him instructions accordingly. I feel convinced that the Ambassador will do all he can to secure favourable action by his Government. I thought you would be interested to know the present status of the negotiations and when I see you will explain more fully the substance of my conversation with Mr. Suarez. I hope to be in New York at the Army-Navy football game on the 27th and shall stay over until Sunday night. Possibly I may have an opportunity to see you then if you are not in Washington before that time. With warm regards, I am Cordially yours Robert Lansing IV As in the case of the League of Nations Covenant three years later. Colonel House was less interested in the wording of the draft than in the spirit behind the agreement and in securing definite and unanimous acceptance. “ I think you have now gotten the four propositions down to the best possible form,” he wrote Mr. Lansing on November 20. And he urged the President to get the business “ buttoned-up.” Indeed, the matter seemed so close to completion that on January 6, 1916, Mr. Wilson, in his address to the Pan- American Scientific Congress, stated publicly the gist of the proposals. But more delays intervened. House again left for Europe in December, remaining abroad until March ; A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 233 and, apparently, during his absence little progress was made in overcoming the final difficulties. While in Europe, although engaged on complex and even more far-reaching business, the Colonel did not forget the Pan- American Pact and took what occasion he might to assist it. It was the subject of discussion between him and the Chilean Minister to Great Britain, Senor Eduardes, and also members of the British Cabinet. He was hopeful of British support, and even considered the possibility of the participation of Canada in the Covenant. February 20, 1916 : I had a conference with the Chilean Minister before lunch [he wrote]. He said his Government was pleased with the proposed pact between the American republics. He mentioned the fear Chile had of Japan. He spoke of the advantage Chile could be to the United States because of her coast-line as a base, and because of her nitrate and copper deposits. He believed that Chile during the coming year would take second place among copper-producing countries. While talking with him, it occurred to me it would be a good time for Great Britain to indicate that she was in S5nnpathy with the Pan-American Pact ; and I told Eduardes I would suggest to Sir Edward Grey to-morrow that he have some member of the House of Commons put a question to him asking if the Government was cognizant of this Pact, how they regarded it, and what effect it would have upon Great Britain. I shall suggest that Grey reply that Great Britain views it sympathetic- ally ; that, being one of the largest American Powers, she looks with favour upon any arrangement which will make for a closer union of American states. “ Eduardes was delighted with this suggestion. Later in the day I proposed it to Lansdowne.^ He was startled, and said it was a matter needing careful consideration because Japan might consider it was directed at her. I ' Minister without Portfolio. 234 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT thought Japan should be taken at her word. She has repeatedly said she had no designs in the Western Hemisphere, and Great Britain need only accept her assurances at their face value. Lansdowne favoured the proposal, but declared it of such importance that careful thought should be given it. “ February 21, 1916 : The first question I took up with Grey was the suggestion which came to me yester- day regarding the Pan-American Pact. I told Grey I had mentioned it to Lansdowne and he thought it a great move, provided it was so guarded as not to offend the Japanese. Grey took the same attitude I did, that the Japanese could not possibly consider it directed at them. He enthused over the idea and asked me to dictate the question I thought should be put to him in Parliament. I did so, while he wrote it down. It was, whether the Government was taking cognizance of the Pan-American Pact recently announced, guaranteeing the political and territorial integrity of the American republics, and what effect it would have upon the British Dominions in America. “ The thought then occurred to me, and I expressed it to Grey, that after this was done and after I had con- sulted with the President, the British Government might join the American guarantee as far as their American colonies were concerned. This, I told him, was one way [for Great Britain] to bring about a sympathetic alliance not only with the United States, but with the entire Western Hemisphere. In my opinion, it was an oppor- tunity not to be disregarded and its tendency would be to bring together an influence which could control the peace of the world. “ Grey . . , thought it should be done. I afterwards cabled the President, telling him what I had proposed to Grey, but without giving details. . . . “ I gave Loreburn^ a summary of what I had told Grey concerning the Pan-American Pact and what Grey had promised to do in the House of Commons provided ^ Lord Lorebnm, an advanced Liberal and former Lord Chancellor, A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 235 the Canadian Prime Minister approved. Grey felt that a matter appertaining solely to American affairs should first be submitted to the Canadian Government, and this was being done by cable. “ I suggested to Lorebum that he prepare a speech in advance, without saying anything to Grey, so when the announcement was made in the Commons he could give it his warm approval in the House of Lords. He was eager to do this, for he said it presented to his mind a magnificent prospect. “ February 22, 1916 : He [Grey] told me that Bonar Law was of the opinion it would be somewhat hasty to have the question asked in the House of Commons, and an answer given just now, about the Pan-American Pact. He has cabled the Canadian Prime Minister and the matter will be brought out at the time con- sidered most opportune.” Returning to the United States on March 5, House heard from Grey soon afterwards that the British thor- oughly approved of the Pan-American Pact and were interested in the plan of affiliation with it, but evidently feared to make any public statement before its con- summation seemed better assured. Sir Edward Grey to Colonel House Foreign Office, March 23, 1916 Dear Colonel House : Soon after you left, the Chilean Minister volunteered a statement to Sir M. de Bunsen^ of his conversation with you about the Pan-American proposal. In consequence of what Sir M. de Bunsen told me I thought it desirable to see the Chilean Minister before saying anything in public. I found him pleased with what you had said to him, but insisting very carefully that the idea of partnership must be emphasized and that of tutelage suppressed. 2 Britisb Ambassador to Austria until 1914 ; appointed Special Ambassador to States of Soatb America m 1918, 236 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT He admitted that you had done this, but he made it clear that if I made any public statement it must be evident that I was founding myself not only on what President Wilson had said, but on the feelings of the A.B.C. countries in South America as well, I asked him to send me a statement which he said the President of Chile had made favourable to the idea, so that if I had to say anything in public I might refer to it as well as to what President Wilson had said. The Canadian Government were quite willing that I should say what I thought of sa 5 dng in favour of it, but finding I should be on rather delicate ground as regards the A,B.C, countries, I think I will wait till the matter comes up in the Press again before making any public utterance. I made it clear to the Chilean Minister that we were favourable to the plan as put before him by you, and that you had spoken to me in exactly the same way as to him, but I said nothing of having discussed with you the question of a public statement here. Yours sincerely E. Grey Notwithstanding the cordial protestations of the Chilean Minister in London, House soon discovered that the attitude of Suarez in Washington was not encouraging and that, as a result of the hesitations of Chile, the early enthusiasm of Brazil was beginning to evaporate. The situation was complicated by a new Mexican crisis. On March 8, Vilia, in revolt against Carranza and pursuing the temporarily profitable career of bandit under the diaphanous guise of liberal patriot, crossed the frontier and murdered seventeen American citizens at Columbus, New Mexico. The punitive expedition under Pershing which was sent after him across the border, led to verbal and military retaliation on the part of Carranza which threatened to produce formal warfare between Mexico A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 237 and the United States. The atmosphere during the spring and summer months was by no means favourable to the completion of the Pan-American Pact. Further- more, Mr. Fletcher, who had been given charge of the negotiations, discovered an unwillingness to settle upon details that nullified the agreement upon the principle which the South American states had professed. The differences were slight on the surface, but they proved sufficient to delay and finally to prevent signature of the Pan-American Pact. It was impossible for the United States to urge action, without arousing the suspicions of Chile that the Pact in reality was to serve our special interests rather than those of the Americas in general. On August 8, Frank Polk, then Under- secretary of State, wrote to Colonel House that the Pact “ seems dead for the moment.” On the following day, Mr, Fletcher reported that progress had stopped. Senor Naon desired delay in order that the tense feeling aroused by the crisis in Mexico and the dispute with Carranza might subside. The attitude of Chile became increasingly aloof. “ In view of the check put on the negotiations by Mr. Naon’s unwillingness to sign [wrote Fletcher to House], I could not open out the treaty to the other republics. So the matter rests in statu quo. Chile is definitely and decidedly opposed to the treaty. ... I feel sure that if we go on without Chile, that is, isolating her from the American concert, she will turn naturally elsewhere in finance and trade and that gradually a spirit of hostility against the United States will be engendered.” Thus the summer dragged along. In September, following the subsidence of the Mexican crisis, the Argentine Ambassador declared himself ready to sign ; }8 A PAN-AMERICAN PACT Lit Chile still held off and Brazil tended to follow her sample. The last reference in Colonel House’s papers )r 1916 to the plan which he had started nearly two ears before, is dated October i ; “ Fletcher called to report on the Pan-American ^eace Pact. He did not go further with Ambassador ^aon, who is willing to sign for Argentina, because ..ansing had promised Dr. Muller, Brazilian Secretary )f State for Foreign Affairs, that he would not move ictively in the matter until the 15th of November, vhich would give Muller time to return to Brazil and iscertain the will of his Government. Muller has been in the United States for the past six weeks at a health resort.” The weeks that followed were filled first with election activities and then with the negotiations that succeeded Germany’s first peace note. The Pan-American Pact was pushed to one side and, with the entrance of the United States into the European War in the spring of 1917, it slipped into a forgotten grave. The failure to carry through the plan to its com- pletion must have brought harsh disappointment to Colonel House, who followed the progress of negotiations with invariable interest, although he ceased to retain active direction of their course. But even unfulfilled, the plan occupies a position of historical significance. It was designed not merely to bring the American states more closely together, but also to serve as a model to the European nations when they had ended the war. Both in its specific language and in its general intent, the Pan-American Pact is the immediate prototype of the Covenant of the League of Nations. By the summer of 1916 Colonel House could see its failure with greater equanimity because his eyes already caught the visioa A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 239 of the United States entering and \dvif}dng a larger concert than that of purely American states. The development of our relations with Europe, forced by the war, brought upon the horizon the need of a world organization into which the Americas might conceivably be drawn. Even before the war House realized that the traditional separation of the United States from Europe in matters political could not be maintained indefinitely and that the time had come when political events of moment in Europe must inevitably prove of direct importance to the United States. It was this realization that led him to give over the active direction of the Pan- American scheme while his chief interest was caught in the European situation. It led him to visit the Kaiser in June 1914, and thus to enter upon an adven- ture that determined the course of his main activities during the following six years. Nothing with which he had hitherto been connected, whether of a diplomatic character or in the field of domestic politics, compares in importance with the European mission he undertook in the early summer of 1914, to w^hich we must now turn our attention. APPENDIX Pan-American Pact— Revised Draft ARTICLE I That the high contracting parties to this solemn covenant and agreement hereby Join one another in a common and mutual guaranty of territorial integrity and of political independence under republican forms of government. ARTICLE II To give definitive application to the guaranty set forth in Article I, the high contracting parties severally covenant to A PAN-AMERICAN PACT 240 endeavour forthwith to reach a settlement of all disputes as to boundaries or territory now pending between them by amicable agreement or by means of international arbitration. ARTICLE III That the high contracting parties further agree, First, that all questions, of whatever character, arising between any two or more of them which cannot be settled by the ordinary means of diplomatic correspondence shall, before any declaration of war or beginning of hostilities, be first submitted to a permanent international commission for investigation, one year being allowed for such investigation ; and. Second, that if the dispute is not settled by investigation, to submit the same to arbitration, provided the question in dispute does not affect the honour, independence, or vital interests of the nations concerned or the interests of third parties. ARTICLE IV To the end that domestic tranquillity may prevail within their territories, the high contracting parties further severally covenant and agree that they will not permit the departure from their respective jurisdictions of any military or naval expedition hostile to the established government of any of the high contracting parties, and that they will prevent the exporta- tion from their respective jurisdictions of arms, ammunition, or other munitions of war destined to or for the use of any person or persons notified to be in insurrection or revolt against the established government- of any of the high contracting parties. November 1915 CHAPTER IX THE GREAT ADVENTURE The situation is extraordinary. It is militarism rnn stark mad. . . « There is some day to be an awful cataclysm. . . • House to Wilson, May 29, igi4,from Berlin I A T the beginning of Wilson’s Administration there / \ were few citizens of the United States who pro- -^fessed a knowledge of, or an interest in, European politics. The traditions of the nineteenth century still held the public mind — traditions which laid down, as the primary principle of American policy, a complete abstention from the political affairs of Europe. They had their origin in sound judgment. During the early days of the Republic, as both Washington and Jefferson realized, entanglement in foreign alliances would have meant that the United States, lacking material strength, must have become the catspaw of an alien power. On the other hand, Nature had provided a wonderful oppor- tunity if the independent colonists would turn their backs upon the Atlantic and devote themselves to developing the resources of their own land. Thus during the early nineteenth century the young country spent its energy upon domestic problems : an aggressive extension of the frontier, a fierce wrestle with the backwoods, a struggle for political unity, the building of transportation lines, the creation of an industrial system. The people knew and cared little of what went on across the Atlantic. 242 THE GREAT ADVENTURE But by the beginning of the twentieth century, conditions had changed. Not merely had the Pacific coast been reached and the intervening territory con- quered, but through the merchant and the missionary American interests had been established in the Orient, and the fortunes of war had brought the Philippines under the United States flag. Our Government claimed a position of equality with the European Powers in the Far East and, under the direction of Hay, had entered into close co-operation with them there. The acquisition of Porto Rico, the control of Cuba, the cutting of the Panama Canal, assured predominance in the Caribbean. Almost unconsciously, the country had become a world power, and it was certain that political contacts with Europe must become more frequent and close, for the great European states were also world powers and their interests touched ours at many points. Economic and intellectual intercourse with Europe was intimate and constant ; political intercourse was henceforth inevitable. This fact had been realized by President Roosevelt, who insisted that responsibility must accompany power. So keen was his sense of responsibility that in 1905 and igo6 he took an active, albeit unguessed, part in the negotiations that led to the Algeciras Conference, which averted the threat of a European war. This was a crisis in which the United States had no direct interest, and one which concerned purely European states. Roose- velt participated in the negotiations merely because of his conviction that the United States must fulfil its duties to the rest of the world in the cause of peace. In such a cause he was willing to scrap the tradition of isolation. The war clouds of 1906, however, continued to hang low over Europe. The reconciliation of France and THE GREAT ADVENTURE 243 Great Britain, consummated in the Entente of 1904, had disturbed the Germans, who saw in it an encouragement to the French political renaissance and to the active foreign policy of the French Foreign Minister, Delcasse. They had hoped to break the Entente by raising the Moroccan issue, but failed. In 1907 they were still more disturbed by the Anglo-Russian reconciliation. It seemed to them that an iron ring was being drawn about Germany. They feared especially the development of an aggres- sive Russian policy in the Balkans that would destroy Germany’s ally, Austria, and cut off the road to the south-east. Once more, in 1911, they tried to break the Entente, now the Triple Entente, and again they failed. Counsels in Germany were evidently divided. There were those, such as the Chancellor, von Bethmann- Hollweg, an amiable but anaemic personality who hoped to find a solution in a peaceable understanding — especi- ally with the British, without whose help Russian plans in the Near East could not succeed. But there were others who insisted that Germany must precipitate a war at the first favourable moment, before Russia was ready. The aggressive spirit had been taught for a generation by the professors, it was rampant in military circles, and it had caught the naval officers. The temper of these groups, who doubtless did not represent exactly the ruling opinion of the nation, would have been a less serious factor, if it had not been sup- ported by the widespread conviction that the Entente was planning to close in on Germany. In this case, as so often, fear proved to be the mother of recklessness. Should the control of German policy be captured even temporarily by the firebrands, backed by a panicky public sentiment, the danger of a decision to risk every- thing on a sudden attack was very real. And because THE GREAT ADVENTURE 244 of the complexity of the diplomatic groupings, such an attack would mean a general European war. In England the peril was realized acutely, but the Government faced an unpleasant dilemma. The rapid development of German sea-power could not but be regarded as a threat to British security, which naturally led to the keenest sort of naval competition. Any slackening in British naval preparation would be fl5dng in the face of Providence. In view of the engagements which the British had made with France, which, however informal, were none the less morally binding, military preparation was also necessary. Such preparation, on the other hand, could only intensify the diplomatic crisis by increasing the fears of Germany and giving a lever to the German militarists who desired war. In Russia and in France military development was the order of the day. There were many who looked upon the general war as inevitable ; the Dual Alliance must get ready and must omit no step which might increase its diplomatic and military weight. Any other policy would lay those in control open to the charge of criminal negligence. But each step taken seemed to transform the Dual Alliance from a defensive to an offensive combination and inevitably stimulated the fears and the belligerence of Germany. Europe thus prepared for war, and as William Graham Sumner used to say, “ What you prepare for you get.” It is true that in 1913 the immediate danger seemed to pass when the efforts of Sir Edward Grey brought a pacific solution to the Balkan crisis. For a few months a detente in Anglo-German relations, assisted by the offer of British co-operation in German plans for the Bagdad Railway, appeared to provide a means for ending the conflict of alliances. But as the British Premier later THE GREAT ADVENTURE 245 wrote, the diplomats were conscious that they ” were skating on the thinnest of ice and that the peace of Europe was at the mercy of a chapter of unforeseen and unforeseeable accidents." ^ II Like Roosevelt, House was convinced that a European war must necessarily attain such proportions that even," part of the world would be touched, and that it was both the duty and the interest of the United States to do all in its power to avert it. The days had passed when America was isolated from the Eastern Hemisphere ; she had much to fear from European trouble and she could do much to appease it. Even before the inauguration of President Wilson, House planned a policy of co-operation which should include the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. He saw that the crux of the danger lay in the animosity of Germans and British, and he hoped that it might be allayed by getting the two countries to work towards a common end. Germany’s expansive energy, he thought, might be turned into more useful channels than Krupp factories and dreadnoughts. “ Jammy 22, 1913 : Martin lunched with us [Colonel House recorded]. ... I told him that I wanted to get Governor Wilson to let me bring about an understanding between Great Britain, this country, and Germany, in regard to the Monroe Doctrine. . . . “ I also told him that it would be my endeavour to bring about a better understanding between England and Germany ; that if England were less intolerant of Germany’s aspirations for expansion, good feeling could be brought about between them. I thought 'we could * Asquith, Genesis of the War, 166. 246 THE GREAT ADVENTURE encourage Germany to exploit South America in a legitimate way ; that is, by development of its resources and by sending her surplus population there ; that such a move would be good for South America and would have a beneficial result generally.” During the first year of the Wilson Administration, the pressure of domestic problems left the plan only half formed in House’s mind. But he kept turning it over, and, as occasion offered, he raised the subject with persons whose influence and information might prove useful. “ ApHl 23, 1913 : I have a letter from James Speyer [he wrote] asking me to meet at lunch downtown Count von Bemstorff, the German Ambassador, who has expressed a desire to know me. I never go downtown, and declined. . . . “ Afril 25, 1913 : James Speyer telephoned and again asked if I would lunch with the German Ambassador uptown instead of downtown, and I promised to do so. . . . " May 9, 1913 : I lunched at Delmonico’s with the German Ambassador, Count von Bemstorff, and Mr. Speyer. “ The Count talked rather more freely than I antici- pated a diplomat of his training would. He spoke of Mr. Bryan and of the different assistants in the State Department with a good deal of freedom. He also criticized ex-Secretary Knox and Huntington Wilson, his First Assistant. “ The most interesting part of his conversation was after lunch, when Mr. Speyer left us and Bemstorff and I walked down the Avenue alone. I suggested that it would be a great thing if there was a sympathetic under- standing between England, Germany, Japan, and the United States. Together I thought they would be able to wield an influence for good throughout the world. They could ensure peace and the proper development THE GREAT ADVENTURE 247 of the waste places, besides maintaining an open door and equal opportunity to everj'one everywhere. “ Mach to my surprise, he agreed with me. He said the understanding betiveen Germany and England was much better of late, and if they had some mutual field of endeavour he thought a good understanding could finally be brought about between them. He suggested that perhaps China was the most promising field at present for concerted action, for the United States could work there with Germany and England. ...” Two months later, in London, House discussed the broad lines of this plan with the American Ambassador. Page sympathized thoroughly with House’s scheme of utilizing the force of nations for purposes other than military or naval. “ It is a time,” he wrote to House, ” for some great constructive, forward idea — an idea for action. If the great world forces could, by fortunate events and fortunate combinations, be united and led to clean up the tropics, the great armies might gradually become sanitary police, as in Panama, and finally gradually forget the fighting idea and at last dis- solve. ...” But Page felt that the Europeans were too tradi- tionally minded to embark upon such a plan, which had in it something suggestive of the Secretariat of the League of Nations- “ On the Continent of Europe,” he wrote, “ the Kaiser is probably the foremost man. Yet he cannot think far beyond the provincial views of the Germans. In England, Sir Edward Grey is the largest- visioned statesman. Yet even he does not seem to have a definitely constructive mind.” House did not force his ideas upon the British at this time, but he discovered that in Sir Edward Grey he would deal with a man who may have lacked imagina- 248 THE GREAT ADVENTURE tion, but who was sincerely desirous of attempting any scheme that might lead towards the maintenance of peace. On July 3, 1913, Colonel House had lunch with Grey, Lord Crewe, and Page. “ We discussed the feeling between Germany and England. Sir Edward remarked that the great cause of antagonism between nations was the distrust each felt for the other’s motives. Before leaving this subject I told him of my luncheon with Count von Bemstorff, German Ambassador at Washington, and that I had been surprised to hear him say he believed that good feeling would soon come between England and Germany. My purpose in repeating this was to plant the seeds of peace.” On his return to the United States, House was caught in the swirl of appointments and the passage of the Federal Reserve Act. But whenever he had the opportunity, he returned to his study of the European problem. “ September i, 1913 : I have had some interesting conversations with Dumba,‘ particularly in regard to some phases of the political situation in south-eastern Europe. He was at one time Minister at Bucharest, and, of course, knows the Balkan situation thoroughly.” In November arrived Sir William Tyrrell, Grey’s secretary, with wEom House found it possible to discuss in aU candour every sort of international question. After arranging with T5T:rell the understanding as to Wilson’s Mexican policy and Panama tolls, the Colonel proceeded to impart his new plan, which he had formulated with some definiteness. The existing crisis he hoped to tide over by an understanding that would lead to a limitation ^ AiistrchHungarian. Ambassador. THE GREAT ADVENTURE 249 of armaments. If this succeeded, he would follow it up with the plan he had already suggested to Bem- storff — a co-operative policy of developing the waste places of the world. “ December 2, 1913 ; I told him [Tyrrell] the next thing I wished to do was to bring about an understanding between France, Germany, England, and the United States, regarding a reduction of armaments, both military and naval. I said it was an ambitious undertaking, but w^as so well w'orth while that I intended to try it. He thought it one of the most far-reaching and beneficent things that could be done. He thought if we continued as at present, ruin would eventually follow, and in the meanwhile it W'ould prevent us from solving the vexatious industrial problems w^e are all facing. He considered I had ‘ a good sporting chance of success.’ “ I asked him to suggest my procedure, and w’e discussed that at length. He thought I should go to Germany and see the Kaiser first, and afterwards the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance. He said I would find them responsive to the idea, but that the Minister of Marine, von Tirpitz, was a reactionary and largely responsible for the present German policy. He did not think it necessary for me to take any credentials. He advised having our Ambassador in Germany whisper to the Kaiser that I was ‘ the power behind the throne ’ in the United States. That if this were done, I would have to warn our Ambassador to tell official Berlin I did not care for ' fuss and feathers ' ; otherwise I would have red carpets laid for me all over Berlin. “ He thought I should proceed quietly and secretly, but should secure an audience with the Kaiser and say to him, among other things, that England and America ‘ had buried the hatchet ’ and there was a strong feeling that Germany should come into this good feeling and evidence their good intention by agreeing to stop build- 250 THE GREAT ADVENTURE ing an extravagant navy, and to curtail militarism generally. “ Sir William assured me that England would co- operate "with Germany cordially, and had been ready to do so for a long while. He saw no cause for difference between them. With England, United States, France, and Germany [agreed], we both thought the balance of the world would follow in line and a great change would come about. He said the Kaiser was a spectacular individual and partook more of French qualities than he did of German. He likened him to Roosevelt. “ Sir William promised to give me all the memoranda passed between Great Britain and Germany upon this question of disarmament, in order that I might see how entirely right Great Britain had been in her position.” Ten days later, House discussed the plan with President Wilson and received his approval. ” I might almost say he was enthusiastic,” wrote House to Page. It was decided that in the early summer the Colonel should go directly to Berlin and take the plan to the Kaiser. If he proved complaisant. House would go to England. During the vanter and spring he made his prepara- tions. In January he wrote to Gerard to make sure of the Kaiser’s plans ; he learned that Wilhelm II would he in Corfu in the late spring, that he would return to Potsdam, go on to Kiel for the races, then on a cruise in Nonvegian waters, and later to his estates on the Rhine.^ House chose the earliest moment available and cabled Gerard to arrange the interview for June, after the Kaiser’s return from Corfu. J House to Gerard, January i, 1914 ; Gerard to House, February 11, March 15, 1914. The matter is of historical interest, since it has been asserted that the Kaiser sailed to Norway as a blind to cover German war plans. It is clear that his itinerary was arranged long before the murder of the Archduke. THE GREAT ADVENTURE 251 The Colonel felt himself already in such close touch with the situation in Great Britain that he believed the chief task he must undertake would be a study of current German psychology and especially the character of William II. In January we find him taking lunch with Benjamin Ide \Wieeler and quietly extracting informa- tion. January i, 1914 ; We had a delightful time together. He is just back from Germany and has seen much of the Kaiser, not only this time but upon former visits. He visits him in the most informal manner and spends many hours with him and his family. He gave me nearly all the information I need regarding the Kaiser and his entourage. Wheeler is also a close friend of Roosevelf s, and I was interested in his comparison of the two men. He considers them very alike, particularly in regard to memory and impulsiveness, but they are dissimilar inasmuch as the Kaiser has a religious turn of mind and is more cultured in his manners. “ In order to obtain the information I desired, I had to disclose my object in questioning him ; and he en- couraged me to believe that I might have some chance of success in bringing the Kaiser around to an agreement for disarmament. He thought the Minister of Marine would be the obstacle, just as Sir William Tyrrell had pointed out. He said the Kaiser had told him that his object in building a navy was not to threaten England, but to add prestige to Germany’s commerce upon the seven seas. He had spoken of how impossible war should be between England and Germany, or, in fact, how utterly foolish any general European war would be. He thinks the coming antagonism is between the Asiatics and the Western peoples and that within twenty years the Western peoples \’^ recognize this and stand together more or less as a unit. " Wheeler told of how narrowly a general European war was averted last March over the Balkan embroglio, and how the Emperor thinks he saved the day by his 252 THE GREAT ADVENTURE suggestion of creating the State of Albania.^ The Kaiser told Wheeler that he had warned Russia if they attacked Austria, he would strike them immediately. The Kaiser also told him he felt kindly towards England and that he was Queen Victoria’s favourite grandchild. “ In his talks with the Kaiser, he said the Kaiserin seldom joined in the conversation, but would sit quietly knitting and only entered the discussion when it fell upon domestic problems. “ Another difierence between the Kaiser and T. R. was that the Kaiser was a good listener when necessary, and is courteous in doing so.” Colonel House spent most of the winter in Texas. But as soon as he returned to the East in March, and notwithstanding the time and effort he was giving to the Federal Reserve appointments, he continued prepara- tions for his European venture. In April he had long conferences with Irwin Laughlin, Counsellor of the American Embassy at St. James’s. ” April 9, 1914 : We fell to talking about my plan for decreasing armaments. Laughlin was three years First Secretary of the American Embassy at Berlin. During that time he talked with the German Chancellor regarding disarmament, and he did not believe there was one chance in a million of my getting Germany to consent to a naval holiday. “ I surprised him by telling him of the direct informa- tion I had of the Kaiser himself — ^none of which, though, was favourable to my plan, but rather coincichng with Laughlin’ s views. But what impressed him was the method I had in mind of accomplishing results. I ^ After the defeats of the Turkish army by the Balkan League in the autumn of Austria protested against the acquisition of any part of the Adriatic Ettoral by Serbia. A conference of the Great Powers was held at London* where Great Britain and Germany worked for a com- promise and where the independent State of Albania was created. Serbia acquired Macedonia* thus precipitating a quarrel with Bulgaria, THE GREAT ADVENTURE 253 explained my purpose not to take it up from a senti- mental or purely ethical viewpoint, but to try and prove that it would be of material advantage to Germany. “ I went into some detail as to giving ^ Germany a zone of influence in Asia Minor and Persia, and also lending a hope that they might be given a freer hand commercially in the Central and South American re- publics. I changed his views as to the desirability of making the effort, but he wanted time to think it over and promised to let me know his conclusions later. Laughlin knows the Germans well, and he told me of the difficulties of reaching the Emperor under right conditions. ... “ April 10, 1914 : Mr. and Mrs. Irwin Laughlin lunched with us. Laughlin and I went into my disarma- ment plan at some length. I used him as a dummy, as it were, knowing he would catch me if I tripped at any point. I discussed my intentions thoroughly, and talked to him as I would talk to the Kaiser were we to meet. “ After thinking of the matter overnight and hearing my plans more in detail, Laughlin believes I should make the effort. . . , “ April 16, 1914 : At half-past nine I left to go to the Borden Harrimans’ in order to meet the guests, since Mrs. Harriman had told them I would do so. Prince Munster, Prince Paul Troubetskoy and his wife. Ambassador Dumba, General Wood, and several others were there. I talked with Prince Munster for a while about the German Emperor, in order to get more informa- tion about him. . . . “ April 28,^ 1914 : I spoke to the President about what I was doing in regard to Germany and the Kaiser, and he remarked, ‘ You are preparing to make the ground fallow.’ I asked again whether he was certain that he wished me to go at this particular time. He replied, ‘ The object you have in mind is too important to neglect. . . “ May 7, 1914 ; ^ Hugh Wallace saw Count von Bemstorff and told him I was going to Germany on the THE GREAT ADVENTURE 254 sixteenth day of May. Von Bernstorff said the German Foreign Office had Mready informed him I was coming and had asked him to give them a report upon me, which he had sent. He said he intended sending another, which I thought was perhaps inspired by Wallace. ...” Thus Colonel House set forth on his extraordinary mission, a private American citizen whose only relevant title was “ personal friend of the President,” a single individual hoping to pull the lever of common sense that might divert the nations of the Old World from the track of war to that of peace. To inject himself success- fully into the core of the European maelstrom demanded as much courage as diplomatic deftness. These qualities he possessed, as well as a sense of proportion which caused him often to laugh at the stark humour of the odds against him. But the stake for which he played was tremendous. It was the peace of the world. If he failed no harm was done. And if he succeeded ! He called his mission the Great Adventure. Colonel House io the President American Embassy, Berlin May 29, 1914 Dear Governor : I was fairly well informed as to the situation here when I reached Germany. Prince Munster and the Count von Moltke were fellow-passengers, and I came to know von Moltke well.^ Munster is what we would call a reactionary, and I let him do all the talking. Von Moltke, on the con- trary, is perhaps the only noble in Germany who has a ^ Tills Count von Moltke was a nephew of the great Field-Marshal and a cousin of the German Chief of Staf during the invasion of Belgium anc France who was superseded by Falkenhayn after the failure of the Germar offensive* THE GREAT ADVENTURE 255 detached point of view and sees the situation as we do. He gave me valuable information, which merely tended to confirm my opinion as to the nearly impossible chance of bettering conditions. I have not seen the Kaiser, but have been invited to lunch at Potsdam on Monday. Just what opportunity there may be to talk with him is an uncertaint3^ . . . I have had long talks with von Jagow, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Admiral von Tirpitz. Jagow is a clever diplomat without much personality. Von Tirpitz is the father of the greater navy and is forceful and aggressive. Neither has ability of the highest order. I was told not to talk to von Tirpitz, because of his well-known opposition to such views as we hold ; but, finding that he is the most forceful man in Germany excepting the Kaiser, I concluded to go at him. We had an extremely interesting hour together, and I believe I made a dent. Not a big one, but sufficient at least to start a discussion in London. I am careful alw^ays not to involve you. Opinions and purposes I give as my own, and you come in no further than what may be assumed because of our rela- tions. The situation is extraordinary. It is militarism run stark mad. Unless someone acting for you can bring about a different understanding, there is some day to be an awful cataclysm. No one in Europe can do it. There is too much hatred, too many jealousies. When- ever England consents, France and Russia will close in on Germany and Austria. England does not want Germany wholly crushed, for she would then have to reckon alone with her ancient enemy, Russia ; but if Germany insists upon an ever-increasing navy, then England will have no choice. The best chance for peace is an understanding between England and Germany in regard to naval armaments, and yet there is some disadvantage to us by these two getting too close. It is an absorbing problem, and one of tremendous THE GREAT ADVENTURE 256 consequence. I wish it might be solved, and to the everlasting glory of your Administration and our Ameri- can civilization. Your faithful and affectionate E. M. House What Colonel House soon realized was that in Ger- many there was a sense of fear as well as aggressiveness, the fear of the man tortured by uncertainty and ready to jump at the throat of the first who seemed to move. Conscious of the enmity which it had aroused, Germany kept its revolver cocked and would let it off at the least whisper. “ May 27, 1914 : I had insisted before coming [re- corded House] that we should not be entertained. There are only a few people I desire to meet. However, the Gerards did not literally follow our desires and we had several people every day. On Tuesday they gave a dinner of twenty-four covers, at which were Admiral von Tirpitz, Minister of Marine, von Jagow, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambas- sador, and Count and Countess von Moltke, who were invited at our request. “Von Tirpitz and I left the dining-room together and ■we stood in one of the drawing-rooms and talked for an hour. He evidenced a decided dislike for the British, a dislike that almost amounted to hatred. One of the things that amused me most was his suggestion that the English ‘ looked down upon Germans and considered them their inferiors.' “ Von Tirpitz spoke of the anti-German feeling in the United States and cited our newspapers in evidence of it. He also spoke of Admiral Mahan’s articles which have a pro-British leaning. I assured him our news- papers did not indicate our real feeling, and asked him whether the press of Germany represented the feeling of the Germans towards us. He replied, ' Not at all,’ He THE GREAT ADVENTURE said the Government had absolutely no control over the German newspapers, but in England, he noticed, the English brought their papers around to the Government point of view whenever the situation required it. “ I spoke of the courage and character of the Presi- dent. This I illustrated by different incidents — one being his insistence in taking part in the funeral parade of the Vera Cruz sailors, and another his refusal to be intimidated or coerced into recognizing Huerta. I drew clearly the distinction between the President and Mr. Bryan. I wanted official Germany to know that if any international complications arose between our two coun- tries, they would have to deal with a man of iron courage and inflexible will. “ Von Tirpitz and I talked largely of armaments, I pleading for a limitation in the interest of international peace and he stating vigorously the necessity of Germany’s maintaining the highest possible order of military and naval organization. He disclaimed any desire for con- quest and insisted it wms peace that Germany wanted, but the way to maintain it was to put fear into the hearts of her enemies. “ I pointed out the danger in this programme, for, while Great Britain did not desire to see Germany crushed because it would leave her to reckon alone with her ancient enemy, Russia, at the same time she could not view with equanimity the ever-increasing naval strength of Germany combined with her large and efficient standing army. If it came to a decision as to whether Germany should be crushed or be permitted to have a navy sufficient to overcome British supremacy at sea, their policy would clearly be to let Germany go under. “ I thought an understanding could be brought about between Germany and England. He hoped so, but he did not trust England, because the English were not ‘ reliable.’ Von Tirpitz was the most anti-English of any of the German officials with whom I talked. I am giving my conversation with him very fully, for it 258 THE GREAT ADVENTURE indicates the general trend of my conversations with others. “ Among other things we did was to go to the Aviation Field and see what they were doing in that direction. I found it difficult to get any estimate of the aerial strength of Germany. One of the' airmen was brought up to the club b}’ the German Major in charge and introduced to us. He then w’ent up and did some spectacular flights for our benefit. He came directly over our heads and looped the loop several times. He performed all sorts of dangerous and curious manoeuvres. I was glad when he came down, for I was afraid his enthusiasm to please might result in his death. The Major told me that thirty-six had already been killed on that field. “ The airman was named Fokker, and he told me he W’as a Dutchman and had recently come from Holland at the request of the German Government.” Thus was Colonel House, before the war, given a glimpse of the aviator whose name was to become terribly familiar. IV Not without difficulty and the exercise of diplomatic adroitness, Ambassador Gerard had arranged that House should have a private talk with the Kaiser. Official Berlin protested. The Foreign Office was perfectly willing that the Colonel should receive the satisfaction of an interview, but they insisted that some member of the civil Government must be present. House was equally definite in his insistence that it must be a tete- a-tete or nothing. “ If that is not possible,” he had written Gerard, ” then please do not bother about it at all.” He wanted to be sure that the frankness of the conversation should not be impeded by official red-tape. Later he wrote : It was a blufl on my part, but I THE GREAT AD^XXTURE 259 declined to see him unless it could be arranged that I could see him alone.” Whate^^er the magic influence may have been, and House ascribes it to the diplomacy of Ambassador Gerard,^ the bluff accomplished its purpose, and Gerard finally received word that if he and House would come to Potsdam on June i, an occasion would be made for the latter to talk alone with the Kaiser. On that day took place the ceremonies of the Schrippenfesi,^ a gorgeous presentation of devotional militarism in the Prussian style, such as the Kaiser loved dearly. House and Gerard, in their black evening dress suits, provided a grotesque sombreness quite out of keeping with their surroundings — “ like two black crows,” as the Kaiser himself described them with more pungency than politeness. ” June I, 1914 ; Gerard and I [recorded House] set forth for Potsdam at half-past nine. We arrived too early and wandered about until nearly eleven, and then entered the Palace. We found ourselves to be the only guests invited to the Schrippenfest. ” We were taken through a beautiful sweep of rooms, running across the park front, until we came to a side entrance. Here we waited a few minutes until the ^ House wrote later, I cannot state too strongly my appreciation ol tlie part the Ambassador played in finessing with Wilhelmstrasse in order to bring about the desired result/* 2 The Schrippenfest, literally the ** Wliite Roll Feast ** (a Scknppe being a roll of white bread), was held annually on Whit-Monday for the model Battalion, in Potsdam. Traditionally it was the one occasion of the year when the common soldier received w’hite instead of black bread, and when he was also treated to such luxuries as meat courses, stewed prunfss* and wine. The feast was given by the Kaiser, %vho invited foreign military and naval attaches, ambassadors, and distinguished strangers* It was attended by the Kaiserin and the younger members of the imperial family* The outstanding feature of the ceremony was the Kaiser*s presence at the table, sitting m the midst of his troops, eating their white roils, and diinkmg from a glass already used by one of the common soldiers* 26 o THE GREAT ADVENTURE Kaiser was announced. He came up and shook hands and passed out with his suite into the park. We followed after the royal party, which consisted of the Emperor, the Empress, and the Princes and their wives. We were given a position near the royal family. “ After religious exercises came the parade, then the decorations were given, and aftenvards we went across to the other Palace, where the soldiers were having their lunch. During this time I was largely with Herr Zim- mermann, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Acting Secretary while von Jagow is absent [on his honeymoon]. I found him quite responsive to my ideas concerning a s^unpathetic understanding between Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. We discussed every phase of the present European situation. “ We lunched in the famous SheU Hall [“ probably the ugliest room in the world,” remarked Gerard].^ The table was crescent-shaped and was beautifully decorated. Gerard and I were seated directly opposite the imperial party. On my right was the Minister for War, General von Falkenhayn ; ^ the man to my left was some general from Saxony, but I did not catch his name. The Em- peror talked across the table with our party, mostly with General von Falkenhajm. . . . The food was delicious and the meal not long, perhaps fifty minutes. . . . “ I had cautioned Gerard before coming to Berlin not to use the title of ‘ Colonel ’ when referring to me or when introducing me after I arrived. This did not serve my purpose, for Bemstorff had cabled of my coming, so I became ‘ Colonel ’ immediately. Most of my time at luncheon was used in explaining to my neighbours the kind of Colonel I was — ^not a real one in the European sense, but, as we would say in America, a geographical one. My explanation finally reached Falkenha3m’s consciousness, but my neighbour from ^ The waEs of the room were composed of sea-shells which encrusted the plaster. ^ Falkenhajm became later Chief of Staf and directed the German oiensive of 191:6 against Verdun. FoUowing the failure to take Verdun, he was siifwwtM hv Hin/lA-nKiiTa’ THE GREAT ADVENTURE 261 Saxony was hopeiessh^ befuddled and continued until the last to discuss army technique. . . . “Afterwards we adjourned to one of the larger drawing-rooms, where I was presented to the Empress. We talked of Corfu, the beauty of Germany in the spring, and other generalities. When this formal ty was o\-er, the Kaiser’s Aide-de-Camp came to say that His Majesty . was ready to receive me on the terrace. . . . “ I found that he had all the versatility of Roosevelt with something more of charm, something less of force. He has what to me is a disagreeable habit of bringing his face very close to one when he talks most earnestly. His English is clear and well chosen, and, though he talks vehemently, yet he is too much the gentleman to monopo- lize conversation. It was give-and-take all the wa}" through. He knew what he wanted to say, so did I ; and since we bothtaikrapidly, the half-hour was quite sufficient. “ Gerard and Zimraermann stood in conversation some ten or fifteen feet away, quite out of hearing. At first I thought I w'ould never get His Majesty past his hobbies, but finally I drew him to the subject I had come to discuss. ... I found him much less prejudiced and much less belligerent than von Tirpitz. He declared he wanted peace because it seemed to Germany’s interest. Germany had been poor, she was now growing rich, and a few more years of peace would make her so. ‘ She was menaced on ever}" side. The bayonets of Europe w’ere directed at her,’ and much more of this he gave me. Of England he spoke kindly and admiringly. England, America, and Germany were kindred peoples and should draw closer together. Of other nations he had but little opinion. . . . “ He spoke of the folly of England forming an alliance with the Latins and Slavs, who had no s}Tnpathy with our ideals and purposes and who were vacillating and unreliable as allies. He spoke of them as being semi- barbarous, and of England, Germany, and the United States as being the only hope of advancing Christian civilization. . . . 262 THE GREAT ADVENTURE “ I thought Russia was the greatest menace to Eng- land, and it was to England’s advantage that Germany was in a position to hold Russia in check, and that Germany was the barrier between Europe and the Siam's. I found no difficulty in getting him to admit this. “ He spoke of the impossibility of Great Britain being a'ole to make a permanent and satisfactory alliance with either Russia or France. I told him that the English w'ere ver}" much concerned over his ever-growing navy, which, taken together with his enormous army, consti- tuted a menace ; and there might come a time when they would have to decide whether they ran more danger from him and his people making a successful invasion than they did from Russia, and the possibility of losing their Asiatic colonies. I thought when that point was reached, the decision would be against Germany. “ I spoke of the community of interests between England, Germany, and the United States, and thought if they stood together the peace of the world could be maintained. He assented to this quite readily. How- ever, in my opinion, there could be no understanding between England and Germany so long as he continued to increase his na\w. He replied that he must have a large navy in order to protect Germany’s commerce in an adequate way, and one commensurate with her gromng power and importance. He also said it was necessary to have a navy large enough to be able to defend themselves against the combined efforts of Russia and France.^ ^ In a memorandum made later, House recorded : I forgot to say that I asked tfae Kaiser why Germany refused to sign the * Bryan treaty * providing for arbitration and a ‘ cooling-oS period ’ of a year before hostili- ties could be inaugurated. He replied : ‘ Germany will never sign such a treaty. Our strength lies in being always prepared for war at a second's notice. We will not resign that advantage and give our enemies time to prepare." Had Germany signed this treaty, it would not have been possible for the United States to enter the war on the submarine issue until after the lapse of a twelvemonth, except on the ground that German use of sub- marines constituted acts of war against the United States. THE GREAT ADVENTURE 263 “ I asked when he would reach the end of his naval programme. He said this was well known, since they had formulated a policy for budding, and, when that was completed, there would be an end ; that Great Britain had nothing to fear from Germany, and that he personally was a friend of England and was doing her incalculable service in holding the balance of power against Russia. “ I told him that the President and I thought perhaps an American might be able to better compose the diffi- culties here and bring about an understanding with a view to peace than any European, because of their distrust and dislike for one another. He agreed to this suggestion. I had undertaken the work and that was my reason for coming to Germany, as I wanted to see him first. After iea\ung Germany it was my purpose to go directly to England, w’here I should take the matter up with that Government as I had done with him. “ I explained that I expected to feel my way cautiously and see what could be accomplished, and, if he wished it, I would keep him informed. He asked me to do this, and said letters would reach him ‘ through our friend Zimmermann here in the Foreign Office.' . . . “ I talked to the Kaiser on the terrace for thirty minutes and quite alone. Gerard and Zimmermann stood some ten feet away. There was a special train scheduled to leave Potsdam at three o’clock, and the time was growing perilously near and everyone was becoming uneasy. The Empress herself came upon the terrace at one time for the purpose of breaking up our conversation, and, prior to that, she had sent one of her sons for the same purpose. Neither, however, approached us, for they saw the earnest and animated manner in which we were talking. She finally sent the Grand Chamberlain, who approached in a halting and embarrassed way, and told the Emperor of the difficulty. He scarcely noticed him and dismissed him curtly and continued our conversation for at least ten minutes more. 264 THE GREAT ADVENTURE “ By this time I had said all I cared to and was ready to leave myself ; therefore I stopped talking and was Very quiet in order to indicate that I, at least, was throiigk This had the desired effect and we bade each other '"good-bye. Gerard told me afterwards that there was the greatest amount of interest displayed concerning what the Kaiser and I were discussing, and that all Berlin was talking of the episode and •wondering what the de\il we had to say to each other for so long and in such an animated way.” V Colonel House left for Paris in the evening that fol- lowed his memorable interview with the Kaiser. He •^vas evidently well pleased with the reception that his plan had met, for although the Emperor made no promises, he left House with sufficient encouragement tc proceed in taking up matters with the British. “ I am glad to tell you,” he wrote Wilson from Paris, “ that I have been as successful as I anticipated. ... I am very happy over what has been accomplished and I am eagei to get to London to see what can be done there. I have a feeling that the soil will be much more fallow.” What impressed House chiefly in Germany was nol so much a will to war based upon any definite plan but an unreasoning nervousness which might at anj moment result in a reckless attack, and a complete inability to approach the problem with intelligent poise and capacity for compromise. “ I find that both England and Germany [he wrote the President] have one feeling in common, and that ie fear of one another. Neither wants to be the first tc propose negotiations, but both are agreed that thej should be brought about, though neither desires to make the necessary concessions.” THE GREAT ADVENTURE 265 In the meantime President Wilson, whose attitude towards the European situation had originally been not far from indifferent, began to appreciate the possibilities of the Great Adventure. He VTote House of the thrill of pleasure he experienced on receiving the Colonel’s report and of his confidence that House had begun a great thing and was canning it through in just the right way with characteristic tact and quietness. In Paris discussions proved to be impossible. France was caught by a Cabinet crisis and the capital would think of nothing but the shooting of Calmette by Madame Caillaux and all the political consequences thereof. Fol- lowing his custom when conditions seemed unpropitiou.<, House retired into his shell, whence for a few days he continued merely to observe. “ June 8, 1914 ; I have spent a quiet week in Paris, my most arduous duty being to dodge Americans and others wanting to see me. We have had many invitations to dinner and luncheon, all of which have been declined, although one came from our Ambassador. " I called on Herrick,^ it ha^ing been understood that I would do so when I w’as ready to talk with him. Mr. Roosevelt had been with him the day before, and he told me something of T. R.’s mental and physical actriities. Herrick made the prediction that T. R. w'as getting ready to go back home and to give the Democrats a thoroughly unhappy time. I replied that I was sure he could do nothing that would distress us so much as it would his fellow-Republicans. “ Herrick read passages from his forthcoming book upon rural credits and told me that within a short time he would have it finished and ready for publication. He would then like to return to America. ... “ June 12, 1914 [London] : I came from Paris on the 9th. I lunched with Page on the loth and he ^ Tlie American Ambassador. 206 THE GREAT ADVENTURE lunched with me yesterday, so we have had an exchange of ideas. He was' kind enough to say that he considered my work in Germany the most important done in this geiieration. I thought before making an estimate we would have to see how far I could get mth it here. He replied I would find this Government very sympathetic and he felt a beginning was as good as accomplished. We decided to approach Sir Edward Grey first and leave it to his judgment whether to bring in Asquith and the King ” House arrived in London at the height of the season, and there was no possibility of securing political results with speed. Social affairs held sway, and it was not until a full week after the Colonel’s arrival that Am- bassador Page could find a free day for the lunch with Sir Edward. In the meantime House followed his habit of seeing people of interest and information — chatting with Sir Horace Plunkett and Lord Bryce, lunching at the Embassy with Roosevelt and other notables, and meeting such varied types as Lord Curzon and Henry James, the Bishop of London and John Sargent, dining at Burdett-Coutts’s palatial home in Piccadilly and dis- cussing its art treasures and manuscripts, and reckoning the wealth of nations with Sir George Paish, of the Statist. On June 17, House, Sir Edward Grey, Sir William Tyrrell, and Page had lunch together. The Colonel told of his visit to Germany and his proposition to the Kaiser. “ Sir Edward was visibly impressed [recorded Colonel House], and we discussed every phase of the European situation, particularly as it applied to Germany and England. He agreed with me that the French states- men had given up all idea of revenge and of the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine, and that they would be content with the position of France as it now is. . . . THE GREAT ADVENTURE 267 “ We spoke of the difficulties of bringing about negotiations. T suggested that the Kaiser, he, and 1 meet at Kiel in some way ; but this was not gone into further. " The relations between Russia and the British Empire were talked of freely and with the utmost candour. Sir Edward explained that Great Britain and Russia touched at so many points in the world that it was essential for them to have some sort of good understanding. “ I thought they should permit Germany to aid in the development of Persia. He said it might be a good move to play the one against the other, and yet the Germans were so aggressive it might be dangerous. Sir Edw’ard was ver\^ fair concerning the necessitv for Germany to maintain a navy commensurate with her commerce, and sufficient to protect herself from Russia and France. I told of the militant war spirit in Germany and of the high tension of the people, and I feared some spark might be fanned into a blaze. I thought Germany w’ould strike quickly when she moved ; that there would be no parley or discussion ; that when she felt that a difficulty could not be overcome by peaceful negotiation, she would take no chances but would strike. I thought the Kaiser himself and most of his immediate advisers did not want war, because they wished Germany to expand commercially and grow in wealth, but the army was militaristic and aggressive and ready for war at any time. “ I told him there was a feeling in Germany, which I shared, that the time had come when England could protect herself no longer merely because of her isolated position ; that modem inventions had so changed conditions that the Germans believed she would be within striking distance before long, just as were her Continental neighbours. Sir Edward replied, ‘ The idea, then, is that England will be in the same position as the Continental Powers.’ I said, ' Quite so.’ “ I gave my opinion of the German aerial strength and what they might accomplish even now. I explained 268 THE GREAT ADVENTURE the part we desired to play as pacificators and why I felt we could do this better than they could do it them- selves. I warned him that the present Chancellor of Germany might go at any time and be replaced by von Tirpitz/and a solution would then be a much more difficult undertaking. “ I feel that my visit has been justified, even if nothing more is done than that already accomplished. It is difficult for me to realize that the dream I had last year is beginning to come true. I have seen the Kaiser, and now the British Government seem eager to cariy^ on the discussion. It is hard to realize, too, that every Government in the world may be more or less affected by the moves we are making and every human being may be concerned in the decisions reached from day to day. “ I told Sir Edward the Kaiser had said when his name wns mentioned that he. Sir Edward, had never been on the Continent and therefore could not understand Germany. Sir Edward replied that while this was not literally true, it was nearly so ; a great many years ago he went to India and crossed the Continent of Europe, though practically without stopping, and the other day he was in Paris with the King for several days.” Colonel House to the Peesident London, June 17, 1914 Dear Governor : ... I found Sir Edward a willing listener and very frank and sympathetic. I am to stay the week-end with Tyrrell, and lunch with Sir Edward next Wednesday. In the meantime he will doubtless discuss the matter with his colleagues. . . . I find here everything cluttered up with social affairs, and it is impossible to work quickly. Here they have their thoughts on Ascot, garden parties, etc., etc. In Germany their one thought is to advance industrially and to glorify war. In France I did not find the war THE GREAT ADVESTCRE 269 spirit dominant. Their statesmen dream no longer of revenge and the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine. The people do, but those that govern and know, hope only that France may continue as now. Germany already exceeds her in population by nearly fifty per cent., and the disparity increases 3’ear by year. It is this new spirit in France which fills me with hope, and which I used to-day to some advantage. France, 1 am sure, will welcome our efforts for peace. Your faithful and affectionate E, M. House Loxcox, Jtme 26, 1914 My dear Friend : I had a very interesting luncheon with Sir Edward Grey Wednesday". The other guests were the Lord Chancellor,^ the Earl of Crewe, and Sir William T^'rreU. Page had to go to Oxford to take his degree and could not be with us. I did not go into the details of my trip to Gennany again, for I took it for granted that Sir Edward had given them to both Haldane and Crewe. I gave it as my opinion that international matters could be worked out to advantage in much the same way as individuals would work out private affairs, and I thought that most of the misunderstandings were brought about by false reports and mischief-makers, and if the principals knew of the facts, what appeared to be a difficifit situation became easy of solution. I illustrated this by mentioning the service Sir William Tyrrell performed in America last autumn and the consequent cordial relations between our two countries. The conversation lasted two hours, and it was agreed that it should be renewed at a later date. In the mean- time, the general idea was accepted; that is, that a frank and open policy should be pursued between all the parties at interest. ’ Lord Haldane. 2/0 THE GREAT ADVENTURE They told me that there was no written agreement between England, France, and Russia, and their understanding was one merely of sympathy and the determination to conserve the interests of one another. . . . Sir Edward was in a most delightful mood and paid you a splendid tribute. At our last meeting, he said It was his purpose, at the proper time, in the House of Commons to say publicly what he thought you had done for international morals.^ I breakfasted with Lloyd George yesterday and had a most interesting conversation with him. I found him peciiliarh'' ill-informed regarding America and its in- stitutions. I will tell you more of this when we meet. I am lunching with the Prime Minister on Thursday of next week, and I will write you again when anything further of importance follows. . . . Your faithful and affectionate E. M. House House not merely emphasized the negative aspect of the problem, the necessity of removing the factors that threatened war in Europe, but also urged the importance of a positive policy of international co-operation with a constructive purpose. It was the same plan he had discussed with Page and Bernstorff, a plan designed to bring the Great Powers of the world into a general undertaking for the development and protection of the backward regions of the world, and it contained the germ of the mandatory scheme later worked out in the League of Nations. He suggested the plan one cool evening as he sat with Sir Cecil Spring-Rice and Sir William Tyrrell before the open fire in Tyrrell’s country home. Spring-Rice and Tyrrell approved, and House carried his plan to Grey. * A reference to the repeal of the Panama tolls exemption. 271 THE GREAT ADVENTURE Colonel House to the President London, June 26, 1914 Dear Governor: There is another matter I have taken up, which I hope may have your approval. I have suggested that America, England, France, Germany, and the other money-lending and developing nations, have some sort of tentative understanding among themselves for the purpose of establishing a plan by which investors on the one hand may be encouraged to lend money at reasonable rates and to develop, under favourable terms, the waste places of the earth, and on the other hand to bring about conditions by which such loans may be reasonably safe. I suggested that each of these countries should tell its people that in the future usurious interest and con- cessions which involve the undoing of weak and debt- involved countries would no longer be countenanced ; that the same rule must hereafter prevail in such invest- ments as is now maintained in all civilized lands in regard to private loans. I brought this matter up at luncheon on Wednesday, and Grey, Haldane, and Crewe were equally cordial in their discussion of it. I told them I wanted to get their views so that they might be laid before you when I returned. If this can be brought about, it will not only do away with much of the international friction which such things cause, but it will be a step forward towards bringing about a stable and healthful condition in those unhappy countries which are now misgoverned and exploited both at home and abroad. Your faithful and devoted E. M. House When Colonel House put a project before President Wilson, he did not expect affirmative commendation. He evidently took the President’s silence for consent. THE GREAT ADVENTURE k>r, as he once said, “ If the President did not object, I kni-w that it vras safe to go ahead, for he rarely agreed in wrtrds ; while if he disagreed, he always expressed IiinisehV With House the opposite was true; we find nuiny phrases, in liis memoranda, such as “ I showed by my silence that I did not agree.” In the present case, receiving no dissenting cable fr(»m Wilson, the Colonel proceeded to elaborate his plan. On July 3 he gathered the American Ambassadors to St. James’s and Italy, the British x\mbassador to the United States, and Sir William Tyrrell. Spring-Rice had prepared a memorandum for Sir Edward Grey, giving the main points of House’s proposal, so that the Foreign Office might be fully informed of its bearing. Colonel House to the President London, July 4, 1914 My dear Friend : ... Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, Sir William Tyrrell, Walter Page, and Thomas Nelson Page, who is now here, took lunch with me yesterday to go into a more detailed discussion. . . . Tyrrell told me that Sir Edward Grey was deeply interested [in the suggestion] and approved entirely its general purpose, and that you could count upon this Government’s co-operation. It was the general consensus of opinion that a great deal of friction in the future would be obviated if some such understanding could be brought about in this direction, and that it would do as much as any other one thing to ensure international amity. The idea, of course, is based entirely upon your Mobile speech, and it is merely that we are trying to mould something concrete from what you have already announced in general as your policy. I suggested that u Ka fA VoAn +tif» matter absolutely confidential THE GREAT ADVENTURE 273 until after I had talked it out with you and you had decided how best to bring ail the other Governments into agreement, if at ail. I do not think it trise to have it known that England was the first to accept the proposal. Tyrrell thought that after we had worked out a plan here which was acceptable to this Government, I could take it to you for your approval and further suggestion. You could then, if your judgment approved, take it to the other Governments through Jusserand — ostensibly because he is the dean of the Diplomatic Corps at Washington, but really because the Central and South American republics would feel more kindly towards a proposal coming from a Latin nation. Tyrrell, Spring-Rice, and I meet again on Wednesday to bring the matter into final form. Page may or may not be present. I think perhaps he had better not be, for the reason that it •would lend something of an official character to it, which we wish to avoid. I touched lightly upon this subject to the Kaiser and I feel sure he, too, -will approve. This was fortunate, for the reason that it can be said it was brought to his attention first. Your faithful and affectionate E. M. House P.S. — ^As Page puts it, this is a concrete example of what may be accomplished if a better international understanding can be brought about. Sir Edward Grey’s personal response to the sugges- tions of House was enthusiastic, for he was as sincerely anxious to do all that lay in his power to convince Germany of the peaceful intentions of the British, as he was to lay the foundations for a permanent system of international co-operation. He may or may not have realized that quick action was desirable. Unfortunately quick action did not seem possible. He had to consider 274 THE GREAT ADVEKTURE the sensibilities of the French and Russians, and Tyrrell reported to House that Grey was meditating methods of coming into touch with the Germans without offending the other members of the Entente. Such were the vices of the pre-war system of alliances which made impossible straightforward conversations. Grey was evi- dently not ■willing to go to Kiel, as House had suggested. Furthermore, the major interest of the Cabinet lay in the Irish crisis, and it w’as difficult to persuade them that the international situation demanded immediate attention if the explosion were to be prevented. House chafed at the delay, but philosophically con- tinued his round of social engagements which might later be turned to diplomatic advantage. Sidney Brooks, of the Times, asked him whether he wished to meet “ politicians or gentlemen,” and it was with him that House breakfasted with Lloyd George. “ June 25, 1914 : Sidney Brooks called at nine o’clock this morning [recorded House], and we wnnt to the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s for breakfast. We were a trifle late and Lloyd George was waiting for me. There were also at breakfast Governor Clifford of the Gold Coast country, and Lloyd George’s daughter. It was a most informal affair, each of us going to a side table and helping himself to whatever desired, as is the usual English custom. The choice of food consisted of fried sole, sausage, ham, eggs, fruit, coffee and tea. George ate a very hearty breakfast. ...” A week later he lunched with the Prime Minister and Mrs. Asquith. July 2, 1914 : After the ladies left the table, Asquith asked me to come and sit by him so that we might talk, which we did earnestly for fifteen or twenty THE GREAT ADVENTURE 275 minutes. I did nearly all the talking. We first discussed the merits of Cabinet officers sitting in Parliament or Congress, as the case may be. ... I expressed the feeling that it was better they should have seats, and he also was inclined to this view. ... I felt very much at home in London now, for the reason that his Government was being abused in exactly the same terms and by the same sort of people as were abusing the Wilson Adminis- tration in the United States. This amused him. I thought the purposes of the Liberal Government and of the Democratic Party were quite similar ; that we were striving for the same end, but if the Conservatives of the two countries had their way, the end would probably be that many of them would be stripped of their wealth and hanged to lamp-posts. He agreed to this. “ Mr. Asquith cast the usual slur upon Mr. Bryan. I explained why the President had taken him into his Cabinet. He understood that the President had acted wisely and yet he considered it extremely unfortunate that the necessity existed. This is the usual comment I hear everywhere, in Germany, in France, and here. They do not do Mr. Bryan justice, but it is absolutely useless to fight his battles, because in doing so you discredit the purpose you are striving for.” VI While House waited for Grey to give some definite word which he might pass on to the Kaiser, the spark was struck that ignited the pile of combustible material which the diplomatic conflict of a decade had heaped up. On June 28 the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir- apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was mur- dered by a Serb nationalist in Serajevo, chief city of Bosnia. Presumably few Englishmen had ever heard of the Archduke and fewer still could locate the pro- vincial capital on a map, yet such was the diplomatic net in which Europe was caught that within six weeks 2;6 THE GREAT ADVENTURE Britibh sjldiers were meeting death on the Belgian border. The nev.s of the Archduke’s assassination reached London at th.e iieighi of the Irish crisis and the feminist agitation, and it created no more audible effect than a tenor solo in a boiler-shop. Some days later the Foreign Secretan,' expressed a sense of anxiety as to the situation in South-eastern Europe, but domestic politics continued to hold the attention of the Cabinet. In Berlin the danger of a puiitical crisis was openly discussed in the papers, and privately the sanction of the German Government was given to Austria for any retaliator}" and repressive measures that Vienna might choose to put into effect against Serbia. But apparently there was little suspicion that the carte blanche so carelessly vouchsafed would end in world war and the destruction of the Empire. The higher officials of the army and navy were not recalled to Berlin ; the Foreign Secretary remained on his honey- moon ; plans for the Kaiser's cruise were not interrupted. Ambassador Gerard wrote cheerfully to House of his return to the United States in August. Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House Berlin, July 7, 1914 My dear Colonel : . . . Have been on A.’s yacht at Kiel, and Mrs. Gerard is still there. I came up for our Colony celebra- tion of the 4th of July. Dined with the Kaiser and lunched with von Tirpitz before the news of the murder of Franz Ferdinand came. They were both most enthusiastic about you. Von Tirpitz thanked me for giving him the opportunity to meet you. We have about decided to go to U.S.A., sailing August 12th on V aterland—and I shall certainly report to you, wherever you are, before my return. THE GREAT ADVENTURE 277 Kaiser had asked me to sail a race on his racing yacht with him at Kiel, but the murder in Bosnia prevented my thus spending a day \rith him. Tennis is responsible for this almost illegible hand- writing. When do you sail ? . . . Berlin is as quiet as the grave. . . . Yours ever James W. Gerard VTiat more sinister, in the light of after-events, than the last sentence: “Berlin is as quiet as the grave.” It was the eve of Armageddon. Ironically enough, precisely at this moment when Austria planned her attack upon Serbia, and Gennany blindly approved, while the wheels of war were already being geared, the British Foreign Office made definite albeit rather belated response to the suggestions of House. On July 3 the Colonel heard from Tyrrell that Grey wanted him to let the Kaiser know of the peaceable sentiments of the British in order that further negotia- tions might follow. House at once wrote a long letter to His Imperial Majesty. Colonel House to the President London, July 3, 1914 My dear Friend : . . . Tyrrell brought word to me to-day that Sir Edward Grey would like me to convey to the Kaiser the impressions I have obtained from my several discussions with this Government, in regard to a better understanding between the nations of Europe, and to try and get a reply before I leave. Sir Edward said he did not wish to send anything official or in writing, for fear of offending French and Russian sensibilities in the event it should become known. He thought it was one of those things that had best be done informally and unofficially. 278 THE GREAT ADVENTURE He also told Page that he had a long talk with the German Ambassador here in regard to the matter and that he had sent messages by him directly to the Kaiser. So you see things are moving in the right direction as rapidly as we could hope. Your faithful and affectionate E. M. House Colonel House to the Kaiser American Embassy, London July 7, 1914 Hjs Imperial Majesty, Emperor of Germany/ King of Prussia, Berlin, Germany. Sir : Your Imperial Majesty will doubtless recall our conversation at Potsdam and that with the President’s consent and approval I came to Europe for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not it was possible to bring about a better understanding between the Great Powers, to the end that there might be a continuation of peace, and later a beneficent economic readjustment, which a lessening of armaments w^ould ensure. Because of the commanding position Your Majesty occupies, and because of your well-known desire to maintain peace, I came, as Your Majesty knows, directly to Berlin. I can never forget the gracious acceptance of the general purpose of my mission, the masterly exposition of the world-wide political conditions as they exist to-day, and the prophetic forecast as to the future which Your Majesty then made. I received every reasonable assurance of Your 1 Tlie Kaiser was " German Emperor and not Emperor of Germany/^ He always aspired to ttie latter title, wMcL the jealousy of the German Princes forbade. Is this unconscious or intentional flattery on the part of Colonel House ? On the copy of the letter is an endorsement in House's handwriting : I wrote thk letter and submitted it to Irwin Laughlin, Counsellor of the Embassy, and he advised its stilted style, which I very much dislike.— E. M. H.*' THE GREAT ADVENTURE 279 Majesty’s cordial approval of the President’s purpose, and I left Germany happy in the belief that Your Majesty’s great influence would be throvm in behalf of peace and the broadening of the world’s commerce. In France I tried to reach the thoughts of her people in regard to Germany and to find what hopes she nursed. Ikly conclusion upon leaving was that her statesmen have given over all thought of revenge, or of recovery of the two lost provinces. Her people in general still have hopes in both directions, but her better-informed rulers would be quite content if France could be sure of her autonomy as it now exists. It was then, Sir, that I came to England and with high hopes, in which I have not been disappointed. I first approached Sir Edward Grey, and I found him sympathetic to the last degree. After a two hours' conference, we parted with the understanding that w^e should meet again within a few’ days. This I inferred to mean that he wished to consult with the Prime Minister and his colleagues. At our next conference, which again lasted for two hours, he had, to meet me, the Lord Chancellor, Earl Crewe, and Sir William T37rrell. Since then I have met the Prime Minister and practically every important member of the British Government, and I am convinced that they desire such an understanding as will lay the foundation for permanent peace and security. England must necessarily move cautiously, lest she offend the sensibilities of France and Russia ; but, with the changing sentiment in France, there should be a gradual improvement of relations between Germany and that country which England will now be glad to foster. While much has been accomplished, yet there is something still to be desired in order that there may be a better medium created for an easy and frank exchange of thought and purposes. No one knows better than Your Majesty of the unusual ferment that is now going on throughout the world, and no one is in so fortunate 2Vj THE GREAT ADVENTURE a position to bring about a sane and reasonable under- standing among the statesmen of the Western peoples, to the end that our civilization may continue unin- terrupted. V'hile this communication is, as Your Majesty knows, quite unofficial, yet it is written in sympathy with the well-known view’s of the President, and, I am given to understand, with the hope from His Britannic Majesty’s Government that it may bring a response from Your Majesty which may permit another step forward. Permit me, Sir, to conclude by quoting a sentence from a letter wliich has come to me from the President : " Your letter from Paris, w'ritten just after coming from Berlin, gives me a thrill of deep pleasure. You have, I hope and believe, begun a great thing and I rejoice with all my heart.” I have the honour to be. Sir, with the greatest respect, Your Majesty’s Very obedient servant Edward M. House Thus W’as a last opportunity given to the Kaiser, who had the assurance of a disinterested outsider that if Germany sincerely desired peace she would have the active assistance of the United States and the co- operation of Great Britain. It was a definite answer to the allegation that Grey’s policy aimed at the encircle- ment and isolation of the Germans. Alas ! by the time Colonel House’s letter reached Germany, Wilhelm II was already on his cruise in Nonvegian waters whence he was recalled by the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and the war-clouds that immediately gathered. The Great Adventure had ended in failure. But House’s attempt to prevent the war was perhaps less barren of consequences than superficial consideration would suggest. His experience during these months in Europe that ended with the sudden descent of the THE GREAT ADVENTURE 281 horror he feared, taught him the need of international organization and confirmed his belief in the necessit}' of some positive purpose to be followed by this organiza- tion. He was already, in essence, an advocate of a league of nations, and his influence with Wilson in tills respect was to be an historical factor of vital importance. Among House’s papers there is a significant memorandum which he made of a conversation with the President soon after the beginning of the war. “ August 30, 1914 : I explained my plan about the backward nations and how enthusiastically it was received by the British Government, and how much they thought it would do toward bringing about a better understanding between the Great Powers. I believed if we had had an opportunity to put this into effect, in all human probability such a war as this would not have occurred — because with the Powers meeting at regular intervals, and with such a concrete example of the good that might be accomplished by concerted action, a conflagration such as was now’ going on would have been impossible.” Note. — ” ‘ The visit of Colonel House to Berlin and London in the spring of 1914,’ Emperor William re- marked to me at Doom, ‘ almost prevented the World War.’ ” — George Sylvester Viereck. CHAPTER X WILSON AND THE WAR He §0€S even fnither than I in his condemnation of Germany’s part :ti this war. . , . Extract frora D:ary Colonel House ^ August 30, 1914 I C OLONEL HOESE sailed on July 21 and arrived in Boston eight days later. Immediately before he left, word was carried to him that the British Foreign Office had awakened to the serious character of the international situation. “ July 20 , 1914 : Tyrrell brought me another message from Sir" Edward Grey, which was to the effect that he wished me to know before I sailed that the Austro- Serbian situation was giving him grave concern.” The forebodings wliich the Colonel had experienced in Berlin were indeed in process of realization. On July 23, Austria sent to Serbia an ultimatum designed to provoke war, and five days later, brushing aside the Serbian reply as unsatisfactory, began the bombardment of Belgrade. The civil rulers of Germany appreciated suddenly the peril of the path down which they were being dragged by their Austrian ally and their own military clique ; stupidly, they refused to accept the conference suggested by Grey, which would have per- mitted a cooling-off period ; and as the crisis intensified with the mobilization of Russia in support of Serbia, the army leaders seized control at Berlin. As House WILSON AND THE WAR 283 had prophesied, they wasted no time but struck im- mediateh". Diplomatic and military complexities pro- duced this paradox ; that a Russo-German war set in motion by an Austro-Serbian quarrel must begin with a German attack upon France, prefaced by the cynical and brutal onslaught upon Belgium. Great Britain, committed to the defence of Belgium by legal, and to that of France by moral, engagements, impelled by her own national interest, could not stand aside. It was the general war. House reached Boston and went up to the North Shore while the issue of the crisis was yet undetermined. He still hoped that the assurances he had sent William II of British good feeling might strengthen the Kaiser’s peaceful inclination, and that England and Germany might work together for a pacific solution, as thet^ had in 1913. If only the British had been less deliberate in their consideration of House’s proposals, an under- standing might have been reached before the murder of the Archduke. Colonel House to the President Pride’s Crossing, ^Massachusetts July 31, 1914 Dear Governor ; When I was in Germany, it seemed clear to me that the situation, as far as a continuation of peace was con- cerned, was in a very precarious condition ; and you will recall my first</